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THE CONSTITUTION AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT:
TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES FIFTY
YEARS AFTER MARSH V. ALABAMA
Steven Siegel*
This Article considers the application of the Supreme Court's state-ac-
tion theory to residential commmunity associations (RCAs), a form of hous-
ing and community governance that has experienced extraordinary growth
in recent years. Fewer than 500 RCAs were in existence in the United States
before 1960. In the early 1990s, it was estimated that 32 million Americans
lived in 150,000 RCAs. A continuing boom in RCA construction has led to
predictions that twenty-five to thirty percent of Americans will be living in
RCAs by early in the next century. Steven Siegel argues that this trend,
although largely unnoticed, carries significant implications for the structure
of our government, the delivery of traditional public services, and the avail-
ability of constitutional protections.
Many RCAs exercise powers traditionally associated with local govern-
ment. Such powers may be extensive, including the ownership of streets and
parks; the regulation of land use and home occupancy; the delivery of ser-
vices such as refuse collection, street maintenance, and security; and the as-
sessment and collection of mandatory fees that may be considered the func-
tional equivalent of real estate taxes. Although the traditional view of RCAs
is that each homeowner consents to the regime or chooses to reside else-
where, Siegel rejects this view and suggests instead that RCAs are the prod-
uct of forces other than consumer choice, including local government land-
use policies and fiscal pressure on local governments leading to the privat-
ization of local government services. Because of the traditional view, RCAs
rarely have been deemed state actors subject to the requirements of the
Constitution. As private entities, RCAs regulate behavior in a way that is
anathema to traditional constitutional strictures.
As with company towns earlier this century, RCAs pose a threat to the
constitutional rights of millions of Americans. This threat warrants a princi-
pled judicial response. Siegel assesses four established theories of state ac-
1997-98 Law Clerk, Hon. Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
New Jersey. B.A., Columbia College, 1978; M.S., Columbia University, 1981; J.D.,
New York Law School, 1992; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1997. The
opinions expressed in this Article are solely my own and are in no way connected to
my official duties as a law clerk employed by the Judiciary of the State of New Jersey.
I am grateful to my wife, Deborah Flynn, for her typing assistance and for her constant
support and encouragement.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
tion and argues that although many RCAs could be considered state actors
by operation of one or more of these theories, a more comprehensive and
systematic approach to state action should be developed to evaluate RCAs.
Siegel provides an approach that accounts for the special characteristics of
the RCA form and the legal and political environment in which the RCA
operates.
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Many people in the United States live in company-owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are
free citizens of their State and country .... There is no more
reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for
curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.'
In all probability, residential community associations account
for the most significant privatization of' local government
responsibilities in recent times ... 
The privatization of [local] government in America is the'
most important thing that's happening, but we're not focused
on it. We haven't thought of it as government yet.3
I. BACKGROUND: THE EMERGENCE OF THE RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION AS THE DOMINANT FORM OF NEW HOUSING IN THE UNITED
STATES
One in eight Americans lives in a residential community association
(RCA),4 a form of housing and private-community governance that encom-
passes condominiums,5 housing cooperatives,6 and planned single-family
' Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
2 U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SYSTEM? 18 (1989).
3 JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 185 (1991) (quoting
Gerald Frug, professor of local government law at Harvard University).
' The term "residential community association" is used by some authorities to refer
to condominiums, housing cooperatives, and planned single-family home developments.
See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 3, 9-10. Other terminology employed by
various authorities includes: "common interest development," see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1351(a) (West Supp. 1997); "community association," see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 468.431 (West 1991); "common interest community," see, e.g., UNIF. COMMON IN-
TEREST OWNERSHIP AcT (1986); "common interest realty association," see, e.g., AMERI-
CAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, COMMON INTEREST REALTY ASSOCIA-
TIONS 1 (1992).
5 In a condominium, a homeowner holds title to a residential unit (sometimes just
the interior of an apartment) and to a proportional undivided interest in the common
spaces of an entire condominium property. A condominium association manages the
common spaces but does not hold title to any real property. A condominium property
may consist of a single high-rise apartment building or may encompass attached or
detached housing units on a substantial tract of land.
6 In a housing cooperative, the entire property is owned by a cooperative corpora-
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housing developments.7 The RCA, of which fewer than 500 were in exis-
tence in the United States before 1960,8 is now the fastest growing form of
new housing and, in many metropolitan areas, accounts for over fifty per-
cent of new home sales.9 The number of Americans living in RCAs is ex-
pected to double in the next decade,"0 leading to predictions that twenty-
five to thirty percent of Americans will be living in RCAs by early in the
next century." The emergence of RCAs as the dominant form of new
housing has been called a "quiet revolution,"'2 which is already having a
far-reaching effect on political and social arrangements within and among
tens of thousands of residential communities throughout the United
States."
Residential community associations are nonprofit organizations estab-
lished by real estate developers with the approval of state or local govern-
ment officials. 4 Although RCAs may take several different forms, 5 all
tion, and the members of the cooperative own shares of stock in the corporation and
hold leases that grant occupancy rights to their residential units. Housing cooperatives
usually, but not always, are situated in apartment buildings.
' In a planned housing development, a homeowner generally holds title to both the
exterior and interior of a residential unit and the plot of land around it. The planned
development association (often called a homeowners' association) owns and manages
common properties, which may include streets, parking lots, open spaces, and recre-
ational facilities.
' See C. James Dowden, Community Associations and Local Governments: The
Need for Recognition and Reassessment, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at
27. The Community Associations Institute (CAI), an industry trade group, recently
estimated that in 1992 there were 150,000 RCAs housing 32 million people. See COM-
MUNITY Ass'NS INST., COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS FACTBOOK 13 (Clifford J. Treese
ed., 1993). Because the U.S. Census Bureau does not maintain data on the number of
individuals or housing units subject to RCA governance, no authoritative and compre-
hensive database on the subject exists. CAI membership lists and estimates generally
have been considered the most reliable sources of information on the extent of RCAs in
the United States. See ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 18 (1992).
9 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 18. According to CAI, RCAs govern 50% of all
housing for sale in the 50 largest metropolitan areas of the country and nearly all new
residential development in California, Florida, New York, Texas, and suburban Wash-
ington, D.C. See id.
" See Timothy Egan, Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1995, at 1.
" See Evan McKenzie, Welcome Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at A23.
12 COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST xi (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994).
"3 See infra text accompanying notes 32-39.
14 Government approval procedures and regulation of RCAs varies significantly
among the states, as well as among municipalities within states. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 310-20.
" Most RCAs take the form of a condominium, cooperative, or planned single-fami-
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RCAs share the distinguishing characteristic that their establishment and
essential authority over constituent homeowners arise from covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions (commonly known as CC&Rs) attached to the deeds
to the homeowners' real property.16 Once established, an RCA typically
performs a variety of functions within a homeowning community. The asso-
ciation maintains commonly owned facilities and real estate, furnishes ser-
vices to the homeowners, establishes rules governing the use of both com-
mon property and individual housing units, and it collects assessment fees to
pay for its operations. All purchasers of property within the RCA communi-
ty automatically become members of the RCA, and are required to obey its
rules and pay its fees and special assessments. In this respect, an RCA is
quite different from a voluntary civic or neighborhood association. 7
RCAs may be broadly characterized as territorial or nonterritorial. Some
associations, especially urban condominiums and housing cooperatives, are
geographically limited to a single high-rise apartment building. These are
nonterritorial RCAs. Other RCAs, such as homeowner associations in
planned single-family home developments, manage a significant amount of
real estate. These territorial RCAs"8 may exercise authority over a network
ly home development. For a discussion of the distinguishing characteristics of these
three different forms of homeownership, see supra notes 5-7.
6 See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 19 (1994).
17 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 9. An RCA homeowner's failure to
pay an RCA assessment will result in a lien on the homeowner's residence and, ulti-
mately, may lead to the forced sale of the residence through the enforcement of the
lien. Once an individual chooses to purchase a home in an RCA community, the indi-
vidual can no more escape payment of an RCA assessment than he can escape payment
of a municipal real estate tax. In many ways, the RCA assessment is the functional
equivalent of a municipal real estate tax. See infra text accompanying notes 382-88.
" The distinction between territorial and nonterritorial RCAs is not grounded in law,
nor is the distinction always clear in practice. There are doubtless some RCAs that own
or maintain a relatively small amount of open land, and for which the classification of
territorial or nonterritorial may appear arbitrary. Nevertheless, most RCAs can be clear-
ly understood as territorial or nonterritorial. In a national survey of RCAs, the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded that approximately
90% of RCAs are territorial. See U.S.-ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11-12.
The territorial/nonterritorial classification is an important distinction in determining
whether a particular RCA is the functional equivalent of a municipality. See infra text
accompanying notes 19-20. As the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations noted:
One characteristic of local government is that it has clear geographical boundaries
and is responsible for territory within its borders. [Territorial] RCAs are similar to
local governments in this regard. They maintain, and in some instances own, real
estate and facilities beyond a single high-rise building ... RCAs possessing some
territorial authority over land and activities outside of private residential units give
rise to "intergovernmental" activities and issues ....
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of streets, parking lots, open space, and recreational facilities. Like munici-
palities, territorial RCAs typically provide services such as street cleaning,
trash collection, maintenance of open space, and security. 9 Territorial
RCAs also exercise extensive land-use powers traditionally associated with
the municipal zoning and police-power authority, such as review of pro-
posed home alterations and enforcement of rules governing home occupan-
cy.
20
Although territorial RCAs hold many of the powers traditionally associ-
ated with general units of local government, these RCAs rarely have been
recognized as "state actors, 2 ' and thereby subjected to the requirements of
the Constitution.22 Instead, RCAs have been viewed as wholly private asso-
U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11.
This Article is concerned exclusively with territorial RCAs, except where the dis-
tinction between territorial and nonterritorial RCAs is at issue. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 482-88. For this reason, whenever the term RCA is used, it refers to territo-
rial RCAs, unless otherwise indicated.
'9 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 12-13.
' See DILGER, supra note 8, at 23-24. RCAs "exercise power over members and
even nonmembers in vital areas of concern, in that their decisions govern what indi-
viduals do in the privacy of their own home and what they do with the physical struc-
ture of the house and its surroundings." MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 135. RCA rules
sometimes restrict the age of those who may own homes in an RCA community, the
number and ages of overnight visitors, the color a homeowner may paint her house, and
whether a homeowner may build an addition to her house. An infraction of RCA rules
may lead to the imposition of a penalty against a homeowner or to the denial of the
right to use RCA facilities backed by judicial injunction. See infra text accompanying
notes 389-96.
21 In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), decided fifteen years after the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court determined that the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to actions taken by the government. See The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11. In general, private conduct, "however discriminatory
or Wrongful," does not come within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). However, the Court, beginning in the 1930s, has come
to recognize that the distinction between public and private conduct is not always clear-
cut, and that, under some circumstances, the actions of private parties may be attributed
to the state. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that state
action was present in a defendant's use of a peremptory challenge in. a criminal case);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that state action was
present when a creditor obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment of a debtor's prop-
erty); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that state
action was present in the conduct of a privately owned restaurant that leased space from
a government agency); Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that state action was present
in the judicial enforcement of a private restrictive covenant); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that state action was present in the operation of a company
town that was the functional equivalent of a municipality); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944) (holding that state action was present in political party primary elections).
'2 See, e.g., Anelli v. Arrowhead Lakes Community Ass'n, No. 2450 C.D., Commu-
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ciations that enforce a private set of rules on homeowners through the famil-
iar common-law mechanism of real estate servitudes. The traditional view of
RCAs holds that an individual consents to the RCA servitude regime when
purchasing property subject to the RCA and that a prospective homebuyer
who does not wish to subject herself to RCA rules may purchase property
elsewhere.' The contemporary RCA, however, is not solely or even pri-
marily the product of consumer choice in the housing marketplace, perhaps
no more than company towns of an earlier era were the product of consum-
er choice.24 In fact, RCAs are the product of many larger forces, including
local government land-use policies' and what the U.S. Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations has termed "the most significant privat-
ization of local government responsibilities in recent times."'
nity Ass'n L. Rep., June 1997, at 3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 13, 1997) (holding that an
RCA is not a state actor); Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, Inc., 502 So.
2d 1380 (Fla. 1987); Ross v. Hatfield, 640 F. Supp. 708 (D. Kan. 1986). But see Pitt v.
Pine Valley Golf Club, 695 F. Supp. 778 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that an RCA restrictive
covenant amounted to state action under the Marsh doctrine); Laguna Publ'g Co. v.
Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982) (holding that an RCA is not a state
actor for federal constitutional purposes but is a state actor under the California Consti-
tution); State v. Kolcz, 276 A.2d 595 (Middlesex County Ct. 1971) (holding that an
RCA may be analogized to the company town in Marsh).
Some commentators have considered the application of state-action theory to RCAs
and have rejected such an application as wholly foreign to notions of free choice and
voluntary consent that these commentators believe lie at the core of the RCA servitude
regime. See Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 275-77, 304-06 (1976); Katharine Rosenberry, The Application
of the Federal and State Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned
Developments, 19 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1, 28-30 (1984). These commentators
are mistaken because they fail to recognize that the free choice and voluntary consent of
housing consumers are largely illusory in the context of RCAs. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 477-80. Moreover, the exigencies of today's housing marketplace, not near-
ly as manifest as when these commentators reached their conclusions, further undercut
the viability of notions of free choice and voluntary consent in the contemporary RCA.
See infra text accompanying note 478.
' See Robert H. Nelson, The Privatization of Local Government: From Zoning to
RCAs, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 50.
24 See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. For a discussion of Marsh and the relative position
of company towns in the United States at the time of the Marsh decision, see note 70.
' See infra text accompanying notes 271-95.
26 U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 18. Although the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission characterizes RCAs as partly the result of a trend toward privatization on the
part of traditional local governments, it does not necessarily follow from this character-
ization that RCAs, as a product of privatization, are themselves to be viewed as wholly
private. In fact, the U.S. Advisory Commission adopted a quite different view: "[F]or
the purposes of understanding the place and role of RCAs in local governance, as well
as the costs and benefits of RCAs for both citizens and governments, an
intragovernmental perspective on RCAs is more useful than a traditional corporate or
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Moreover, from the perspective of the individual homebuyer in today's
housing market, the notion of consent to the RCA legal regime at the time
one purchases RCA property is simply incompatible with the exigencies of
the housing market. RCAs constitute nearly all new residential development
in California, Florida, and Texas and fifty percent of all housing for sale in
the fifty largest metropolitan areas.27 One housing market analyst has de-
clared, "If you want a new home, it is increasingly difficult to get one that
doesn't come with a homeowners' association. ' As previously noted, the
dominance of RCAs as a form of housing and community governance will
continue to increase in coming years, with predictions that twenty-five to
thirty percent of Americans will be living in RCAs early in the next century,
a doubling of the current RCA percentage of the U.S. population.29 Just as
significant, RCAs are often the most affordable housing available in many
housing markets.3" In light of these factors, the notion of individual
homebuyer autonomy, and especially individual homebuyer consent to the
complex and comprehensive RCA servitude regime, is illusory.3'
As private entities not subject to the requirements of the Constitution's
First and Fourteenth Amendments, RCAs apparently are free to impose a
ban on posting signs inside or outside a home,32 to restrict public assembly
neighborhood association perspective." Id. at 13 (emphasis added). This Article reaches
the same conclusion and, having done so, explores the necessary constitutional implica-
tions arising from this conclusion.
27 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 18.
GARREAU, supra note 3, at 189 (quoting Douglas Kleine, former research director
of the Community Associations Institute). In one survey of the California housing mar-
ket, researchers found that 84% of those who bought a home in an RCA had not been
looking to buy in an RCA and that many RCA homebuyers purchased their homes "re-
luctantly because they could not afford a home in an ordinary neighborhood or because
few 'ordinary' neighborhoods existed in the areas they wanted to buy in." Carol J.
Silverman & Stephen E. Barton, Shared Promises: Community and Conflict in the Com-
mon Interest Development, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERN-
MENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 12, at 129, 137.
29 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
30 See McKenzie, supra note 11, at A23. In Orange County California, for example,
the median price of a home subject to an RCA is $45,000 less than the median price of
a non-RCA home. See id.; see also U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 13.
3' See infra text accompanying notes 477-80.
32 Cf City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (holding unconstitutional a mu-
nicipal ordinance that banned the posting of signs on residential property). Ladue would
not be applicable to an RCA rule that banned the posting of signs on an RCA
homeowner's property because RCAs typically have not been deemed state actors. The
right of an RCA to prohibit RCA homeowners from posting signs generally has been
held to be a reasonable restriction under established private-law principles. See Anelli v.
Arrowhead Lakes Community Ass'n, No. 2450 C.D., Community Ass'n L. Rep., June
1997, at 3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 13, 1997); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condomini-
um Ass'n v. Cappuccio, No. 02139, Community Ass'n L. Rep., May 1996, at 4 (Pa.
1998] 469
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on their streets,33 to prohibit the distribution of newspapers on their
streets,34 to restrict the number and ages of overnight visitors, 35 to prohibit
members of a homeowner's immediate family (including the homeowner's
spouse) from cohabiting with the homeowner,36 and even to ban sexually
Sup. Ct. Jan. 16, 1995); see also Randolph P. Smith, Homeowner Pays Fine:
Brandermill Said "Shrink-Swell" Sign Was Violation of Subdivision Covenants, RICH-
MOND TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 1996, at B5 (reporting that an RCA imposed a mone-
tary penalty on a homeowner for displaying a sign that disclosed an adverse environ-
mental condition affecting property). But see Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo-
minium, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that judicial enforcement of
an RCA covenant barring the display of a flag constituted state action under the doc-
trine of Shelley v. Kraemer), vacated on other grounds, 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla.
1991); Pittman v. Cohn Communities, 229 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. 1977), (declining to enforce
a covenant restricting the displaying of signs under the theory that such a covenant is
state action, but not discussing state-action theory).
" Cf Hague v. Committee of Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.,
concurring) ("Wherever the title of [public] streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discuss-
ing public questions."). In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Supreme Court
extended the rights of free speech and assembly to streets held by certain private enti-
ties. See id. at 507. For a discussion of the application of Marsh to RCAs, see infra text
accompanying notes 59-121. For examples of RCA restrictions on political gatherings,
see MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 15 n.59. It is noteworthy that one state has enacted a
statute that expressly overrides RCA restrictions on assembly in RCA common areas.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 617.304 (1993) ("No [RCA] shall unreasonably restrict any parcel
owner's right to peaceably assemble or right to invite public officers or candidates for
public office to appear and speak in common areas and recreation facilities.").
31 See Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982) (hold-
ing that an RCA ban on the distribution of newspapers on RCA property is not cogniza-
ble under the Federal Constitution). In Laguna, an RCA consisting of 20,000 residents
banned the unsolicited distribution of all newspapers except for its in-house paper. The
ban was enforced by the RCA's private security guards. See id. at 823. The California
court struck down the ban on state constitutional grounds. See id. at 829; see also infra
note 50. For a description of a ban on newspaper distribution by a large RCA in Arizo-
na, see GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190-91.
31 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 16.
36 In one case, an RCA sued a married couple because the wife, at age forty-five,
was three years younger than the RCA's age requirement for residency. According to a
newspaper account, the court decided in favor of the RCA and ordered the husband to
sell the unit, rent the unit, or live without his wife. See MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at
15. (This decision apparently is not reported in the major reporters or on-line services).
Similarly, Joel Garreau described the efforts of a large Arizona RCA to enforce its age-
restrictive covenants by preventing an adult child (age 42) from residing with his par-
ents. See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190. Note that the Federal Fair Housing Act,
which among other things generally prohibits housing discrimination against families
with children under 18 years of age, does not prohibit the particular age restrictions that
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explicit films, books, and magazines from a homeowner's bedroom3 7
Moreover, the RCA governing board, although elected by RCA homeown-
ers, is the product of an electoral system that is at substantial variance from
the one-person, one-vote principle guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3" The typical RCA electoral scheme employs a one-house, one-vote
system, disenfranchises all renters, and employs weighted voting in favor of
the developer. Not surprisingly, one commentator has characterized the
typical RCA electoral scheme as "profoundly undemocratic.
39
These considerations call for a principled judicial response. Toward this
end, this Article carefully assesses four established theories of state action,
each of which offers a perspective that is directly applicable to the present
task. Although many RCAs could well be deemed state actors by operation
of one or more of the established theories of state action, a more compre-
hensive and systematic approach to state action should be developed-an
approach that takes account of the special characteristics of the RCA form
and the legal and political environment in which the RCA operates.
II. ESTABLISHED THEORIES OF STATE ACTION AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
RCAs
A. The "Functional Equivalent of a Muni.cipality" Theory
1. Overview
In 1946, less than a decade after the Supreme Court pronounced that
publicly owned streets were to be treated as public forums for expressive
activity, 4 the Court in Marsh v. Alabama4' extended the reach of the First
are the subject of these two examples. See 42 U.S.C. §3602(k) (1994).
" Such a restriction has been reported to exist in at least one RCA located in Phoe-
nix, Arizona. See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190. The restriction apparently has not
been the subject of litigation.
38 In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the
malapportionment of a state legislature violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id at
568. The one-person, one-vote principle subsequently was extended to other elected
state instrumentalities, including municipalities, see Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474, 478-79 (1968), and certain special purpose governmental organizations that per-
form "important governmental functions," see Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S.
50, 53-54 (1970). Although no court has held that an RCA is subject to the one-person,
one-vote principle, certain territorial RCAs indisputably perform general governmental
functions. See infra text accompanying notes 62-86.
39 COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 12, at xii.
4 The public forum doctrine first appeared in a famous concurring opinion by Jus-
tice Roberts:
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Amendment to privately owned streets in certain company-owned towns.
The town of Chickasaw, Alabama, was owned in its entirety by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation. 42 Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, distributed
religious literature on a street in Chickasaw and was subsequently arrested
and convicted of trespassing." The Supreme Court struck down the convic-
tion, holding that a company-owned town that performed all of the functions
of a traditional municipality was a "state actor" subject to the First Amend-
ment." The Court noted:
Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but
to a municipal corporation and had appellant been arrested
for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling by
those appointed by the corporation to manage a company
town it would have been clear that appellant's conviction
must be reversed.45
The Court reasoned that the residents of Chickasaw, as "free citizens of
their State and country," 46 were entitled to the same constitutional rights as
all other citizens, even if this were to entail a subordination of the property
rights of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. 7
On its face, Marsh can be read as a sweeping expansion of constitution-
al protection to expressive activity carried out on private property held open
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Hague v. Committee of Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (Roberts, J., concur-
ring). The Roberts concurrence subsequently was adopted by the Court in Schneider v.
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
41 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
41 See id. at 502.
41 See id. at 503.
See id. at 508-09.
41 Id. at 504.
46 Id. at 508.
41 See id. at 508-09. The Court noted, "When we balance the Constitutional rights of
owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion,
as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupies a preferred posi-
tion." Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
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for public use. Alternatively, Marsh can be understood as a much more
narrow expansion of constitutional protection applicable only to company
towns and other privately owned communities that are the "functional equiv-
alent of ... municipalit[ies]" 4 -that is, private property that is held open
to the public and that contains homes, businesses, streets, and other town-
like facilities and services.
At first, the Supreme Court adopted the more expansive reading of
Marsh. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 509 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.,49 the Court held that a privately owned shopping center held
open to the public is subject to the requirements of the First Amendment.
The Court noted that the Logan Valley Plaza shopping center was "clearly
the functional equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw ... in
Marsh."5 This expansive reading of Marsh was to remain the law of the
land for fewer than ten years.5
In Hudgens v. NLRB,52 the Court expressly overturned Logan Valley53
4 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976). Hudgens was the first case in which
the Court enunciated this concept as a description of the state-action theory first recog-
nized in Marsh.
49 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
50 id. at 318.
5 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518.
52 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
See id. at 518. The overturning of Logan Valley actually was a two-step process.
Logan Valley arose from the labor picketing of a nonunion store in a privately owned
shopping center, see 391 U.S. at 311-12, a circumstance in which the purpose of the
picketing was directly related to the operation of the shopping center. In Logan Valley,
the Court expressly left open the question of whether the right to engage in expressive
activity at a privately owned shopping center also extended to expressive activity not
related to the operation of the shopping center. See id. at 320 n.9. Four years later, the
Court in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), directly addressed this question,
and answered it in the negative. Lloyd appeared to establish a two-tiered analysis of
First Amendment rights, premised on the content of expression. As things were to turn
out, the Lloyd formulation laid the seeds of destruction of the right first recognized in
Logan Valley because the formulation placed the right at odds with the core First
Amendment doctrine that forbids content-based regulation of speech in a public forum.
See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). In Hudgens, the Court
squarely confronted the doctrinal conflict and elected to resolve the conflict by over-
turning the right recognized in Logan Valley-the right to engage in expressive activity
in privately owned shopping centers-rather than to expand the right by overturning the
content-based restriction on speech established in Lloyd. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 512-
21.
In any event, the Court's reasoning in Lloyd and Hudgens left untouched the essen-
tial holding of Marsh because the content-based restriction on speech propounded in
Lloyd was intended to be applied only to privately owned shopping centers, see Lloyd,
407 U.S. at 563, 569, and not to company towns and other private municipalities. More-
over, in Hudgens the Court was careful to distinguish Marsh from Logan Valley and to
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and adopted the narrow reading of Marsh. Under this reading, which re-
mains the prevailing constitutional standard, it is not enough that private
property held open for public use is the functional equivalent of a portion of
a town, such as a town's business district. 4 The private property must be
the functional equivalent of an entire town."5 Significantly, the Court in
Hudgens determined that, for constitutional purposes, an "entire town" is
equivalent to the totality of major features distinguishing the community of
Chickasaw in 1946:
The question is, Under what circumstances can private prop-
erty be treated as though it were public? The answer that
Marsh gives is when that property has taken on all the at-
tributes of a town, i.e., "residential buildings, streets, a sys-
tem of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and 'business block'
on which business places are situated." '
Thus, the Court in Hudgens not only replaced the broad reading of Marsh
with the narrow reading; in a sense, the Court memorialized Marsh's Chick-
asaw as the paradigmatic town for constitutional purposes.
In the twenty years since Hudgens, the Supreme Court has not decided
any case that included a claim that a private community should be deemed a
state actor under the rule first recognized in Marsh. Consequently, the
Marsh decision as modified by Hudgens remains the prevailing federal con-
stitutional standard57 for determining whether a private community is the
reaffirm Marsh's vitality. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 514-20. The Hudgens reading of
Marsh is now the prevailing constitutional standard governing the functional equivalent
of a municipality doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 54-58.
, See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. But see Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 318.
s See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 516-17.
16 Id. at 516 (citation omitted) (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502 (Black, J., dissent-
ing)).
"' Although the Marsh/Hudgens standard represents the present outer boundary of
federal constitutional protection of expressive activity on private property, some state
courts have recognized a broader right to engage in expressive activity based on their
own state constitutions. See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446
(Or. 1993); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Alderwood
Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981); Robins v.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). These
decisions all arose from litigation concerning the right to engage in expressive activity
in privately owned shopping centers. It will be recalled, however, that the United States
Supreme Court denied federal constitutional protection to expressive activity undertaken
in privately owned shopping centers. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507.
The apparent conflict between federal and various state constitutional provisions
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functional equivalent of a municipality.58
affecting expressive activity on private property has been squarely addressed by the
United States Supreme Court. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980). In PruneYard, the Court upheld the authority of state courts to recognize free
speech rights under state constitutional provisions that exceed free speech rights recog-
nized under the Federal Constitution. See id. at 80-81. The Court also held that the
recognition of a right to engage in expressive activity on private property under a state
constitutional provision does not represent a taking of private property for public use
under the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. See id. at 82-85.
The application of particular state constitutional provisions to expressive activities
(or other fundamental rights) undertaken on property owned by an RCA is outside the
scope of this Article.
58 Although since Hudgens the Court has not passed on a claim directly implicating
the "functional equivalent of a municipality" doctrine, the Court in dicta has made ref-
erences to the doctrine on several occasions as part of an effort to explain and harmo-
nize its disparate and seemingly ad hoc state-action jurisprudence. In Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Court noted, "We have ... found state
action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State," citing the company town of Marsh as an example. Id. at 352
(citations omitted). For discussion of the potential significance of the Jackson dictum,
see infra text accompanying notes 130-35. In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978), the Court identified the "functional equivalent of a municipality" doctrine as a
subset of a broader theory of state action that the Court referred to as "public-function
doctrine." Id. at 158. The "functional equivalent of a municipality" doctrine represents
one of two "branches" of public-function doctrine; the other branch arose from a series
of decisions establishing that state action extends to the primary elections of a dominant
political party. See id. (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)). "These two branches of
public-function doctrine," the Court explained, "have in common the feature of exclu-
sivity .... [T]he elections held by the Democratic Party and its affiliates were the only
meaningful elections in Texas, and the streets owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp.
were the only streets in Chickasaw .... ." Id. at 159-60 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
This latter-day interpretation of Marsh turns not on the fact that Chickasaw con-
tained the necessary physical features identified with a municipality, but, rather, on the
purported fact that all of its streets were privately owned. This interpretation is not only
inconsistent with the reasoning of Marsh, it also is inconsistent with the factual record
of Marsh: The private community of Chickasaw contained a major street that was not
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation and was, in fact, a publicly owned road.
See Record at 34-42, Marsh (No. 114-1945) evidencing that the deed for the property
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation indicated that a public road traversed the
property). For this reason, the Court's latter-day interpretation of Marsh must be termed
a reformulation, not a mere restatement. Under the Marsh reformulation, a privately
owned community would be deemed the functional equivalent of a municipality if the
community were to contain streets, if the streets were to be held open to the public, and
if all of the streets in the community were to be held in private ownership. It is worth
noting that many RCAs would satisfy the requirements of this test, including RCAs that
would fail the traditional Marsh test because of the lack of a business district. In any
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2. The Theory as Applied to RCAs
As noted above, the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine requires that, for a private
community to be deemed a state actor, the community's streets must be held
open for public use and the community must encompass (in addition to
public streets) residential buildings, a business district, and perhaps other
facilities associated with a municipality, such as sewers and a sewage treat-
ment plant. 9 Under this strict standard, the vast majority of territorial
RCAs would not be deemed state actors, either because they do not contain
a business district" or because their streets are not held open to the pub-
lic.61
Before reaching the question of the specific application of the
Marsh/Hudgens doctrine to various types of RCAs, it is useful to first con-
sider the functional similarity of a territorial RCA to a municipality. Territo-
rial RCAs exercise authority over a network of streets, parking lots, open
space, and recreational facilities. Like municipalities, territorial RCAs typi-
event, the Marsh reformulation, as noted above, is mere dictum and is a misstatement
of the factual record of Marsh.
" While this Article strictly interprets the Court's enumeration in Hudgens of
homes, streets, and businesses as conditions precedent to a determination that a private
community is a state actor, one hesitates to extend this strict interpretation to sewage
systems and sewage treatment plants. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 516. Many municipali-
ties, particularly in rural areas, lack these facilities and rely instead on private septic
systems. Because it is difficult to credit that the mere presence or absence of sewers
should make a constitutional difference in the status of a private community, this Arti-
cle liberally interprets this element of the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine and concludes that
sewage systems and sewage treatment plants are merely illustrative of town-like infra-
structure rather than a condition precedent to a finding of state action.
o See DILGER, supra note 8, at 24. Many RCAs prohibit commercial uses within
their territories. See id. Although Dilger does not cite statistical evidence concerning the
prevalence of RCAs that prohibit commercial uses, he notes that "it is generally as-
sumed RCAs enhance property values in urban areas by shielding low-density residen-
tial uses from the encroachment of... commercial ... uses." Id.; see also Rosenberry,
supra note 22, at 71.
61 RCAs that own and maintain streets that are not held open to the public generally
are referred to as gated communities. It is estimated that four million people live in
30,000 gated communities in the United States. See generally EDWARD J. BLAKELY &
MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED AND WALLED COMMUNITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1995). Approximately one in five RCAs is gated. See id. at 184 n.1;
COMMUNITY Ass'NS INST., supra note 8, at 13. This percentage can be expected to
increase, in light of predictions that the number of gated communities will double over
the next five years. See Rebecca J. Schwartz, Comment, Public Gated Residential Com-
munities: The Rosemont, Illinois, Approach and Its Constitutional Implications, 29 URB.
LAW. 123, 124 (1997).
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cally provide services such as street cleaning, trash collection, snow remov-
al, and maintenance of open space.62 Territorial RCAs also exercise powers
traditionally associated with the municipal zoning authority, such as review
of proposed home alterations and enforcement of rules governing home
occupancy.63 All purchasers of property within an RCA community auto-
matically become members of the RCA, and are required to obey its rules
and pay its fees and special assessments.' A failure to pay an RCA fee,
like the failure to pay a municipal real estate tax, can result in a lien on a
homeowner's residence, and, ultimately, in the forced sale of the property
through the enforcement of the lien.65 Finally, an RCA community, like a
municipality, is governed by officers who are elected by community resi-
dents.'
In Marsh, the Supreme Court analogized company towns to municipali-
ties and concluded that many company towns have "all the characteristics of
any other American town."'67 The analogy resulted in the "functional equiv-
alent of a municipality" standard; yet because the standard arose from the
circumstances of a company town, the standard does not consider or give
weight to other municipal characteristics found in some private communities
but not generally found in company towns.6" As the above listing of RCA
62 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 12-13.
63 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 23-24; see also infra text accompanying notes 389-
98.
64 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 12-13.
65 See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 184-85; see also infra text accompanying notes
382-88.
66 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 10. Note, however, that the voting
franchise in an RCA is generally limited to homeowners. See infra notes 399-415 and
accompanying text.
67 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
6' Two commentators offered the following assessment of the functional similarities
of RCAs and municipalities:
[U]pon analysis of the association's functions, one clearly sees the association as
a quasi-government entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of a municipal government. As a "mini-government," the associa-
tion provides to its members, in almost every case, utility services, road mainte-
nance, street and common area lighting, and refuse removal. In many cases, it
also provides security services and various forms of communication within the
community. There is, moreover, a clear analogy to the municipal police and pub-
lic safety functions. All of these functions are financed through assessments or
taxes levied upon the members of the community, with powers vested in the
board of directors, council of co-owners, board of managers, or other similar body
clearly analogous to the governing body of a municipality. Terminology varies
from region to region; however, the duties and responsibilities remain the same.
Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and
Administration of Condominium and Home Owner Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 915, 918 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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characteristics makes clear, a territorial RCA often may have more in com-
mon with a municipality than would a company town because an RCA, in
addition to being a human settlement, is a comprehensive system of service
delivery, quasi-taxation, and community governance. 69 This observation
suggests not only that the Marsh company-town paradigm may be ill-suited
to RCAs, but also that a new, more inclusive, and up-to-date paradigm may
be needed.7' This undertaking is the subject of Part IV of this Article. For
It is noteworthy that the MarshiHudgens standard underlying the "functional equiv-
alent of a municipality" theory of state action makes no reference to the power of local
taxation or to the presence of an electoral system as indicia of state action. In contrast
to RCAs, company towns presumably seldom contain an electoral system, and a compa-
ny town's system of employment compensation, fringe benefits, and deductions from
benefits is much more difficult to directly analogize to a system of local taxation.
69 The Marsh/Hudgens doctrine is grounded in the physical attributes of a town and,
as a result, overlooks other attributes, including, most significantly, the nature and ex-
tent of powers a town exercises. These overlooked attributes are encompassed by other
theories of state action, which are discussed in subsequent sections of this Article. For
example, the power to control land use over a substantial amount of territory, and the
power to collect and enforce assessments that are the functional equivalent of real estate
taxes, can be understood as attributes of a municipality encompassed by the Supreme
Court's general governmental powers doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 382-
98. This Article ultimately proposes a unified state-action doctrine for RCAs that draws
on aspects of four discrete state action theories. See infra Part IV. As for the
MarshiHudgens town paradigm and its application to contemporary community develop-
ment, the paradigm should be reconsidered in light of major changes in the physical as
well as nonphysical attributes of towns in the five decades since Marsh was decided.
See infra text accompanying notes 70, 76-82.
70 In Marsh, the Supreme Court fashioned a state-action theory implicating company
towns in part because "many" Americans then lived in company towns. Marsh, 326
U.S. at 508 & n.5 (citing data showing that "[i]n the bituminous coal industry alone,
approximately one-half of the miners in the United States [about 330,000 workers] lived
in company-owned houses ... "). At the time of Marsh, few Americans lived in RCAs.
See Dowden, supra note 8, at 27. Today, the situation is reversed: Few Americans live
in company towns, and many Americans live in RCAs. See generally JAMES B. ALLEN,
THE COMPANY TowN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 140-45, 184-85 (1966) (describing the
"gradual disappearance of the company town" in the western United States and also
noting that there has never been a census or reliable survey of the population of compa-
ny towns in the United States); COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., supra note 8, at 10-13 (de-
scribing the ascendancy of the RCA over the past thirty years). Even if the total number
of Americans living in company towns in 1946 were ten times the 350,000 bituminous
coal miner workers expressly cited by the Court in Marsh as evidence that "many"
Americans lived in company towns, the resulting estimate of 3,500,000 Americans liv-
ing in company towns when Marsh was decided would constitute less than 3% of the
1940 United States population. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, 1940 CENSUS OF POPULATION 14 (1940) [hererafter 1940 CENSUS]. By contrast,
the 32 million Americans estimated to have lived in RCAs in the early 1990s constitute
13% of the 1990 United States population, or over four times the population percentage
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present purposes, the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine, as presently construed, is
applied to several types of RCAs with a view toward exposing the conceptu-
al limitations of the current doctrine.
a. Large Mixed-Use RCAs
Some larger RCAs probably would be deemed state actors under the
Marsh/Hudgens standard. For example, Reston, an RCA in northern Virgin-
ia, is spread over 74,000 acres and has a population of over 35,000. It con-
tains 12,500 residential units and over 500 businesses. It also has twenty-
one churches, four shopping centers, eight public schools, and a sewage
treatment plant. The streets and businesses are open to the general public.71
Sun City, an RCA in Arizona, has 46,000 residents and ten shopping cen-
ters, which are open to residents and nonresidents alike. The Sun City com-
munity association operates parks, libraries, and a fire department.72 Even
under the most stringent application of the Marsh/Hudgens standard, there is
little question that Reston and Sun City are the functional equivalents of a
municipality and, consequently, are state actors.
b. Exclusively Residential RCAs
As noted above, the vast majority of RCAs probably would not be,
deemed state actors under the Marsh/Hudgens standard.73 The principal
reason is that most RCAs lack a business district, such as the block of stores
in Marsh.74 Significantly, the lack of commercial establishments in most
RCAs parallels the lack of commercial establishments in most new suburban
residential developments.75 This observation suggests that the Marsh
possibly represented by company towns at the time Marsh was decided. See COMMUNI-
TY Ass's INST., supra note 8, at 13; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 1 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 CENSUS].
These observations not only suggest that RCAs have supplanted company towns as the
dominant form of private community in the United. States; they also perhaps suggest
that state action theory applied today, in the same manner as the Court applied it in
Marsh in 1946, would implicate RCAs as state actors.
"1 See Katharine Rosenberry, Condominium and Homeowner Associations: Should
They Be Treated Like Mini-Governments?, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N,.supra note 2, at
71-72.
See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 184.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
, See supra note 60.
5 The lack of commercial establishments in new residential developments was a
major reason that the Supreme Court in 1968 held that a shopping center was the func-
tional equivalent of a municipality. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1968). Although Logan Valley
subsequently was overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the following
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"town" paradigm may need to be reconsidered.
In 1946, the year Marsh was decided, a human settlement consisting of
homes, streets, and businesses could be fairly characterized as the sine qua
non of a "town,"'76 and a human settlement entirely in private hands that
contained homes, streets, businesses, and a modicum of public access could
be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a town for constitu-
tional purposes.' Today, for reasons that relate in part to increased reliance
on the automobile78 and in part to more restrictive zoning,79 the Marsh
"town" paradigm no longer is consistent with prevailing patterns of commu-
nity development. The Thornton Wilder version of a small town exemplified
in Marsh has been replaced by suburban sprawl," regional shopping cen-
observation made in Logan Valley remains pertinent to the entirely different question of
whether an exclusively residential community, in light of contemporary patterns of
community development, may be deemed the functional equivalent of a municipality:
The economic development of the United States in the last 20 years reinforc-
es our opinion of the correctness of the approach taken in Marsh. The large-scale
movement of this country's population from the cities to the suburbs has been
accompanied by the advent of the suburban shopping center, typically a cluster of
individual retail units on a single large privately owned tract. It has been estimat-
ed that by the end of 1966 there were between 10,000 and 11,000 shopping cen-
ters in the United States and Canada, accounting for approximately 37% of total
retail sales in those two countries.
Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 324 (footnote omitted). In the nearly thirty years since Logan
Valley, growth in regional shopping malls has continued unabated. See New Jersey
Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 766-67
(N.J. 1994) (noting that "from 1972 to 1992, the number of regional and super-regional
malls in the nation increased roughly 800%") (citation omitted). By 1993, there were
nearly 40,000 shopping centers in the United States, accounting for over fifty-five per-
cent of total retail sales. See INT'L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CTRS., THE SCOPE OF THE
SHOPPING CENTER INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 1992-1993, at 2 (1992). In turn,
the development of regional shopping malls reinforced the trend toward physical separa-
tion of residential development from commercial development. See generally MARK
BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICA
7-8 (1986); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF
THE UNITED STATES 259-61 (1985). In sum, prevailing land-use and development trends
suggest that contemporary notions of what constitutes a "town" have been drastically
altered from the time of Marsh.
76 See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 100-02, 184-85, 238-43 (comparing the dominant
patterns of suburban development in the United States over the past century).
77 See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-09.
78 See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 239 (describing low population density, made
possible by the automobile, as a major characteristic of post-war suburban develop-
ment).
71 See id. at 242. Some suburban municipalities have adopted zoning ordinances that
exclude commercial and industrial uses entirely from their jurisdictions. See 1 E.C.
YOKLAY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 7-23 (4th ed. 1978) (noting that courts gener-
ally have upheld single-use zoning classifications).
so See BALDASSARE, supra note 75, at 7; JACKSON, supra note 75, at 239; RICHARD
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ters far removed from residential areas,"' and zoning ordinances that sepa-
rate commercial uses from residential uses-or even entirely prohibit com-
mercial uses within a municipality. 2 If the Marsh "town" paradigm were
to be updated and made consistent with contemporary forms of community
development, which typically exclude commercial uses from residential
areas, 3 then many more territorial RCAs would be deemed the functional
equivalent of municipalities.
In response to this formulation, some may argue that, even though the
essential definition of an American town may no longer include a business
district, the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine nevertheless should remain unchanged
because extension of the state-actor doctrine to entirely residential private
communities would implicate countervailing constitutional interests, such as
residential privacy. These interests were not specifically addressed in Marsh
because the decision arose from expressive activity undertaken in a commer-
cial area.s'
This argument is best answered by posing the question: If Grace Marsh
were to have been arrested for distributing religious literature in the residen-
tial, rather than the commercial, portion of Chickasaw, would the Court in
Marsh have reached a different result? Substantial evidence in the Marsh
opinion suggests that the Court would not have reached a different result,
provided the privately owned residential streets of Chickasaw were held
open to the public in the same way that publicly owned residential streets
are held open to the public. 5 In any event, once a private community is
.determined to be the functional equivalent of a municipality, it follows that
the private community should be subject to the same constitutional princi-
ples generally applicable to a municipality. Such constitutional principles, it
should be stressed, already recognize homeowners' privacy interest in the
face of expressive activity conducted on residential neighborhood streets.8 6
LoUV, AMERICA II, at 22-25 (1983).
81 See supra note 75.
82 See supra note 79.
83 See supra notes 78-79.
The plaintiff in Marsh was distributing religious literature on a sidewalk in the
business district of the town of Chickasaw. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
85 For example, the Court noted: "In short the town and its shopping district are
accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish
them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the prop-
erty belongs to a private corporation." Id. at 503 (emphasis added). The Court's state-
ment suggested that not just the shopping district of Chickasaw was accessible to the
plaintiff, but that other parts of the town were as well. Accordingly, if the plaintiff were
to have distributed religious literature in these other parts of the largely residential
town, the Court presumably would have reached the same result.
For example, a municipality may, consistent with the First Amendment, enact an
ordinance that prohibits "focused picketing" on a street in front of a particular resi-
dence. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988). Such an ordinance protects
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c. RCAs with Restricted Access Policies
Many territorial RCAs restrict access to their streets and common areas
to RCA residents and their guests. These RCAs typically are equipped with
gates or guardhouses through which access to the community is carefully
controlled. 7 Under the MarshiHudgens doctrine, there is no question that a
nonresident of an RCA with a restricted-access policy would have no consti-
tutional right to engage in expressive activity on the community's streets or
common areas."8 Less clear is whether a resident of a restricted-access pri-
vate community (that otherwise satisfies the requirements of Marsh and
Hudgens) would be precluded from making a constitutional claim against
the community. A strict interpretation of the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine may
lead to the conclusion that the requirement of public access to the private
community is intrinsic to the doctrine, that is, the requirement applies as
much to the resident claim as to the nonresident claim that gave rise to the
Marsh decision. As will be discussed below, however, a strict interpretation
of Marsh-one that limits its reach to the facts giving rise to its deci-
sion-may not be the most sensible or logical interpretation.
3. The Theory as Applied to RCA Residents
This Section discusses the application of the MarshiHudgens theory to
RCA residents. For purposes of this Section, it is assumed that the RCAs
under discussion contain all of the essential physical elements of a town as
mandated by Hudgens, that is, the RCAs contain homes, streets, a business
district, and municipal-like facilities such as sewers. The purpose of this
Section is to highlight the significant unsettled questions arising from the
application of the MarshiHudgens doctrine to RCA residents.
a. Residents of RCAs That Are the Functional Equivalent of a Municipality
and That Provide Unrestricted Public Access to RCA Streets
Marsh arose from the assertion of a constitutional right against a private
community by a nonresident of the community. 9 The decision, therefore,
does not directly address the assertion of a constitutional right against a
private community by a resident of the community. Still, even the bare
holding of Marsh scarcely could justify a rule giving more constitutional
"residential privacy," which, for First Amendment purposes, is a "significant govern-
ment interest." Id. at 484.
87 See supra note 61.
88 See supra text accompanying note 59; see also supra note 85.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
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rights to nonresidents of a private community than to residents of the com-
munity. Moreover, much in Marsh suggests that the rights of community
residents are at least coextensive with the rights of nonresidents. In fact, the
right of Grace Marsh to engage in expressive activity in the private commu-
nity of Chickasaw was premised, in large measure, on the right of Chicka-
saw residents to receive information to the same degree that residents of
municipalities receive information." If residents of private communities
were to be entitled to the First Amendment right to receive information,
then it follows that the same residents would be entitled to the right to en-
gage in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.91 For this
reason, there is little question that the state-action principle recognized in
Marsh implicitly extends both to residents and nonresidents of a private
community.
b. Residents of RCAs That Are the Functional Equivalent of a Municipality
and That Restrict Public Access to RCA Streets
Because Marsh arose from the assertion of a constitutional right against
a private community by a nonresident of the community, a key issue was
the significance of the right of the owner of the community to exclude the
nonresident. In finding that the nonresident had a right to enter the property
and to engage in expressive activity, the Court was careful to condition this
right on the existence of a license, express or implied, that permitted the
nonresident to enter the property at least for purposes other than expressive
activity-for' example, to walk the streets or to patronize a store.92 Absent
o Although Grace Marsh was a Jehovah's Witness who sought to distribute religious
literature, the Court did little more than mention in passing this petitioner's free exer-
cise and free speech rights. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505. The Court instead based its
decision largely on private community residents' First Amendment right to receive in-
formation:
[Residents of company-owned towns], just as residents of municipalities, are free
citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make deci-
sions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens
they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their
information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these
people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than
there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.
Id. at 508-09 (footnote omitted).
9" The Court first expressly recognized the right to receive information, as a neces-
sary corollary of the right to distribute information, in a decision issued three years
before Marsh. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (plurality opinion); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
' See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503 ("[T]he town and its shopping district are accessible
to and freely used by the public in general .... ").
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this pre-existing license, the property owner could avail itself of the full
panoply of trespass laws and exclude any unauthorized person from the
property for any purpose, including expressive activity. Conversely, if the
owner already were to have afforded broad public access to its property,
then the trespass laws would be unavailable when a member of the pub-
lic-a nonresident-sought to engage in protected expressive activity.93
The Court's careful consideration in Marsh of the pre-existing right of a
nonresident to enter a private community should have no relevance to the
entirely different question of whether a resident of a private community may
assert a constitutional claim against the community. The right of the resident
to enter community property does not arise from a mere license, express or
implied; rather, the resident's right is itself a property right arising from the
resident's common-interest ownership of the community property.94 Assum-
ing that a private community is the functional equivalent of a municipali-
ty-that is, it contains homes, streets, a business district, and other town-like
facilities-then the right of a resident to assert a constitutional claim against
the community should not depend upon whether the community maintains
unrestricted public access to its streets and other common areas.
In response to this broad interpretation of Marsh, some may argue that
the requirement of public access is not severable from the doctrine of the
functional equivalent of a municipality, in view of the undeniable fact that a
defining characteristic of a municipality is that it gives residents and nonres-
idents alike access to the municipality's streets and parks.95 This position
finds some support in certain passages of the Marsh opinion.96 As noted
above, however, Marsh also can be interpreted as mandating a public-access
3 See id. at 506 ("The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it.") (citation omitted).
4 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. In a typical RCA, the CC&Rs at-
tached to a homeowner's deed grant the homeowner access to RCA community proper-
ty. In addition, a homeowner's access to the streets owned by a territorial RCA can be
understood as a necessary incident of ownership, in view of the fact that the streets are
usually the only means of access to the homeowner's residence.
9 See Hague v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.,
concurring) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.").
6 For example, the Court stated: "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Marsh, 326 U.S.
at 506 (citation omitted). It is possible to read this passage as supporting the proposition
that the requirement of public access is intrinsic to the doctrine of the functional equiva-
lent of a municipality, even when the person seeking to exercise a constitutional right is
a resident of a private community.
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analysis only to the extent that such analysis is relevant to the question of
whether a particular First Amendment claimant has the right to enter upon a
property in the first instance.97 This interpretation finds strong support in
the Court's stated concern in Marsh for the protection of constitutional
rights of residents of private communties, and in the Court's unambiguous
pronouncement that these residents are entitled to the same rights as resi-
dents of municipalities:
Many people in the United States live in company-owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are
free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citi-
zens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of
community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be
informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed
their information must be uncensored. There is no more
reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for
curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.9"
Thus, the Court intended that residents of private communities be the prima-
ry beneficiaries of its theory of state action articulated in Marsh. This under-
lying concern of Marsh provides strong support for the propositions that the
availability of constitutional protections to residents of private communities
should not depend upon the degree of public access to the community, and
that the public-access requirement in Marsh arises only because petitioner
Grace Marsh was a nonresident.
Under this broad interpretation of Marsh, then, private communities that
have unrestricted public access-and that are the functional equivalent of a
municipality-should be deemed state actors with respect to residents and
nonresidents alike, whereas private communities that have restricted access
policies-and that are the functional equivalent of a municipality-should be
deemed state actors, at least with respect' to residents. This interpretation of
Marsh, however, does not settle entirely the question of how, and to what
extent, the Marsh standard applies to residents of private communities. A
further consideration is the extent to which resident consent to RCA rules
that are contrary to constitutional principles preclude the application of those
principles. This is the subject of the following Section.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
- Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09 (footnotes omitted).
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c. Residents of RCAs That Are the Functional Equivalent of a Municipality:
The Effect of Restrictive Covenants That Are Inconsistent with the Exercise
of Rights Otherwise Guaranteed by the Constitution
As noted above, RCAs traditionally are viewed as wholly private associ-
ations that enforce a private set of rules on homeowners through the familiar
common-law mechanism of real estate servitudes." Many RCAs have
adopted rules that, for example, severely restrict the right of a homeowner to
engage in expressive activity on RCA streets, or even on the homeowner's
own property. 1'0 In the absence of a finding of state action under Marsh or
under some other state-action doctrine, these rules are fully enforceable
through judicial injunction.'0 ' Implicit in the prevailing legal regime is the
view that each homeowner consents to RCA servitudes when purchasing
property subject to the RCA, and that a prospective homebuyer who does
not wish to subject herself to RCA rules may purchase property else-
where."°2
Because in Marsh the assertion of a constitutional right against a private
community was made by a nonresident of the community, 3 the petitioner
in Marsh was unencumbered by any contractual relationship with the com-
munity. Marsh, therefore, does not directly address the question of whether,
in a community that is found to be the functional equivalent of a municipali-
ty, the contractual obligations of homeowners, including the obligation to
adhere to the community's rules, preclude a homeowner from challenging
one of these rules on constitutional grounds.
There are at least two possible approaches to addressing this question,
each proceeding from a somewhat different set of assumptions. The first
approach proceeds from the premise that an RCA that already has been
determined to be the functional equivalent of a municipality under the
99 See supra text accompanying note 23.
100 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
101 Such enforcement, however, remains subject to common-law theories that require
the party seeking enforcement to act reasonably and in good faith. See PATRICK J.
ROHAN, 6 HOME OWNER -ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS-LAW
AND PRACTICE § 8.05, at 8-37 (1996). Judicial interpretations of these standards vary
considerably among jurisdictions, see id. at 8-37 to 8-49, but, in general, an
"association's power in enforcing ... restrictions can be immense, as illustrated by
cases requiring the removal of a second story of a house or the relocation of the foun-
dations for a house." WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIA-
TION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 6.03(0, at 296 (2d ed. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted).
102 For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties with this view in light of contempo-
rary economic and social trends and other considerations, see infra text accompanying
notes 474-80.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
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Marsh/Hudgens doctrine would, as a state actor, be subject to the same
constitutional constraints to which the state itself is subject. Among these
constraints are those encompassed by the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, under which a state generally may not grant a privilege or benefit
subject to the condition that the recipient not exercise a constitutional
right."° Thus, a state generally may not terminate an employee if it were
to disagree with the employee's speech even if the state were free to termi-
nate the employee for other reasons. 5 Similarly, a state may not impose
unconstitutional conditions on out-of-state corporations even if the state
otherwise were able to exclude entirely the corporation from doing business
in the state."0 The- doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, as applied to an
RCA operating as a state actor would, for example, invalidate an RCA re-
strictive covenant that conditioned the right to own property in an RCA on
the waiver of one's constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expres-
sion or association. Such a condition would be unconstitutional even though
prospective property owners have no per se constitutional right to own prop-
erty in an RCA.
A second approach to addressing the question of the enforceability of
RCA contractual obligations against RCA residents draws on a theory of
state action, wholly distinct from the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine, that was first
recognized in Shelley v. Kraemer,17 a case decided by the Supreme Court
two years after Marsh. The Shelley doctrine, and its application to RCAs, is
discussed in detail in Part II.B. For present purposes, it is appropriate to
briefly discuss Shelley as it applies to the narrow question of whether, in a
community that is found to be the functional equivalent of a municipality
under the MarshiHudgens doctrine, the contractual obligations of RCA resi-
dents, including the obligation to adhere to the RCA's rules, preclude a
resident from challenging one of these rules on constitutional grounds.
In Shelley, the Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of a racial-
ly restrictive covenant constituted state action. 8 The scope of the Shelley
" See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1988); Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine
of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97,
100 (1988).
oS See Eltod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1976) (holding as unconstitutional
public officials' traditional patronage practice of replacing public employees who are
not affiliated with the political party of the public official); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) (finding that a state's refusal to renew a teacher's contract
because he had been publicly critical of state policies imposed an unconstitutional con-
dition on the receipt of a public benefit).
106 See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (holding that a state
may not condition the right of an out-of-state corporation to conduct business in the
state upon the corporation's waiver of its right to litigate in federal court).
107 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
10' See id. at 19-20. For a separate and detailed discussion of the judicial-enforcement
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principle remains unsettled: Some lower courts have confined Shelley largely
to its facts; other courts have interpreted the Shelley principle as extend-
ing to the enforcement of covenants that restrict the use and occupation of
land in ways that would be unconstitutional if such restrictions were the
product of a state instrumentality."' The broader interpretation of Shelley,
as applied to RCA residents, would mean that RCA restrictive covenants
would be unenforceable if, in their operation, they were closely analogous to
an unconstitutional land-use ordinance of a municipality.' Thus, an RCA
restrictive covenant prohibiting the display of signs on a homeowner's prop-
erty would be unconstitutional to the same extent as a zoning ordinance with
the same purpose. This would be true, under the Shelley principle, notwith-
standing the fact that the homeowner expressly agreed to be bound by the
RCA 's restrictive covenants."
2
The application of the Shelley doctrine to RCAs, unlike the application
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to RCAs, does not necessarily
depend upon a prior determination that an RCA is the functional equivalent
of a municipality under the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine. The Shelley doctrine,
as previously noted, turns on the mere act of judicial enforcement as state
action,"' rather than on the status or attributes of the party against which
judicial enforcement is sought. Still, it is possible to fashion a rationale,
premised on prudential considerations, that would limit the application of
theory of state action, see infra Part II.B. For present purposes, discussion of the theory
is limited to its potential application in nullifying the contractual obligations of home-
owners, in circumstances when a private community already has been deemed the func-
tional equivalent of a municipality under the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine. It is important to
note that the judicial-enforcement theory of state action is entirely independent of the
"functional equivalent of a municipality" theory of state action. See generally 2 RON-
ALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 16.2-.4 (2d ed. 1992).
109 See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995);
Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 135 n.6a (3d Cir. 1977).
,1o See, e.g., Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condominium, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339,
1341 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084,
1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196,
200 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969).
... Applying this principle, a court held invalid a restrictive covenant that prohibited
the construction of a house of worship. The court reasoned that "if a zoning ordinance
is in its operation, unconstitutional, a restrictive covenant in the same area having the
same effect would likewise be unconstitutional." Abbate, 261 N.E.2d at 200 (citing
Shelley).
112 In Shelley, the seller of the real property subject to the racially restrictive cove-
nant "consented" to the covenant when originally purchasing the property. Nevertheless,
the seller's consent to the covenant had no effect on the Court's decision to hold uncon-
stitutional the enforcement of the covenant. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19-20.
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
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Shelley to only those RCAs that amount to the functional equivalent of a
municipality under the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine. 114 Alternately, the Shelley
doctrine, as a theory of state action wholly independent of the
MarshiHudgens state-action theory, can be understood as applying to a
much broader range of RCAs, for reasons that arise from a careful reading
of Shelley itself. This is the subject of Part II.B of this Article. 5
14 For a discussion of the potential dangers to constitutional liberties that would
result from an overly broad interpretation of Shelley, see infra text accompanying notes
169-76. For discussion of the proper scope of the Shelley doctrine as applied to RCAs,
see infra Part II.B.3.
1,' A third approach to addressing the question of enforceability of RCA contractual
obligations against RCA residents, when the RCA already has been found to be the
'functional equivalent of a municipality under the Marsh/Hudgens doctrine, may be
derived from constitutional analysis found in Marsh. The Court in Marsh expressly
undertook a ranking of constitutional values and concluded that First Amendment values
are paramount. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509. Conversely, the constitutional value
deemed subordinate is a basic tenet of property rights, that is, the right of an owner to
exclude others from his property. See id. at 500-01.
Applying the Marsh analysis to circumstances in which an individual plaintiff's
asserted constitutional right is the same as the right asserted by the petitioner in Marsh
(freedom of expression), and in which a defendant RCA's countervailing constitutional
claim arises from the plaintiff's violation of the defendant's restrictive covenant (rather
than on a trespass on real property as in Marsh), it would be difficult to reach a result
other than the one reached in Marsh.
On the defendant's side of the ledger, the asserted violation of rights is more in the
nature of a contract breach than a violation of a core property right. Under modern
Supreme Court doctrine, contract rights appear to have a less compelling claim to con-
stitutional protection than do property rights, especially the core constitutional right by
which an owner may exclude another from his property. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation ... ."); Allied Structur-
al Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1978) ("Although it was perhaps the
strongeit single constitutional check on state legislation during our early years as a
Nation, the Contract Clause receded into comparative desuetude ... in modern consti-
tutional history."). It may be that the contract right at issue does not even rise to the
level of a constitutional right. See Spannaus, 483 U.S. at 244, 247 (holding that, among
other predicates to a Contract Clause violation, the impairment of the contract must be
"substantial" and the challenged government action must not be necessary to remedy an
"important general social problem").
In any event, the rights at stake on the plaintiff's side of the ledger are, according
to the Court in Marsh, "preferred" over other constitutional rights. Marsh, 326 U.S. at
509. Thus, Marsh's ranking of constitutional values, at least as applied to the enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants that would abridge an RCA resident's right of free expres-
sion, presumably would yield the same result as in the Marsh decision.
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4. Summary
The "functional equivalent of a municipality" theory, exemplified by
Marsh v. Alabama, arose from the limitations on personal freedoms imposed
by company towns. The Court in Marsh established a paradigm of a munici-
pality and found that a company town conformed, in essential respects, to
the paradigm. The municipal paradigm consisted of streets held open for
public use, and an amalgam of homes, a business district, and infrastruc-
ture. 116 The paradigm would encompass some territorial RCAs that exist
today." 7 The paradigm, a construct of the 1940s, may need to be updated
to reflect the typical contemporary suburban municipality, which often lacks
a business district. Such an updated paradigm would encompass many more
RCAs because the majority of RCAs lacks business districts."8
The underlying significance of Marsh lies not in its specific municipal
paradigm but rather in its recognition that company towns-the dominant
form of privatized municipal governance at the time Marsh was decid-
ed-should be subject to constitutional restraints as a matter of fundamental
fairness. The Court observed that "[t]here is no more reason for depriving
[the people who reside in company towns] of the liberties guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizen."" 9 In the fifty years since Marsh, com-
pany towns virtually have disappeared and RCAs have grown to encompass
twelve percent of the United States population.' In the United States po-
litical economy today, RCAs may be said to occupy a similar, if not more
dominant, position than that occupied by company towns some fifty years
ago.' Viewed from this perspective, the Court's concern in Marsh over
the major form of privatized local government that existed at the time of its
decision would seem to apply, with equal force, to the major form of privat-
ized local government that exists today.
B. The Judicial-Enforcement Theory
1. Overview'
In Shelley v. Kraemer," the Supreme Court held that state action ex-
116 See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502-03.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
18 See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
11 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09.
120 See COMMUNITY Ass'NS INST., supra note 8, at 13.
121 See supra note 70.
122 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ists when a court enforces a racially restrictive real property covenant. The
facts of this well-known decision may be summarized in a few sentences.
Shelley, an African-American, purchased real property that was subject to a
covenant that restricted the ownership and occupancy of the property to
persons of the "Caucasian race."1 3 The same racially restrictive covenant
bound the owners of forty-seven adjacent properties in a St. Louis neighbor-
hood." By its terms, the covenant permitted any of the co-covenantors to
commence an action to enforce the covenant against any other co-covenan-
tor, or against any successor in interest of a co-covenantor. 25 Kraemer, a
co-covenantor, brought suit against Shelley, seeking enforcement of the
covenant in the form of a judgment divesting Shelley of title to the proper-
ty." The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the covenant was
fully enforceable and ordered the trial court to grant the relief Kraemer
requested." The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that judi-
cial enforcement of the covenant amounted to state action and that such
state action violated the Equal Protection Clause."
Shelley has been called "one of the most controversial and problematic
decisions in all of constitutional law."'29 The controversy surrounding the
decision results at least in part from the somewhat disingenuous way in
which the Court reached its decision. The opinion, by Chief Justice Vincent,
characterized its finding of state action as a straightforward application of
established state-action principles, noting that the general proposition that
judicial action is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment is
"a proposition which has been long established by decisions of this
Court.' ' 30 The Court proceeded to cite no fewer than forty-one of its prior
decisions in support of this general proposition.' The cited decisions,
however, arose either from violations of procedural due process in state
123 Id. at 5.
124 See id.
125 See id.
16 See id. at 6.
127 See id. (citing Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946)).
1 See id. at 20.
129 GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1491 (1986). Shelley has
spawned a voluminous literature. See, e.g., Louis. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for
a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959);
Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
383 (1988); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); David S. Elkind, Note, State Action: Theories for Applying
Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
130 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 14.
131 See id at 14-18 nn.13-22.
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court criminal and civil proceedings"' or from violations of First Amend-
ment rights in the judicial enforcement of substantive common-law rules in
criminal prosecutions and tort actions.33 The cited decisions provide scant
support for the specific holding in Shelley that judicial enforcement of the
substantive provisions of a private agreement could amount to state action
and, solely by virtue of such state action, subject the substantive contractual
provisions, under some circumstances, to constitutional constraints." For
this reason, the Shelley opinion has been harshly criticized as failing to
recognize the distinction between the judiciary in its capacity as a public
institution and the judiciary in its capacity as an enforcer of private transac-
tions. 35 Far from being a straightforward application of well-established
state-action principles, Shelley represents the recognition of an entirely new
branch of state-action theory.
The failure of the Court in Shelley to address directly or even to ac-
knowledge its own doctrinal disjuncture led inexorably to other critical
shortcomings in the opinion. Thus, the Court failed to even consider the
countervailing constitutional values at stake'36 and failed to articulate a co-
herent set of principles by which lower courts could apply the Shelley theory
of state action in particular cases. In the absence of this guidance, the Shel-
ley decision, taken literally, can be understood as subjecting to constitutional
132 See id. at 15-17 nn.14-18.
3 See id at 17-18 nn.20-21.
4 See id. at 18-23. It is telling that the Court, following its exhaustive survey of its
own precedent, went on to state the following proposition, almost as an aside: "Nor is
the [Fourteenth] Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of dis-
crimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a pri-
vate agreement." Id. at 20. Significantly, this statement was not accompanied by any
citation to authority. This statement constitutes the theory of state action first recognized
in Shelley.
135 See Henkin, supra note 129 at 474-77.
136 If the judiciary, acting in its capacity as an enforcer of private transactions, were
deemed a state actor, then this determination would have a direct and substantial effect
on the enforceability of private transactions, which, in turn, suggests that the contract
rights and property rights secured by these transactions may well be abridged in partic-
ular cases. These contract rights and property rights themselves have a constitutional
dimension. See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 249-50 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
concurring):
Underlying ... [Shelley] is a clash of competing constitutional claims of a high
order: liberty and equality. Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or
his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational,
arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to
a large measure of protection from government interference.
See also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For a discussion of
the countervailing constitutional rights at stake in applying state-action theory to RCAs,
see infra text accompanying notes 465-503.
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constraints the entire sphere of private agreements whenever these agree-
ments are subject to judicial enforcement. It is doubtful that the Court ever
intended this result in Shelley, because such a result effectively would re-
duce the Fourteenth Amendment state-action requirement to a "meaningless
formality."' 3
The essential ambiguity of the Shelley opinion, and the apparent unwill-
ingness of the Supreme Court to revisit the decision, 3 ' has ensured a lega-
cy of doctrinal confusion. Although virtually all courts and commentators
agree that the reach of the Shelley doctrine should be restricted, the search
for a limiting principle has failed to produce anything approaching a consen-
sus. Quite to the contrary, the Shelley decision has given rise to a welter of
conflicting interpretation as to its essential meaning and application.'39
Some courts essentially limit the application of Shelley to the judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.' Other courts interpret Shel-
ley as proscribing the judicial enforcement of covenants that discriminate on
grounds other than race as well as covenants that abridge fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and the first eight amendments to the
Constitution.' Other courts, whether accepting of a narrow or a broad in-
terpretation of the rights protected by Shelley, limit the application of the
Shelley holding to circumstances in which judicial enforcement of a private
covenant is contrary to the wishes of parties to a transaction to which the
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL CHOICES 259 (1985).
138 In the nearly fifty years since Shelley was decided, the Court has never defined
the essential contours of the Shelley doctrine.
139 See infra notes 142-76 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995)
("The holding of Shelley ... has not been extended beyond the context of race discrim-
ination."); Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 135 n.6a (3d Cir. 1977) ("[The Shelley]
doctrine has been limited to cases involving racial discrimination."); Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 549 (Pa. 1984) ("Where a state
court enforces the right of private persons to take actions which are permitted but not
compelled by law, there is no state action for constitutional purposes in the absence ot a
finding that racial discrimination is involved as existed in the Shelley case . . ").
141 See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the judicial enforcement of a discovery motion sought by a private party would
amount to state action under the Shelley doctrine and, as such, its enforcement would
violate the First Amendment rights of the litigant against whom the order would have
been enforced); Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238-39
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the judicial enforcement of an injunction against the boy-
cotting of a merchant would amount to state action under the Shelley doctrine); Henry
v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the judicial en-
forcement of an injunction against the boycotting of a merchant would amount to state
action under the Shelley doctrine); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court, 752 F. Supp.
1152, 1156 (D.P.R. 1990) (holding that judicial enforcement of discrimination against
handicapped persons amounts to state action under the Shelley doctrine).
19981 493
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
covenant applies,142 a circumstance that was present in Shelley. Still other
courts, explicitly or implicitly recognizing the functional similarity of the
restrictive covenant in Shelley to government land-use regulation, have ap-
plied the Shelley holding broadly when the matter at issue has been the
enforcement of restrictive covenants that controlled the use and occupation
of land.'43 Significantly, only a few commentators have called for the
overturning of Shelley,1" a fact that suggests that there is broad (if not un-
qualified) support for the Shelley doctrine, but very little agreement on the
scope, and indeed the central meaning, of the doctrine. These matters are
discussed at length in the next Section.
2. The Shelley Doctrine and Its Application: The Search for a Limiting
Principle
The purpose of the present discussion is not to consider actual and po-
tential applications of the Shelley doctrine to RCAs; that discussion comes
later. The purpose, quite simply, is to consider the proper scope of the Shel-
ley doctrine because, as noted above, this crucial issue of constitutional law
has yet to be resolved. 4 Toward this end, this Article considers four dis-
tinct principles that, to varying degrees, would limit the scope of the Shelley
doctrine. This discussion begins with the principle that would limit Shelley
most narrowly and proceeds, in ascending order, to the principle that would
apply Shelley most broadly. One of the four principles is then identified as
appearing to best embody the complex considerations that gave rise to the
Shelley decision. This article then discusses the actual and potential applica-
tion of this principle to RCAs.
142 See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 330-32 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting);
see also Pollak, supra note 129, at 13.
143 See, e.g., Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condominium, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 884
(M.D. Fla. 1989); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 1969); see also Lewis, supra note 129, at 1115-16.
141 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 15-16 (1971) ("[Shelley] converts an amendment whose text and history
clearly show it to be aimed only at governmental discrimination into a sweeping prohi-
bition of private discrimination. There is no warrant anywhere for that conversion.");
Lino A. Greglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 787-88
(1989) ("[Shelley] is disconcerting because it illustrates with stark clarity both the
Court's belief and the truth that it is exempt from any requirement that its opinions
make sense.").
45 See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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a. Shelley Is Limited to the Enforcement of Racially Restrictive Covenants
Some courts and commentators have limited Shelley to the judicial en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants, a limitation that essentially con-
fines Shelley to its facts.14 There is little in Shelley that would support
such a restrictive interpretation. Most of the opinion in Shelley is taken up
with the question of whether judicial enforcement of a private covenant
amounts to state action.147 The Court answered this question in the affir-
mative'48 and, in doing so, did not expressly limit its newly recognized
theory of state action to any particular subject matter.'49
Thus, in order to confine the judicial-enforcement theory of state action
to racially restrictive private covenants, one must look beyond Shelley and
consider other established principles of constitutional law. One need not
look far; racial equality is, without question, a central concern of the Equal
Protection Clause and of constitutional law generally.15 However, the
proposition that racial equality is a central concern of the Constitution is
quite different from the proposition that the right to be free of racial dis-
crimination is a right that is superior to all other constitutional rights includ-
ing, for example, the right of free expression and the right to privacy. It is
the latter proposition, and not the former, that would support a narrow read-
ing of Shelley to the effect that the judicial-enforcement theory of state
action is limited to racially restrictive covenants and may never apply to
covenants that, for example, limit free expression or infringe the right to
146 See supra note 140.
147 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8-21.
148 See id. at 23.
149 In fact, the theory of state action first recognized in Shelley is articulated in
sweeping language:'
Nor is the [Fourteenth] Amendment ineffective simply because the particular
pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by
the terms of a private agreement. State action, as that phrase is understood for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all
forms. And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the
constitutional commands.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Note that "rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment" encompasses the substantive rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in addition to the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
ISO See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AII legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.");
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
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privacy. However, the latter proposition which amounts to an explicit rank-
ing of constitutional values, is not a recognized principle of constitutional
law.15 '
Those who advocate the limiting of Shelley to racially restrictive private
covenants apparently would believe that judicial enforcement of a covenant
that effectively prohibits a married couple from living together in a private
residence' is a constitutional exercise of judicial power as is the judicial
enforcement of a private covenant that prohibits the displaying of signs in a
private residence. 5 1 Shelley unquestionably is in need of a limiting princi-
ple, but as the above real-world examples of private covenants may dem-
onstrate, the limiting principle should not be so confining as to recognize
one and only one constitutional right-racial equality-when courts enforce
private covenants.
b. Shelley Is Limited to the Enforcement of Covenants Affecting Particular
Transactions Under Circumstances in Which the Transaction Would Have
Been Completed but for the Enforcement of the Covenant
Shelley arose from the enforcement of a covenant against a particular
sale of real property in which both the buyer and seller of the property were
willing participants in the transaction. 54 Under these circumstances, the
transaction would have been completed but for the intervention of the state
court, which acted in this case not on behalf of either buyer or seller, but on
behalf of a plaintiff co-covenantor of the seller. 55 In one passage in the
Shelley opinion, the Court expressly noted that the transaction would have
been completed but for the intervention of the state court, and suggested that
this fact was a factor in its determination that state action was present in the
judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenant. 56
'' The distinction is a subtle one and thus bears repeating: Although racial equality
under law is, without doubt, a paramount constitutional value, it has never been held to
be the supreme constitutional value, superior per se to the values guaranteed by the
First Amendment, for example.
152 For a description of such an RCA covenant and of its judicial enforcement against
an RCA homeowner,, see supra note 36.
15' For a description of such an RCA covenant, see supra note 32.
'5 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
'5 See id. at 6.
156
We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and
complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose that petitioners were
willing purchasers of properties upon which they desired to establish homes. The
owners of the properties were willing sellers; and contracts of sale were accord-
ingly consummated. It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been
free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.
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Although in Shelley the Court did not unequivocally adopt a "but for"
standard of judicial intervention as a necessary precondition to a finding of
state action in the judicial-enforcement context, some courts, stressing the
fact pattern of Shelley and the passage in the opinion noted above, have
argued for the adoption of such a standard. 57 Alternatively, many other
courts have ignored or declined to limit the judicial-enforcement theory of
state action to the particular circumstances giving rise to the Shelley deci-
sion.'58 Indeed, much in the Shelley opinion suggests that the judicial-en-
forcement theory of state action extends beyond the narrow confines of a
"but for" standard of judicial intervention.'5 9
Id. at 19. Although this passage from Shelley suggests that a "but for" standard was a
factor in the Court's determination that state action was present, the passage does not
foreclose a broader reading of the Shelley holding. In fact, the opinion elsewhere seems
to invite a broader reading, as in this passage:
Nor is the [Fourteenth] Amendment ineffective simply because the particular
pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by
the terms of a private agreement. State action, as that phrase is understood for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all
forms. And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the
constitutional commands.
Id. at 20.
"" For example, Justice Black, writing in dissent in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964), argued for the proposition that Shelley protects the right of a property owner to
"sell his property to whom he pleases.., so long as both parties are willing par-
ties . . . ." Id. at 331. Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), also adopted this characterization of the Shelley holding.
See id. at 635-36.
158 See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the judicial enforcement of a discovery motion sought by a private party would
amount to state action under the Shelley doctrine and, as such, its enforcement would
violate the First Amendment rights of the litigant against whom the order would have
been enforced); Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238-39
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the judicial enforcement of an injunction against the boy-
cotting of a merchant would amount to state action under the Shelley doctrine); Henry
v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the judicial en-
forcement of an injunction against the boycotting of a merchant would amount to state
action under the Shelley doctrine); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court, 752 F. Supp.
1152, 1156 (D.P.R. 1990) (holding that judicial enforcement of discrimination against
handicapped persons amounts to state action under the Shelley doctrine); Gerber v.
Longboat Harbour N. Condominium, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Franklin
v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); West
Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969).
159 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20:
Nor is the [Fourteenth] Amendment ineffective simply because the particular
pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by
the terms of a private agreement. State action, as that phrase is understood for the
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As a potential limiting principle intended to curtail the reach of the
Shelley doctrine, the "but for" principle merits careful consideration. In
essence, the principle characterizes the act of judicial enforcement as a su-
pervening force, separate and distinct from the intentions of certain parties
to a particular transaction. Because the judicial enforcement does not arise
from the intentions of these parties, then, so the theory holds, the enforce-
ment may be understood as arising not from a private third party but, rather,
from the state itself.
This analysis depends upon how one chooses to define the entire matter
in controversy. Although, under the above paradigm, the act of judicial
enforcement arises from a third party to the subject transaction, e.g., the
sale of the home in Shelley, it is equally true that the judicial enforcement
arises from a party to the subject litigation, e.g., Kraemer of Shelley was the
original plaintiff in the litigation and the party that sought the enforcement
of the racially restrictive covenant. Therefore, at the risk of belaboring the
obvious, should one choose to define the entire matter in controversy as the
litigation rather than the transaction, then the act of judicial enforcement is
not a supervening force but, rather, is the enforcement of the pleadings of
one of the parties to the litigation. This observation suggests that the charac-
terization of an act of judicial enforcement as a state act merely because it
does not arise from either party to a bipolar transaction amounts to either a
conceptual slight of hand or an instance of severe judicial myopia.
The "but for" principle has other conceptual difficulties. Taken literally,
the principle has little, if any, applicability beyond the factual circumstances
that gave rise to Shelley. As noted above, the principle is predicated upon
the existence of a two-party transaction separate from the litigation as well
as upon the existence of one party to the litigation that is not a direct party
to the subject transaction. This model, however, is of limited or no value
when the matter in controversy is a different type of transaction, even when
the rights and interests at stake in such a transaction are identical to those in
Shelley.
Consider this example, in which the facts in Shelley are somewhat al-
tered, but the parties and historic circumstances surrounding the case remain
the same. Imagine that the co-covenantors of Shelley have established a
homeowners association, of which membership among all co-covenantors is
mandatory, and that the association maintains recreational facilities generally
available to members of the association. Imagine further that Shelley, an
African-American, was permitted to purchase a home within the homeown-
ers association, but that he was not permitted to use the recreational facili-
ties because a restrictive covenant expressly limited use of the facilities to
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exceptions of state power in all
forms.
See also supra note 156.
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white members of the association. Shelley nevertheless attempted to use the
facilities, and the association brought suit to enforce the restrictive covenant.
What result under the "but for" principle of judicial enforcement, assuming
the statutory and common-law regime that existed in 1948?"6
It would appear that the plaintiff homeowner association would prevail
under a strict application of the "but for" principle because, under the facts
in Shelley, there is no analogue to the willing seller. Instead, there is only
the plaintiff homeowner association, which wishes to discriminate, and the
defendant African-American, who wishes to be free of discrimination. Thus,
a strict application of the "but for" principle to these facts yields a highly
unsatisfactory result, one which elevates form over substance.
The formalistic difference between the above facts and the facts in Shel-
ley should properly give way to the real issue, which is that the homeowners
association, like the plaintiff co-covenantor in Shelley, sought to enforce a
racially discriminatory restrictive covenant and that the judiciary, as an in-
strumentality of the state, was poised to undertake such an enforcement. If
the Shelley holding were to stand for anything, it surely must stand for a
principle that is sufficiently broad as to encompass the facts described
above. If so, then it follows that the "but for" standard of judicial enforce-
ment must be rejected as a potential principle that would limit the applica-
tion of the judicial-enforcement theory of state action.
c. Shelley Is Limited to the Enforcement of Covenants That Restrict the Use
and Occupation of Land in Ways That Would Be Unconstitutional if Such
Restrictions Were the Product of a State Instrumentality
Shelley arose from the enforcement of a restrictive covenant affecting
the use of real property. This simple observation suggests a principle by
which the application of Shelley may be limited: that is the Shelley doctrine
does not reach every act of judicial enforcement of private agreements, but,
rather, the doctrine is confined to some private covenants that control the
use and occupation of land. This interpretation of Shelley stresses the func-
tional similarity of comprehensive schemes of private restrictive covenants
that "run with the land" and of municipal zoning. 6 '
16 By 1973, the Supreme Court had struck down the form of racial discrimination
described above, although on statutory rather than constitutional grounds:
When an organization links membership benefits to residency in a narrow geo-
graphical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the bundle of rights for
which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the area. The mandate of
42 U.S.C. § 1982 then operates to guarantee a nonwhite resident, who purchases,
leases, or holds this property, the same rights as ... a white resident.
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973). Having
disposed of this matter on statutory grounds, the Court did not pass on the constitutional
question of whether the Shelley doctrine applied to these facts.
161 See generally Lewis, supra note 129, at 1115-16; see also Petition for Writ of
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The zoning analogy draws strength from the suggestion in Shelley that
the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was merely an indirect way
of accomplishing what legislatively determined zoning schemes had accom-
plished directly, 162 prior to the Court declaring such zoning schemes un-
constitutional. 163 On this view, Shelley can be read as standing for the
proposition that, to the extent that a zoning scheme seeks to accomplish an
unconstitutional purpose and is thereby invalid, the judicial enforcement of a
restrictive covenant seeking to effectuate the same unconstitutional purpose
also is invalid."x '
This reading of Shelley is premised on what may be fairly characterized
as an unstated assumption of Shelley that comprehensive local land-use con-
trol is a sovereign function of government and that even partial delegation
of this function to private parties is an appropriate subject of constitutional
concern.65 Note that this unstated assumption draws on the principles ar-
ticulated in the public-function theory of state action first recognized in
Marsh.166 In this way, this interpretation of Shelley attempts to overcome
some of the analytic weakness of the Shelley decision-such as the lack of
an explicit limiting principle-by drawing on the principles articulated in
another branch of state-action theory.
A land-use reading of Shelley offers a coherent and plausible principle
by which the Shelley doctrine can be understood and applied. This principle
will be returned to shortly, at which time the intrinsic and extrinsic factors
supporting this reading of Shelley are more comprehensively discussed
167
Certiorari at 46, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 1947-72) ("Judicial en-
forcement by injunction of the restrictive covenant achieves precisely the same purpose
as a zoning ordinance.").
162 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 11 ("It is ... clear that restrictions on the right of occu-
pancy of the sort sought to be created by the private agreements in these cases could
not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state
statute or local ordinance.") (emphasis added).
163 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1917).
16 See West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1969); see also Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condominium, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884,
886-87 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084,
1088-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1023 n.24
(Okla. 1985); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 578-79 (Tex. App. 1981).
165 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 1947-72) ("The series of covenants becomes in effect a zoning ordi-
nance binding those in the area subject to the restriction without their consent ....
When a State has delegated to private persons a power so similar to law-making author-
ity, its exercise may fairly be held subject to constitutional restrictions."); see also Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 329 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
166 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
167 See infra Part II.B.3.
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and a land-use reading of Shelley is adopted for the purposes of this Arti-
cle.168
d. Shelley Applies to the Enforcement of Covenants That Would Be
Unconstitutional if Such Covenants Were the Product of a State
Instrumentality
It is possible to read Shelley as standing for the sweeping proposition
that "[w]hen judges command private persons to take specific actions which
violate the Constitution if done by the State, state action will be present in
the resulting harm to constitutionally recognized rights."169 This interpreta-
tion is not a limitation upon Shelley; it is Shelley unbound, a literal extrapo-
lation of Chief Justice Vincent's opinion. Brief reference to this interpreta-
tion is made at this juncture only for the purpose of rounding out the discus-
sion of alternative readings of the Shelley holding.
A moment's reflection reveals the conceptual weakness and, indeed, the
potential dangers to constitutional liberties of an unbridled Shelley. If "every
private right were transformed into governmental action by the mere fact of
court enforcement of it, the distinction between private and governmental
action would be obliterated."' 70 Thus, Shelley unbound would preclude, for
example, the probate of a will leaving a testator's property to a particular
religious organization; 7' the enforcement of a trespass action in which a
white homeowner seeks to exclude African-Americans from attending a
private function in his home;' the issuance of an injunction against labor
picketing when such picketing is expressly proscribed by an employment
agreement, but which otherwise would be permitted by law;' and the en-
forcement of an arbitration decision in which the arbitration procedure did
not rise to the level of due process required in court proceedings.'74 In
168 See infra Part II.B.4.
169 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, § 16.3, at 545.
170 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
171 See Pollak, supra note 129, at 12-13.
172 See Henkin, supra note 129, at 498.
173 For example, a labor organization that pickets an employer on a public street
adjacent to the employer's property ordinarily would be entitled to maintain such a
picket under the First Amendment consistent with reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of the protest. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177
(1983) (setting standards for regulating expression in a public forum). However, an
employer could seek an injunction against the labor organization if the picketing were
to amount to a violation of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and
the labor organization. An unbridled Shelley presumably would prevent a court from
issuing an injunction in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
171 See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81,
111 (1992).
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each case, an unrestrained application of the Shelley doctrine would trans-
form these private actions into state action and, in each case, the constitu-
tional standards applicable to state action would preclude judicial enforce-
ment.
In short, Shelley unbound would lead to the demise of an entire sphere
of personal liberty, property, and privacy-a sphere that in many cases, has
at least an equal claim to constitutional protection as do the very rights the
Shelley doctrine sought to vindicate.' If the Shelley doctrine were to be
applied at all, it must be applied only after careful consideration is given to
countervailing constitutional principles. Because a broad unrestrained appli-
cation of the Shelley doctrine does not prescribe a means by which to bal-
ance competing constitutional claims, it is untenable.76
3. Proposed Recognition of a Principle That Would Limit Shelley to the
Enforcement of Covenants That Restrict the Use and Occupation of Land in
Ways That Would Be Unconstitutional if Such Restrictions Were the Product of
a State Instrumentality
The preceding Section discussed the lingering ambiguity and confusion
over the scope of the Shelley doctrine and considered four alternative princi-
ples that would resolve the ambiguity and, to varyinig degrees, limit the
application of the doctrine. First considered was a narrow principle that
would limit Shelley to the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. This
principle was rejected because it is inconsistent with other well-established
principles of constitutional law. Racial nondiscrimination, while undeniably
an important constitutional value, has never been held by the Supreme Court
to be a higher value than, for example, free expression, such that a particu-
lar theory of state action could implicate the former but never the latter. 77
Considered second was a somewhat broader principle that would limit Shel-
175
Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and
dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even
unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of protec-
tion from governmental interference. This liberty would be overridden, in the
name of equality, if the strictures of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were applied to
governmental and private action without distinction.
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
176 While Shelley makes clear that judicial enforcement amounts to state action (and a
later Supreme Court decision, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953), makes
clear that the award of damages amounts to state action), the Court in Shelley was care-
ful to point out that the mere making of a contract does not amount to state action. See
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13. Left unanswered is the question of the residual legal signifi-
cance, if any, of a technically valid contract that is unenforceable at law or in equity.
" See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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ley to circumstances in which judicial enforcement of a private covenant is
contrary to the wishes of the parties to a transaction to which the covenant
applies. This principle was rejected because the terms "parties" and "trans-
action" are too narrowly defined, and a broader definition undercuts the
conceptual basis for the principle. 78 Also rejected was the exceedingly
broad principle that holds that Shelley applies to the enforcement of cove-
nants that would be unconstitutional if such covenants were the products of
a state instrumentality. This principle is plainly inadequate in that it fails to
take account of countervailing constitutional values associated with actions
generally considered private."'
The remaining principle considered-limiting Shelley to the enforcement
of covenants that restrict the use and occupation of land in ways that would
be unconstitutional if such covenants were the product of a state instrumen-
tality--occupies the middle ground of interpretation.' This reading of
Shelley is not so constrained as to confine the decision essentially to its
facts, nor is the reading so broad as to submit to constitutional constraints
that which remains of the common law. Instead, the land-use reading of
Shelley hews closely to Shelley's grounding in the conflict between constitu-
tional values and the common-law principles governing restrictive covenants
and real-property transactions.
The land-use reading of Shelley is consistent with many of the Court's
underlying concerns in Shelley. Three decades before Shelley was decided,
the Court in Buchanan v. Warley' held that racially restrictive municipal
zoning ordinances were unconstitutional. 182 In Shelley, the Court squarely
confronted the legacy of its earlier decision that the enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants arose as an indirect way of accomplishing what legisla-
tively determined zoning schemes had accomplished directly. 83 At issue
was the privatization of the municipal zoning authority.
In order to appreciate the full significance of the matter before the Court
in Shelley, some historical background is necessary. In the aftermath of
Buchanan, developers and homeowner associations, among others, estab-
lished racially restrictive private covenants to achieve the same purposes of
178 See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 169-76.
'so See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
181 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
182 See id. at 82.
183 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 11 ("It is ... clear that restrictions on the right of occu-
pancy of the sort sought to be created by these private agreements in these cases could
not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state
statute or local ordinance.") (emphasis added); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 49, Shelley (No. 1947-72) ("The Record in this case discloses that private individuals
got together to do what the state was forbidden to do, and created a ghetto solely be-
cause of race or color.").
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the zoning provisions the Court had declared unconstitutional. 184 By the
time of Shelley, racially restrictive private covenants had become a common
practice in new suburban subdivisions as well as in many older urban areas
in the North."5 One study of New York covenants in 1947 found that six-
ty-three percent of new developments with twenty or more homes had race
restrictions.1 16 A study of Chicago found that "over half the residential ar-
ea not occupied by Negroes [was] covenanted against colored people.', 8 7
Another study found that racial covenants "were widespread in cities from
coast to coast,"'88 achieving a form of segregation as effective and as per-
vasive as if this land-use policy were enacted expressly by state legislatures
and city councils. Against this background, the Court in Shelley was com-
pelled to decide whether the partial delegation'89 of a key element of gov-
's The link between Buchanan and the widespread adoption of racially restrictive
covenants is cogently described in the amicus curiae brief of the Solicitor General in
Shelley:
[R]acial restrictive covenants came to be widely used only after this Court had
ruled that racial residential segregation could not be imposed by state or munici-
pal legislatures. They seem to have been adopted as a substitute for such legisla-
tion, and have, indeed, well fulfilled that role. Racial restrictive covenants have
become so pervasive in this country that the consequences of their enforcement
are hardly distinguishable from, and certainly no less serious than, the legislative-
ly-imposed segregations invalidated in Buchanan v. Warley ....
... The result of the constantly increasing use of restrictive covenants has
been large-scale compulsory segregation of racial groups with respect to housing.
That segregation is not confined to Louisville, Kentucky, as it was in Buchanan v.
Warley; it has become a national problem; the effects of such covenants are ap-
parent in most of the major urban communities of our country.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 78.
185 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 49, Shelley (No. 1947-72) ("The extent to
which [racially restrictive covenants] exist[] is stated in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Missouri here sought to be reviewed. [Such covenants] extend[] from coast to
coast."); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 69-74. For contemporary accounts of
racial segregation in residential communities at the time of Shelley, see CHARLES S.
JOHNSON, NEGRO HOUSING (1932); ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948).
16 See John P. Dean, Only Caucasian: A Study of Race Covenants, J. LAND & PUB.
UTIL. ECON., 428, 429 (1947).
187 WEAVER, supra note 186, at 247.
188 MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 69.
89 The term "partial delegation" is used here because the state, through the judiciary,
retained enforcement power, and this enforcement power was the state action implicated
in Shelley. However, because mere judicial enforcement in many other contexts has not
been held to be state action, see supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text, something
more than judicial enforcement, standing alone, must have given rise to the Shelley
holding. Accordingly, the additional element present in Shelley is the partial delegation
of governmental land-use decision-making authority to private parties, an analysis which
draws on the principles articulated in the public-function theory of state action recog-
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ernmental land-use decision making was constitutionally permissible, and
the Court, in essence, decided that it was not.190
To be sure, Shelley is concerned both with the partial delegation of
governmental land-use decision making and with invidious racial classifica-
tions. The practical result of this combination of concerns-racial apart-
heid-represents an exceptionally powerful threat to constitutional
values. 9' Still, to acknowledge this fact is also to recognize that the land-
use component of Shelley is itself an essential and powerful element of the
decision, an element that may properly shape the contours of the state-action
principle first recognized in Shelley.
As noted earlier, the land-use reading of Shelley is premised on what
may be fairly characterized as Shelley's unstated assumption that compre-
hensive local land-use control is a sovereign function of government92 and
nized in Marsh.
The phrase "in essence" is meant to emphasize that the Court in Shelley did not
make reference to the issues discussed above: the explosive growth in the use of racial-
ly restrictive covenants in the wake of the Court's decision in Buchanan, and the effect
of this trend on urban development and racial segregation throughout the nation. Unlike
its decision six years later in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
Court in Shelley studiously avoided discussion of broader social and economic factors
affecting its constitutional analysis. Shelley must be understood in terms of these factors
because the Court's nominal basis for its decision-merely that judicial enforcement of
private covenants amounts to state action-is plainly unsatisfactory. See supra text ac-
companying notes 135-39, 169-74.
191
The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the
Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to achieve,
it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment of equality in
the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those
rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States based on considerations
of race or color. Seventy-five years ago this Court announced that the provisions
of the Amendment are to be construed with this fundamental purpose in mind.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23 (citations omitted).
192 The question of whether zoning independently qualifies as a public function under
the Supreme Court's public-function analysis set forth in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974), and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
157-60 (1978), requires extended discussion. This Article takes the view that a large
territorial RCA that exercises land-use powers in the form of a comprehensive scheme
of restrictive covenants can be understood as exercising a public function under the
Jackson/Flagg Bros. test. To reach this conclusion, however, certain assumptions must
be made concerning this test because the Court has afforded only limited guidance as to
the meaning of the test and its application.
Public-function analysis, it will be recalled, applies not merely to private municipal-
ities such as the company town in Marsh, but also to any function that is "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted); see
supra text accompanying notes 48-58. The Jackson formulation leaves unanswered pre-
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cisely how a particular function is to be defined. This is a significant omission because
a narrowly defined function is more likely to satisfy the requirements of the test, where-
as a broadly defined function is certain to encompass activities traditionally associated
with the private sector. The Jackson formulation also leaves unanswered whether the
exclusivity requirement applies to the entire United States or applies, for example, ex-
clusively to the political subdivision particular to the circumstances of the case.
The importance of the first unanswered question-that is, whether a public function
is defined narrowly or broadly-can be readily appreciated when considering whether
zoning can be understood as a public function under the Jackson formulation. The pow-
er to zone is a police power of the state, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1, 4 (1974), and the zoning power, in its traditional form, is exercised exclusively by
the state. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1618-19 (6th ed. 1995). Alternately, if one
were to define zoning as a form of land-use control, then the activity encompassed by
that term undoubtedly includes activity traditionally undertaken by the private sector.
In this case, Jackson's first unanswered question can be resolved by characterizing
the function under consideration as land-use control rather than zoning. Having charac-
terized the function more broadly, it may appear that land-use control cannot then be
characterized as a public function under the Jackson formulation. However, the matter
cannot be settled until the second question left unanswered by the Jackson formulation
is resolved.
The question whether a particular function is "traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State" turns on how one chooses to define the territory to which a particular func-
tion is said to be exclusive. If the territory were the entire United States, then land-use
control cannot be said to be a public function. However, if the territory were confined
to the jurisdiction of a particular political subdivision, then a different answer may
obtain.
On this question left open by Jackson, the Court has since provided some much-
needed guidance. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-60. In reviewing its prior public-
function decisions, the Court in Flagg Bros. noted:
These two branches of the public-function doctrine [the conduct of certain prima-
ry elections, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), and the operation of a
company town, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)] have in common the
feature of exclusivity .... [T]he elections held by the Democratic Party and its
affiliates were the only meaningful elections in Texas, and the streets owned by
the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp. [the owner of the company town in Marsh] were the
only streets in Chickasaw ....
Id. at 159-60. Thus, the Court in Flagg Bros. held that the correct scope of Jackson's
exclusivity requirement is the territorial extent of the political subdivision particular to
the circumstances of the case. Most significantly, the correct scope of exclusivity for
the exercise of municipal powers, as in Marsh, is the territorial extent of the municipali-
ty. Under this analysis, then, a large territorial RCA exercising comprehensive land-use
powers within its jurisdiction and occupying all, or substantially all, of the territory of a
municipality would be exercising a public function. See Pitt v. Pine Valley Golf Club,
695 F. Supp. 778, 783 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that restrictions of an RCA that occupied
an entire municipality amounted to zoning power and that, as such, the RCA was exer-
cising a public function).
A rigid requirement that a large territorial RCA occupy the entire territory of a
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that even partial delegation of this function to private parties is an appropri-
ate subject of constitutional concern. 93 Note that this unstated assumption
draws on the principles articulated in the public-function theory of state ac-
tion first recognized in Marsh. In this way, this interpretation of Shelley
attempts to overcome some of the analytic weakness of the Shelley opin-
ion-such as the lack of an explicit limiting principle-by drawing on the
principles articulated in another branch of state-action theory.
The land-use reading of Shelley not only limits the subject matter of the
Shelley doctrine in a principled way, it also suggests a coherent approach to
applying the Shelley doctrine to the various types of claims that would fall
within the subject matter limitation. Simply put, "[I]f a zoning ordinance is
in its operation, unconstitutional, a restrictive covenant in the same area
having the same effect would likewise be unconstitutional."' 94 Thus, this
interpretation of Shelley would do no more than adopt the well-settled con-
stitutional law principles affecting municipal zoning ordinances 95 and ap-
municipality is a bit too formalistic because some municipalities occupy hundreds of
square miles while other municipalities are no larger than a few square blocks. But the
basic principle underlying the Flagg Bros. test appears sound-that the scope of public-
function analysis for traditional municipal powers, such as land-use control, is at the
local, rather than national, level. Under a relaxed reading of Flagg Bros., a large territo-
rial RCA that dominates a local housing market or political subdivision would be
deemed to exercise a public function when making and enforcing a comprehensive
scheme of restrictive covenants. This reading is a proper reconciliation of public-func-
tion analysis and a land-use reading of Shelley.
A large territorial RCA also can be deemed a state actor by operation of the
Marsh/Hudgens test, as distinct from the Jackson/Flagg Bros. test. See supra Part
II.A.3. Moreover, it should be noted that the land-use reading of Shelley does not de-
pend upon a specific determination that land-use control qualifies as a public function
under the Jackson/Flagg Bros. test; rather, it is that the land-use reading of Shelley
draws strength from the principles articulated in another branch of state-action theory.
193 See supra note 165.
'9 West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969).
195 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme
Court upheld the municipal power to zone. The Court noted, however, that particular
zoning provisions would be unconstitutional when the "provisions are clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. The Court later characterized the Euclid test
as equivalent to the familiar rational basis standard, see Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974), under which most government action is presumed to be
valid. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). If
the zoning provision were to implicate a fundamental right or suspect class, however,
the presumption of validity would no longer be applicable. See id. at 440-42 (citing
examples of suspect classifications that, if present, would subject a zoning ordinance to
heightened scrutiny); Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 6-8 (citing examples of fundamental
rights that, if present, would subject a zoning ordinance to heightened scrutiny). Thus,
the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that banned the posting of signs on residential
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ply these principles to the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants that
run with the land.
The land-use reading of Shelley represents an important step toward the
reining in of the judicial-enforcement theory of state action. However, this is
not to suggest that this reading of Shelley necessarily would result in the
nonenforcement of all covenants that restrict the use and occupation of land
in ways that would be unconstitutional if such restrictions were the product
of a state instrumentality. There may be circumstances in which exceptions
to this rule are appropriate based on a balancing of competing constitutional
values, such as when a covenant is established by the owner of a single
residence and is limited in effect to the subject residence.' As is argued
in the next Section, however, the land-use reading of Shelley applies with
special force to territorial RCAs, which represent aggregations of land-use
power and which promulgate restrictive covenants on a "W'holesale" level in
much the same way that racially restrictive covenants were promulgated on
a "wholesale" level by real estate developers and RCAs in the pre-Shelley
years.
property as contrary to the right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57-58 (1994). In addition, the Court long ago
struck down racially restrictive zoning ordinances. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60, 87 (1917). The Court also has, on occasion, struck down zoning provisions that did
not implicate a fundamental right or suspect class but were found to lack a rational
basis under the Euclid standard. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (holding that a zoning
restriction on the construction of a residence for mentally retarded persons lacked ratio-
nal basis); Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-23
(1928) (holding that a zoning restriction on the construction of a residence for the aged
lacked rational basis); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-89 (1928)
(holding that a use restriction in a zoning district was irrational under the circumstanc-
es).
"g The Court in Shelley admitted no exception to its holding that the judicial enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants amounted to state action and, as such, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20-23. The
Shelley holding of per se unconstitutionality is fundamentally sound as applied to racial-
ly restrictive covenants because, as noted earlier, Shelley is concerned both with the
partial delegation of governmental land-use decision making and with invidious racial
classifications, and the practical result of this combination of concerns-racial apart-
heid-represents an exceptionally powerful threat to constitutional values. See supra
note 191 and accompanying text. However, Shelley's per se holding of unconstitutional-
ity is not necessarily applicable in other contexts, such as, for example, judicial enforce-
ment of covenants that discriminate against non-traditional households or against reli-
gion, especially when the covenant was established by the owner of a single residence
and when the covenant is limited in effect to the owner's residence. In this context,
consideration of countervailing constitutional values is appropriate and necessary. For a
discussion of the balancing of countervailing constitutional rights in the context of a
territorial RCA, see infra text accompanying notes 215-21.
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4. The Theory as Applied to RCAs
In the preceding Section, it was argued that a land-use reading of Shel-
ley offers a coherent and plausible principle by which the Shelley doctrine
can be understood and applied. This Section considers the specific applica-
tion of the principle to RCAs.
As previously noted, the RCA and the historical circumstances giving
rise to the Shelley decision are closely linked. In the period beginning with
the 1917 Supreme Court decision that struck down racially restrictive zoning
ordinances"9 and ending with the Shelley decision in 1948, homeowner
associations were the "primary mechanisms"'98 for establishing legally en-
forceable racial segregation in residential communities. 99 In older urban
neighborhoods, voluntary "neighborhood improvement associations" and the
like' were established for the purpose of excluding African-American
homebuyers through restrictive covenants aimed at encompassing as many
contiguous properties as organizers could achieve through the solicitation
and, at times, coercion of neighborhood property owners." In new large-
scale suburban subdivisions, developers commonly established homeowner
associations along with racially restrictive covenants. Establishing racially
restrictive covenants was easier under these circumstances than in existing
communities because the necessary legal steps could be taken before tie
new homes were constructed, meaning that the establishment of racially
restrictive covenants in new subdivisions was the result of an initial and
binding decision made solely by the developer. 2 Before Shelley, the con-
nection between new large-scale suburban subdivisions, homeowner associa-
tions, and racially restrictive covenants was particularly striking: Over sev-
enty percent of homes in pre-World War II developments of twenty or more
homes were subject to racially restrictive covenants.2 3
"9 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 87 (1917).
198 "Until 1948 homeowner associations, voluntary and mandatory, were the primary
mechanisms developers used to enforce race restrictive covenants." MCKENZIE, supra
note 16, at 75.
'99 As a technical matter, racially restrictive covenants could be enforced in the name
of an individual co-covenantor or in the name of the association of co-covenantors to
which the constituent property owners had delegated the authority to sue. The racially
restrictive covenant that gave rise to Shelley was of the first type: Thirty property own-
ers in a neighborhood of St. Louis entered into a covenant permitting any of the co-
covenantors to sue any other that violated the covenant. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 5-6.
200 MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 71.
2o See id. at 73.
2 See Dean, supra note 186, at 429.
13 See id.
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Today, because of Shelley and subsequent decisions' and enact-
ments, 5 racial discrimination in housing is no longer backed by the force
of law. However, the regime of privatized land-use regulation that gave rise
to Shelley has undergone a remarkable transformation. Today, comprehen-
sive schemes of restrictive covenants administered by RCAs regulate the use
and occupation of land, sometimes in ways that would violate the Constitu-
tion if the regulation were the product of a state instrumentality.' Under
prevailing constitutional principles, RCAs are free to impose a ban on post-
ing signs inside or outside a home, to restrict public assembly in their
streets, to prohibit members of a homeowner's family from cohabiting with
the homeowner, and to ban sexually explicit material from a homeowner's
bedroom.7'
By the early 1990s, the RCA land-use regime encompassed nearly fif-
teen percent of the population of the United States.2m In most major met-
ropolitan areas today, comprehensive privatized land-use decision making in
new housing developments is the norm, not the exception.' Just as pri-
vatized racial land-use decision making was pervasive in the period between
the two World Wars, privatized land-use decision making that touches on
many other sensitive constitutional issues210 is pervasive today.211 If, as
argued in the preceding Section, Shelley were to stand for something more
than the ad hoc repudiation of racially restrictive covenants,212 then it must
stand for a principle that implicates, under certain circumstances, the privat-
ized land-use decision-making power that lies at the heart of the modem
territorial RCA.
There is perhaps no better statement of the proposition that pervasive
privatized land-use decision making is constitutionally suspect than these
204 See Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (holding that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 "bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the
sale or rental of property").
... See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1994).
206 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
208 See COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., supra note 8, at 13. The Community Associations
Institute estimated that, in 1992, 32 million people lived in RCAs in the United States.
See McKenzie, supra note 11, at A23. The total population in the United States in 1990
was approximately 250 million. See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 70, at 1. If current esti-
mates were to prove correct, RCAs will encompass 30% of the United States population
early in the next century. See McKenzie, supra note 11, at A23.
"' It has been estimated that 50% of all housing for sale in the 50 largest metropoli-
tan areas of the country and nearly all residential development in California, Florida,
New York, Texas, and suburban Washington, D.C., are governed by RCAs. See COM-
MUNITY ASS'NS INST., supra note 8, at 18.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
211 See supra notes 8-9.
212 See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
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passages from the amicus curiae brief of the United States in Shelley:
Racial restrictive covenants on real property are of com-
paratively recent origin. If limited in number, and confined
to insignificant areas, they would not have been of such
public importance. But they have already expanded in large
cities from coast to coast.
•.. The Court is not here concerned with the effect or
validity of isolated racial restricted covenants. It is confront-
ed by the existence of such a mass of covenants in different
sections of the country as to warrant the assertion that pri-
vate owners have, by contract, put into effect what amounts
to legislation affecting large areas of land ... thus present-
ing constitutional issues which must be resolved by weighing
the interests of more than a single vendor or a single vend-
ee. 
213
Today, the pervasiveness of the RCA form of community suggests that the
Solicitor General's articulation of a key constitutional issue underlying Shel-
ley has assumed new significance. This is not to suggest that the RCA form
of governance is itself unconstitutional. It is to suggest, rather, that RCA
restrictive covenants should be reviewed, for constitutional purposes, as
municipal zoning ordinances: If a zoning ordinance in its operation were
unconstitutional, then an RCA restrictive covenant, in the same area and
having the same effect, should likewise be unconstitutional. 214
What of the countervailing constitutional values of liberty and property
that would be subordinated if RCA restrictive covenants were subjected to
constitutional review? The constitutional values underlying the making and
enforcement of restrictive covenants are premised on an overarching concep-
tion of individual choice: the "[f]reedom of the individual to choose his
associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property as he sees
fit." '215 Pervasive privatized land-use decision making in Shelley and in
contemporary territorial RCAs, however, is fundamentally at odds with
traditional notions of individual choice to use and dispose of property:
[Miore was involved [in Shelley] than private choice protect-
ed and made meaningful by the courts. Machinery was pro-
vided by which concerted action extending even beyond the
213 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, 79, Shelley No. 1947-72).
114 See West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1969).
215 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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will of an existing group of property owners was possible.
Since the covenants "run with the land" purchasers had no
choice but to assent to an existing scheme or forego a pur-
chase of land. Even this choice was largely nonexistent be-
cause of the widespread use of the covenants. The power
exercised was greater than ordinary contracting powers. In a
real sense the common law of the state functioned to dele-
gate zoning powers to private parties. The effect of the cove-
nants was to restrict the use of land not only beyond the
power of an individual over his own land but beyond the
period of ownership of the land by any of the parties initiat-
ing the restriction.216
Restrictive covenants, by their very nature, impose temporal and spatial
restraints that are inconsistent with notions of individual choice.217 This
inconsistency is magnified when a developer of a territorial RCA initially
establishes an RCA servitude regime, and individual "consent" to the regime
is essentially limited to the decision of whether to purchase property in the
RCA.218 Even this degree of "consent," however attenuated, is becoming
less available to vast numbers of homebuyers in the United States because
of the increasing dominance of the RCA form of housing in many states
219
and because RCAs are usually the most affordable housing available in the
community. As a practical matter, then, "consent" to the RCA form of
community governance, and its customary limitation of rights that would be
of a constitutional order if such limitations were undertaken by the state,221
is less and less a matter of choice and more a matter of necessity. For this
reason, the subjection of restrictive covenants of at least some territorial
RCAs to constitutional review would, far from threatening individual free-
dom to use and dispose of property, actually enhance this freedom.
In sum, if Shelley were to stand for something more than the ad hoc
repudiation of racially restrictive covenants, then it must stand for a princi-
ple that implicates, under certain circumstances, the privatized land-use
decision-making power that lies at the heart of the modern territorial RCA.
Implicit in the Shelley decision is the proposition that zoning is a public
function, and that a private regime of aggregated land-use power is function-
ally equivalent to zoning. It follows from this that a private regime of
216 Lewis, supra note 129, at 1115 (footnote omitted).
217 See id.
218 See infra note 477 and accompanying text.
219 See infra note 478 and accompanying text.
220 See.McKenzie, supra note 11, at A23.
221 See supra notes 32-37.
See supra note 192.
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land-use power that runs afoul of constitutional norms will be subject to
searching judicial review.223
C. The Mutual-Contacts/Symbiotic-Relationship Theory
1. Overview
The Supreme Court has recognized state action in the conduct of a pri-
vate party when there is a "sufficiently close nexus"' between the private
party and the government and when "[t]he state has so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with [the private party] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant"'  in the private conduct. Under these
circumstances, the private party and the government can be said to be in a
"symbiotic relationship,"' and the challenged conduct will be subject to
constitutional constraints.
The symbiotic-relationship theory is not supported-by any single stan-
dard or by a consistent analytic framework.227 Instead, as the Court has
candidly admitted, state action is determined by "sifting facts and weighing
circumstances."2" The ad hoc mode of decision making employed by the
Court would seem to resist any effort at generalization. However, as we
shall see, coherent principles do emerge from this branch of state-action
theory," and these principles are readily applicable to RCAs.23°
The "classic"23' symbiotic-relationship case is Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.2 32 In this decision the Court held that a privately owned
restaurant that was a tenant in a government-owned public parking garage
Not incidentally, the land-use reading of Shelley provides a principled way to
reconcile the Shelley doctrine with countervailing constitutional considerations, a critical
task not undertaken by the Court in Shelley and a task never seriously attempted by the
Court in the more than 50 years since Shelley was decided. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 215-21.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
2 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
Id.; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur cases deciding when private action might be deemed
that of the state have not been a model of consistency ... because the state action de-
termination is so closely tied to the 'framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances
present."') (citation omitted).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 254-68.
230 See infra Part II.C.2.
231 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, §16.4, at 560.
232 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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could not refuse service to African-Americans.233 The Court discerned
state action in the discriminatory conduct of the restaurant by virtue of the
high "degree of state participation and involvement" in the operation of the
restaurant.234 The finding of a symbiotic relationship between the state and
the restaurant was supported by a number of factors, including, most obvi-
ously, the fact that the restaurant leased space in a government-owned facili-
ty that otherwise was devoted to providing a service generally available to
the public.235 Government funds paid for the maintenance and upkeep of
the facility. The restaurant incidentally benefitted from its location in that
the public parking facility provided a convenient place for the restaurant's
patrons to park their cars. For its part, the government benefitted from the
presence of the restaurant, not only through the rent monies received, but
from the increased use of the parking facility attributable to restaurant pa-
trons and employees. 36 These factors, taken together, amounted to suffi-
cient contact between the government and the restaurant to give rise to a
finding of state action in the restaurant's discriminatory conduct.237
In Evans v. Newton,23 the Court discerned state action in the operation
of a privately owned park. The park property was controlled by private
trustees under the terms of a trust that required that use of the property be
restricted to white persons." The property originally had been devised to
a municipality, which for some years had operated the property in accor-
dance with the terms of the trust.24 When it became apparent that contin-
ued municipal ownership and control of a racially segregated park was no
longer consistent with constitutional requirements, 4 the municipality
sought to be removed as trustee, and its removal was accepted by the Geor-
gia courts;2 however, even after its removal the municipality appeared to
furnish some maintenance services to the park property. 3 The Supreme
Court held that these circumstances gave rise to a finding of state action
3 See id. at 726.
234 Id. at 724.
"35 "[T]he restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a
public parking service ... ." Id (emphasis added). This is an "obvious fact" that, to-
gether with other considerations, suggests a sufficient "degree of state participation" to
give rise to a finding of state action in the restaurant's conduct. Id.
236 See id.
237 See id.
23 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
239 See id. at 298.
240 See id. at 297-98.
241 See id. at 298.
22 See id. (citing Evans v. Newton, 138 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. 1964)).
243 See id. at 301. Justice White vigorously disputed this point in a concurring opin-
ion. See id. at 304 (White, J., concurring).
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because of the property's "tradition of municipal control,"244 the continu-
ing role of the municipality in the maintenance of the property, and the
public nature of land used as a park within a city. 5
Burton and Newton were decided at a time when the Court took an
expansive view of the symbiotic-relationship theory. Subsequent decisions
suggest that the Court has drastically narrowed the scope of the theory. For
example, the Court failed to discern state action in the conduct of a private
club notwithstanding its licensure by the state, in the conduct of a pri-
vately owned electric utility notwithstanding its extensive regulation by the
state and its status as a government-approved monopoly,247 and in the con-
duct, respectively, of a private school"'8 and of a nursing home 9 not-
withstanding their licensure, regulation, and substantial funding by the state.
In each case, the Court held that the challenged practices of the private
entities were not subject to constitutional constraints because the practices
could not be shown to be approved, encouraged, or even influenced by the
state as a consequence of state licensure, regulation, or funding." ° By con-
trast, Burton and Newton seem to stand for the proposition that when there
are sufficient contacts between a private actor and the government, then the
approval, encouragement, or influence of the government in the challenged
conduct of the private actor may be fairly inferred."' In its subsequent
I4 Id. at 301.
24 See id. at 301-02. ("Like the streets of the company town in Marsh v. Ala-
bama ... the predominant character and purpose of this [private] park are municipal.")
(citations omitted).
246 See Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-75 (1972).
2 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1974).
28 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
249 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-05 (1982).
250 See id. at 1005-11; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59;
see also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195 (1988) (holding that the conduct of a
private sports association did not amount to state action notwithstanding the relationship
of the sports association to the public university); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522, 546-47 (1987) (holding that the conduct of the USOC, a pri-
vate corporation, did not amount to state action notwithstanding the relationship of the
committee to the federal government).
"' See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 ("The State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence ... that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity.") (emphasis added). Note that in Burton the Court made no specific
finding of state involvement in the challenged conduct of the private actor. It was
enough that the generalized contacts between the state and the private actor amounted to
a symbiotic relationship from which the approval, encouragement, or influence of the
state in the challenged conduct of the private actor could be inferred. See id. at 724.
Newton similarly turned on a generalized finding of a symbiotic relationship and not on
a specific determination that the state was involved in the challenged conduct of a pri-
vate actor. See Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
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state-action decisions, the Court generally has refused to make this infer-
ence, M and at least one Justice has suggested that the making of this in-
ference should be expressly disavowed. 3 If such a view were adopted by
the Court, it would amount to a repudiation of the symbiotic-relationship
theory and the overturning of Burton and Newton.
Under prevailing state-action principles, however, Burton and Newton
remain good law."5 4 It is possible to reconcile Burton and Newton with lat-
er cases2 5 by recognizing that the later cases did not contain the type of
mutual contacts between the state and private actors necessary to give rise to
the crucial inferences made in Burton and Newton. In particular, the mutual
contacts found in Burton and Newton, but not found in the later cases, were
the furnishing of maintenance services by the state to facilities leased or
owned by private actors. 256 The provision of maintenance services by the
state to a private establishment suggests a degree of entanglement between
the state and a private actor that typically would not be present in a state
regulatory, licensing, or funding scheme. Unlike state regulation, licensing,
or funding, state provision of maintenance services to a private establish-
ment generally would entail direct involvement of public employees in the
operation of the establishment. This is far more than a mere government
subsidy, which the Court rejected as a basis for a finding of state action in
252 See supra text accompanying notes 235-40. But see Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (6-3 decision). In holding that the exercise of a peremp-
tory challenge by a private litigant in a civil case amounts to state action, the Court in
Edmonson relied in part on the symbiotic-relationship theory. See id. at 621 (citing
Burton). For a discussion of the potential significance of Edmonson, see infra text ac-
companying notes 261-68.
" See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 980 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor opined that "a test of state action predicat-
ed upon public and private 'interdependence' sweeps much too broadly." Id. Other
Justices, while not joining in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Lebron, on other occasions
have signaled their discomfort with the symbiotic-relationship theory of state action.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, for example, consistently have declined to
recognize state action in the conduct of private parties. See, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at
631 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., dissenting); Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195; San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 546-47.
25 As recently as 1991, the Court expressly relied on Burton in discerning state ac-
tion. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621. For a discussion of the possible significance of
Edmonson in the evolution of the Court's state action doctrine, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 261-68.
" See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 522; Blum, 457 U.S. at 991;
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 345; Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1992).
256 See Newton, 382 U.S. at 301 ("So far as this record shows, there has been no
change in municipal maintenance ... over this facility."); Burton, 365 U.S. at 724
("Upkeep and maintenance of the building, including necessary repairs, were responsi-
bilities of the [Wilmington Parking] Authority and were payable out of public funds.").
[Vol. 6:2
1998] THE CONSTITUTION AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 517
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 1 7 and Blum v. Yaretsky; 8 it is an indication of
joint involvement in the enterprise." As we shall see, this point takes on
particular significance when the potential application of the symbiotic-rela-
tionship theory to RCAs is considered.'
Although the Court has declined to apply the symbiotic-relationship
theory in most of its decisions of the past two decades, the Court did ex-
pressly rely on the theory in one recent line of cases. In Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.," the Court held that the exercise of a peremptory
challenge by a private litigant in a civil case amounts to state action.262 In
discerning state action, the Court in Edmonson relied in part on the symbiot-
ic-relationship theory and in part on the public-function and judicial-enforce-
ment theories. 3 In 1992 and 1994, the Court reaffirmed the Edmonson
state-action formulation by applying Edmonson to other circumstances in
which private litigants exercised peremptory challenges in judicial proceed-
ings.'
257 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (holding that extensive state funding of a private school
did not give rise to a finding of state action).
8 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (holding that extensive state funding of a nursing
home did not give rise to a finding of state action).
'9 See Newton, 382 U.S. at 301 ("So far as this record shows, there has been no
change in municipal maintenance and concern over this facility .... If the municipality
remains entwined in the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the re-
straints of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 307-09.
261 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
262 See i&L at 621-22.
263
Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course
of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following:
the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits,
see . . .Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority ... ; whether the actor is per-
forming a traditional governmental function, see ... Marsh, v. Alabama ... ; and
whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of gov-
ernmental authority, see Shelley v. Kraemer .... Based on our application of
these three principles to the circumstances here, we hold that the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges by the defendant in the District Court was pursuant to a
course of state action.
Id. (some citations omitted). The "three principles" of state action that the Court relied
upon in Edmonson also are generally known, respectively, as the symbiotic-relationship
theory, the public-function theory, and the judicial-enforcement theory. See generally
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 109, §§ 16.2-.4.
2 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128, 140-41 (1994) (applying
the Edmonson state-action formulation and holding unconstitutional discrimination on
the basis of gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants); Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992) (applying the Edmonson state-action formu-
lation and holding that the exercise of a peremptory challenge by a criminal defendant
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Concededly, the circumstances surrounding a private litigant exercising a
peremptory challenge may not be readily analogized to the circumstances
that typically would give rise to a state-action claim that may implicate an
RCA.265 The Supreme Court peremptory challenge cases are nevertheless
relevant to the subject of this Article for two reasons: First, the cases reaf-
firm the continuing vitality of the symbiotic-relationship theory of state
action,2' and second, the cases may be read as supporting the proposition
that the determination of state action is made especially compelling when
the challenged private conduct implicates more than one theory of state
action.2 This proposition, which this Article terms "multiple-theory state
action," may well be of considerable significance in determining whether the
conduct of an RCA amounts to state action.268
2. The Theory as Applied to RCAs
The relationship between RCAs and local governments is not subject to
easy generalization, given the great variety of state and local regulatory
amounts to state action).
265 Most obviously, a claim against an RCA would not be expected ordinarily to arise
from the conduct of the RCA, or its attorneys, during the course of a judicial proceed-
ing.
266 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
267 In Edmonson, the Court held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge by a
private litigant in a civil case amounted to state action because the private conduct im-
plicated "three principles" of state action: the symbiotic-relationship theory, the public-
function theory, and the judicial-enforcement theory. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22
(emphasis added).
In Edmonson, the Court did not speculate as to whether the implication of only one
theory of state action would have been sufficient to support a finding of state action,
nor did it assess the relative importance of the contribution of each theory of state ac-
tion to the Court's overall finding that state action was present under the circumstances
of the case. See id. at 621-28. Instead, the opinion suggested that the application of
three theories of state action had the effect of making especially compelling a determi-
nation that state action was present. See id.
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), provides further support for this proposi-
tion. Newton discerned state action in the management of park property that was owned
by a private entity. See id. at 299-302. In determining that state action was present, the
Court relied on the application of both the symbiotic-relationship theory and the public-
function theory. See id. at 301-02. As to the first theory, the Court noted that the mu-
nicipality in which the park was located was "entwined in the management or control of
the park." Id. at 301. As to the second theory, the Court concluded that the park proper-
ty was dedicated to a use that is "municipal in nature," that is, a public function. Id. at
301-02. Thus, Newton, like Edmonson, may be said to support the proposition that the
determination of state action is made especially compelling when the challenged private
conduct appears to implicate multiple theories of state action.
26 See infra notes 287-95, 310-12 and accompanying text.
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regimes, the differences in corporate form among RCAs, and the variations
in services performed by RCAs.29 Some RCAs are closely tied to munici-
pal regulations and services; other RCAs operate with little or no govern-
mental oversight and with only minimal reliance on services furnished by
the local government.27 Nevertheless, it is possible to assess broadly the
application of the Supreme Court's symbiotic-relationship theory to RCAs
from two distinct perspectives: First, the establishment of the RCA viewed
both as a consequence of policy choices made by a municipality pursuant to
its land-use authority and as a delegation by the municipality of various
public functions to a private entity, and second, the operation of the RCA
under circumstances in which the RCA and the governing municipality act
as partners in revenue collection or service delivery. As we shall see, the
analytic framework underlying these two perspectives is quite different.
a. A Symbiotic Relationship Discerned from the Role of Local Government
in the Establishment of RCAs
Several commentators have discerned a powerful connection between the
rapid growth in the number of RCAs over the past two decades and the
interests and policies of local government. 7' For example, Profess6r Evan
269 See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 9-13; DILGER, supra note 8,
at 16-30; Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Com-
mon Interest Community, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERN-
MENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 12, at 4-12.
270 Very little empirical research has been conducted regarding the estimated 150,000
RCAs in the United States. The most comprehensive nationwide research effort to date
is a 1988 survey of some 40 RCAs conducted jointly by the U.S. Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations and the Community Associations Institute. See U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 10-23. The survey respondents consisted almost
entirely of "territorial RCAs," defined as RCAs that maintain real estate and facilities
beyond a single high-rise building. See id. at 11; see also supra text accompanying
notes 18-20. The survey queried RCAs on the types of services that RCAs provided to
their residents. The survey found that 72% of responding RCAs provided trash collec-
tion, 65% provided water or sewer services, 65% provided street repair, 58% provided
street lighting, 48% provided snow removal, and 31% provided a security patrol. See id.
at 13. It may be assumed that the RCA survey respondents that answered "no" in reply
to a question as to whether their RCA provided a particular service, were instead re-
ceiving such a service from their local governments. In any event, the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded, on the basis of its survey,
"There is considerable overlap between the services provided by RCAs and by local
government." Id. at 10.
27 See, e.g., C. JAMES DOWDEN, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS 41-42 (1980); MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 178-82; Barton & Silverman,
supra note 269, at 11; James L. Winokur, Choice, Consent, and Citizenship in Common
Interest Communities, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 12, at 87, 89.
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McKenzie maintains that it was "no accident"272 that RCAs began to pro-
liferate in the 1970s, a period in which local governments were contending
with increased demands for services, reduced federal aid, and burgeoning
tax revolts.273 For some local governments, especially those in the high-
growth areas of the country, the establishment of RCAs represents a seem-
ingly ideal response to countervailing pressures to accommodate develop-
ment and to restrain the growth in municipal outlays. RCAs allow these
local governments to reap the benefit of an increased tax base without the
need to build the infrastructure and to provide the services that the RCA
provides.274 In light of these considerations, it is perhaps not surprising
that the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
termed the recent proliferation of RCAs "the most significant privatization
of local government responsibilities in recent times."275
The critical and often unrecognized role that local governments have
played in the establishment of RCAs276 derives from the plenary authority
exercised by municipalities over the use and development of land within
their jurisdictions.277 Municipalities have been accorded broad powers over
land development through zoning, subdivision regulations, and the issuance
of building permits.278 Under this broad authority, local governments, be-
ginning in the 1960s, adopted planned unit development zoning amend-
ments, commonly known as PUDs, in which subdivision developers were
afforded greater flexibility in design and construction, including the right to
construct higher densities of residential units than would otherwise be per-
mitted under conventional zoning regulations.279 Significantly, the regulato-
ry flexibility available under the PUD approval process also serves as the
basis for many municipalities to encourage or to require developers to estab-
lish RCAs as a means of operating and maintaining infrastructure that other-
wise would be the responsibility of the local government.' 0 Thus, for a
272 MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 178.
273 See id. at 178-79.
274 See id.; see also DOWDEN, supra note 271, at 41-42; U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY AssOCIATIONS: QUES-
TIONS AND ANSWERS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 4-5 (1989).
275 U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 18.
276 See Winokur, supra note 271, at 89.
277 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 285, at 5.
278 See 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION §§ 74.01-.07 (David A.
Thomas ed., 1994).
279 See DOWDEN, supra note 271, at 7-10. In many cases, higher residential densities
can make the difference between success or failure in the housing marketplace because
higher densities reduce the land cost per residential unit. See id. at 8.
280 See COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 12, at xii ("[C]ommon interest developments are often forced
upon reluctant private developers by local governments exercising their regulatory pow-
ers."); DOWDEN, supra note 271, at 42 ("[I]t is clear that in many instances homeowner
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developer to win PUD approval and its attendant economic benefits, the
developer may have little choice but to acquiesce to a municipality's prefer-
ence for RCA control of subdivision infrastructure. 8 In this way, local
governments draw on their substantial discretion, which they exercise as part
of their land-use authority, in order to transfer responsibility for traditional
municipal services and facilities, 2 thereby minimizing their own cash out-
associations have been created in cluster or PUD communities primarily for the purpose
of meeting local government requirements to deliver services such as maintenance of
private roads, streets, and open areas."); U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 9-10
("Although local governments encourage PUD housing, they are often less enthusiastic
about accepting public dedication of open spaces and other facilities .... PUDs created
with [private] facilities require a private organization, the RCA, to own and maintain
them . . . ."); Winokur, supra note 271, at 89.
"' See Barton & Silverman, supra note 269, at 11. ("Many local governments re-
sponded [to their own fiscal difficulties] by requiring the developer to provide such
infrastructure as streets, street lighting, water and sewer lines, parks, playgrounds, and
parking areas.") (emphasis added). This is not to suggest, however, that RCAs are the
product solely of municipal regulatory decision making. The rapid growth in the num-
ber of RCAs over the past three decades also is a response to national economic and
demographic trends, such as an upsurge in housing costs and an increase in the number
of families with fewer children. These trends contributed to the increasing market de-
mand for smaller and less expensive townhouses and low-rise apartments. See id. at 10-
11. These housing types most often are owned in the condominium form of ownership,
which requires an association of owners to manage the common property. See supra
note 5. Another reason for the increasing number of RCAs is the preference of many
homeowners to live and own property in a gated community. See generally BLAKELY &
SNYDER, supra note 61; Timothy Egan, The Serene Fortress: Many Seek Security in
Private Communities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 1. A gated community is necessari-
ly an RCA community because the facilities and amenities within the communi-
ty-typically available only to community residents and their guests-are held in com-
mon ownership by residents of the community. See BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note
61, at 1-2. The fact, however, that the rapid growth in the number of RCAs is in part a
market-driven phenomenon does not obviate the corollary fact that municipalities also
have played a significant role in the growth of RCAs, especially with respect to the
growth in the number of RCAs that have assumed responsibility for services traditional-
ly provided by the municipality. Although it is certainly true that this assumption of
responsibility by an RCA can be understood as a quid pro quo in the context of a gated
community-i.e., the community's authority to regulate public access in return for the
community's economic responsibility for facilities ordinarily owned or maintained by a
municipality-this rationale does not hold true for nongated RCA communities. For
nongated RCA communities, then, the role of the municipality in delegating responsibil-
ity for the provision of traditional municipal services seems fairly clear.
" A municipality's requirement that a subdivision developer establish an RCA for
the purpose of providing traditional municipal services in a subdivision has never been
held to be an unconstitutional exaction. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391
(1994) (holding that a municipal requirement that a developer dedicate a portion of its
land to the municipality as a condition of municipal consent to development must satis-
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lays and maximizing their own net reserves from an expanded tax base. 3
Viewed from this perspective, the local government's role in the estab-
lishment of RCAs and the local government's delegation of traditional mu-
nicipal functions to RCAs together give rise to a symbiotic relationship
28
fy the test that the required dedication is roughly proportionate, both in nature and ex-
tent, to the proposed development); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987) (holding that an "essential nexus" must exist between a legitimate state
interest and an exaction). The term "exaction" generally applies to requirements that
subdivision developers construct streets, utilities, and other infrastructure within the
subdivision, and, upon completion of construction, transfer ownership of the facilities
and the attendant real property to the municipality. See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 9.01 (1996). The term "exaction" also applies to fees
developers must pay to municipalities in lieu of dedicating facilities, with the money
being set aside for the construction of the facilities. See id. It is not clearly established
whether the Nollan/Dolan principles apply to the second form of exactions, commonly
known as impact fees. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. et al., Nollan/Dolan: The Emerging
Wing in Regulatory Takings Analysis, 28 URB. LAw. 789, 791-93 (1996). In any event,
a municipal requirement that a developer establish an RCA for the purpose of providing
traditional municipal services in lieu of dedicating facilities and the municipal operation
of such facilities has not been characterized as an "exaction." Even if it were so charac-
terized, it would be difficult to square this form of an "exactioii" with the constitutional
standards of Dolan and Nollan because those decisions arose from governmental deter-
minations essentially mandating the transfer of an interest in real property to the gov-
ernment without payment of compensation. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 384-85, 396; Nollan,
483 U.S. at 831, 841-42. By contrast, a, municipal requirement that a subdivision devel-
oper establish an RCA in order to provide services to the subdivision is premised pre-
cisely on the developer retaining ownership and control over its real property.
283 See DOWDEN, supra note 271, at 41-42:
The local government gets benefits as a result of increased population and in-
creased tax base and yet does not have to assume all of the responsibility and
costs for providing public services to the new residents.... [I]t is clear that in
many instances homeowner associations have been created in cluster or PUD
communities primarily for the purpose of meeting local government requirements
to deliver services such as maintenance of private roads, streets, and open areas.
(emphasis added). See also U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 274, at 4 ("When
RCAs are significantly self-financing, local governments find their tax base expanded,
potentially without comparable expansion in the demand for those public services the
RCA provides itself.").
2 4 In this formulation, the second factor-the local government's delegation of tradi-
tional municipal functions to an RCA-can be understood as a factor intrinsic to an
overall assessment of a symbiotic relationship. Alternatively, the second factor can be
understood as extrinsic to the application of the symbiotic-relationship theory and as a
concurrent application of the separate public-function theory of state action. Because
public-function analysis is a well-established theory of state action, it is useful to treat
that analysis as extrinsic but complementary to the symbiotic-relationship theory. The
Supreme Court has been less than clear in sorting out the relative contributions of its
various theories of state action in its decisions that implicate more than one theory of
state action. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22
THE CONSTITUTION AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT
in that "[t]he state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdepen-
dence with [a private party] that it must be recognized as a joint partici-
pant" 5 with the private party. This reading of the local government-RCA
relationship should not be understood as implicating all government con-
tracts with private parties in which a private party assumes responsibility for
a service traditionally provided by government. 6 Instead, only a much
narrower set of circumstances is necessarily implicated: that is, the local
government-RCA relationship may amount to state action because (1) the
establishment of an RCA is, in critical respects, the product of municipal
land-use authority, and (2) such establishment entails the delegation of mul-
tiple traditional municipal functions to a single private entity in a geographi-
cally defined area.'
Significantly, this understanding of the local government-RCA relation-
ship mirrors the two-part analysis that gave rise to a finding of state action
in Evans v. Newton." In this case, state action was discerned in the man-
agement of a private park 8 9 In making this determination, the Supreme
Court relied on the symbiotic-relationship theory, under which the Court
found "entwine[ment]" 2' between a municipality and the private owner of
the park, and on the public-function theory, under which the Court deter-
mined that the "service rendered ... by a private park of this character is
municipal in nature." '291 The finding of state action under the symbiotic-
relationship theory was said to be "buttressed 292 by the additional finding
(1991) (applying the symbiotic-relationship, public-function, and judicial-enforcement
theories of state action). All that can be said with some degree of certainty is that the
determination of state action is made especially compelling when the challenged private
conduct implicates more than one theory of state action. See id.; see also supra text
accompanying notes 261-68. This proposition provides considerable support to a finding
of state action, based on the application of symbiotic-relationship and public-function
theories, when an RCA is established as a consequence of policies enacted through a
municipality's land-use authority and when such establishment amounts to the delega-
tion of multiple traditional municipal functions to a single private entity in a geo-
graphically defined area. See supra text accompanying notes 271-83.
' Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
286 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) ("Acts of ... private con-
tractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even
total engagement in performing public contracts.").
' Note that the second prong of the proposed standard mirrors the "functional
equivalent of a municipality" theory of state action first recognized in Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). For an extended treatment of Marsh and its application to
RCAs, see supra Part II.A.
28" See 382 U.S. 296, 299-302 (1966).
289 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 238-45.
290 Id. at 301.
291 Id.
292 Id.; see also supra note 284.
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of state action under the public-function theory.
Similarly, the Court in Edmonson discerned state action and placed
considerable weight on the fact that its conclusion was supported by multi-
ple theories of state action, including the symbiotic-relationship and public-
function theories.293 As noted earlier, Edmonson, a recent decision, as well
as Newton can be understood as standing for the proposition that the deter-
mination of state action is made especially compelling when the challenged
private conduct implicates more than one theory of state action.294 This
proposition provides considerable support to a finding of state action, based
on the application of symbiotic-relationship and public-function theories,
when an RCA is established as a consequence of policies enacted through a
municipality's land-use authority and when such establishment amounts to
the delegation of multiple traditional municipal functions to a single private
entity in a geographically defined area.295
b. A Symbiotic Relationship Discerned from the Role of Local Government
in the Operation of an RCA
This application of the symbiotic-relationship theory disregards the role
of the local government in the establishment of the RCA and instead views
the local government-RCA relationship strictly from the perspective of mu-
nicipal involvement in the day-to-day operations of the RCA. For ease of
reference, this Article refers to this application of the theory as the "opera-
tional" perspective and the previously discussed application as the "estab-
lishment/delegation" perspective.
Local government has no standard role in the operation of RCAs.296
The local government-RCA relationship is as much a product of local ad-
ministrative practice as it is of state law.2' Thus, the relationship may
293 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991).
294 See supra text accompanying notes 267, 292.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 271-83.
296 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 10-11.
29 In general, the broad discretion of local government officials to provide traditional
public services to RCAs arises because RCA streets are privately owned and local offi-
cials typically are not required by state law to provide public services, such as roadway
maintenance, street light repair, and snow removal, on private streets, even private
streets held open to the public. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE, § 1806 (West Supp.
1997) ("No city shall be held liable for failure to maintain any road until it has been
accepted into the city street system . . . ."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 177.081(2) (West 1987)
("[N]othing herein shall be construed as creating an obligation upon any governing
body to perform any act of... maintenance within such dedicated areas [including
streets and public areas] except when the obligation is voluntarily assumed by the gov-
erning body.") (emphasis added). Alternately, a few states by statute or through com-
mon-law principles explicitly permit local government officials to provide local govern-
ment services on streets, notwithstanding the fact that the streets are privately owned.
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vary widely not just among the fifty states, but also among municipalities
and RCAs within a state.
For example, some local governments and RCAs have entered into
agreements authorizing the local government to provide particular services,
such as routine police patrols, refuse collection, and animal control on RCA
property.29 Other local governments require RCA covenants to state the
right of local governments to take over the functions of the association in
circumstances when the RCA is unable to perform, such as when the RCA
becomes insolvent.2' Conversely, some local governments flatly decline to
provide most public services to RCAs under any circumstances."
In 1990, New Jersey became the first state to require all of its munici-
palities to provide certain municipal services to qualifying RCAs them-
selves, or, in the alternative, to require municipalities to reimburse RCAs for
the value of the services furnished by the RCAs.3°' Covered services in-
clude refuse collection, snow removal, and street lighting.'e The annual
cost to all New Jersey municipalities of complying with this state mandate
was estimated at sixty-two million dollars. 3 Although no other state has
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:67-23.1 (West 1992); Nemours v. City of Clayton, 175
S.W.2d 60, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (holding that a city has an inherent authority to
undertake traffic control measures on streets held open to the public, even if the streets
were privately owned). However, a review of state statutes and case law discloses that
the authority of local governments to maintain private streets and furnish other public
services on those streets has not been clearly established. In the absence of a controlling
statute or case law, it appears that the provision of public services on private streets is
largely a product of local administrative practice. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra
note 2, at 14 ("Local governments may refuse to provide services to an RCA communi-
ty that they provide for other subdivisions.").
298 See DOWDEN, supra note 271, at 45; U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at
14.
299 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 30.
" See DOWDEN, supra note 271, at 45 ("From the local government perspective,
long-standing practice and precedent has been not to provide such services [such as
street maintenance, refuse collection, and routine police patrols] on private property.").
A local government's refusal to provide certain public services to an RCA may result
either from a determination that the municipality is without legal authority to provide
such services, see supra note 301, or from a political decision not to expend additional
funds for services when the provision of such services to RCAs is permitted but not
required by law. In many cases, however, mounting political pressure from RCA boards
and residents has led to a reversal of prior municipal policy either through express
agreements between RCAs and local governments authorizing the latter to furnish ser-
vices to RCAs, see U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 10, or through legislation
mandating that local governments provide municipal services to RCAs. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2 to -23.8 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). See infra notes 301-05 and
accompanying text.
301 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2 to -23.8 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
See id. § 40:67-23.3 (West 1992).
303 See SENATE REVENUE, FINANCE AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STATEMENT,
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yet followed New Jersey's lead, certain local governments, such as Hous-
ton,' and Montgomery County in Maryland,3"' have adopted similar
measures in which direct government aid is provided to RCAs.3°I
The operational symbiotic-relationship theory seems particularly applica-
ble to those RCAs that are direct recipients of services furnished by local
government when such services normally are furnished by local government
only on publicly owned streets.' When a local government maintains
RCA streets, including roadway repair, streetlight maintenance, street clean-
ing, and snow removal, then the mutual contacts between the government
and the RCA are far more pervasive than a mere licensing or regulatory
scheme. Under these circumstances, government employees and equipment
enter upon and maintain private property, a state of affairs giving rise to
both the perception and the actuality of entanglement between public and
private entities. Indeed, if Burton and Newton were to be understood as
standing for any single proposition in the wake of the Supreme Court's
subsequent decisions narrowing the scope of the symbiotic-relationship theo-
ry,s it would be that the provision of maintenance services by the state to
a private facility is a talisman of a symbiotic relationship."n Thus, public
No. 2869-L. 1989, c. 299, reprinted in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:67-23.2 (West 1992).
" Houston makes available to qualifying RCAs a property tax rebate for RCAs that
furnish their own residential refuse removal. See DOWDEN, supra 271, at 46.
305 Montgomery County provides tax reimbursements for private street maintenance
for RCAs that provide public access to their streets and satisfy certain other criteria. See
U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 274, at 16.
306 According to Robert Dilger, most local governments have refused to provide tax
rebates to RCAs because to do so would require local government "to either raise taxes
or reduce services in other areas" of the municipality. DILGER, supra note 8, at 29.
However, the political attractiveness of offering property tax rebates to RCAs may well
become irresistible to state and local elected officials as the number of RCAs continue
to increase. The potential political potency of the issue is vividly sketched by a lobbyist
working on behalf of a group of California RCAs:
No issue is [more] likely ... to galvanize a constituency where once there was no
constituency, than that of the taxation/double taxation of community associations.
And yet this issue is being all but ignored by policy-makers .... It is only a
matter of time before the tax-and-equity bomb blows .... As yet there is no
clearly identified champion for the people who live in [RCAs] .... The politician
who manages to capture this constituency, speak to its needs and offer it a voice,
will be amply rewarded with gratitude and votes. Those time bombs are ticking,
but is anyone listening?
MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 195 (quoting Robyn Boyer Stewart).
' Examples of such services include street repair and maintenance, refuse collection,
and routine police patrols. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 12-14.
30' See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522 (1987);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge Number 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); see also supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
309 As noted earlier, the mutual contacts found in Burton and Newton but not found
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maintenance of RCA facilities may well give rise to a finding of state action
by virtue of the symbiotic-relationship theory.
For somewhat different reasons, the symbiotic-relationship theory also
may be applicable to those RCAs that receive municipal tax funds as "reim-
bursement" for the municipal-like services that these RCAs provide to their
own residents. Under these circumstances, the mutual contacts between the
local government and the RCA can be extensive: for example, the local
government's establishment of standards governing the type and level of
RCA service delivery qualifying for reimbursement, municipal inspections
of RCA service delivery, and an accounting by the RCA of its expenditures
in connection with service delivery.310 It is true that the Court has held
that a private contractor's mere use of taxpayer funds is insufficient to give
rise to a finding of state action; 311 but, in this example, there is much
more: An RCA delivering multiple municipal-like services-as well as regu-
lating land use and architecture within its jurisdiction-may well be under-
stood as a state actor, even in the absence of its receipt of public funds, by
operation of the public-function theory of state action.312 It would follow
that an RCA conforming substantially to the above description, but also
furnishing its municipal-like services with the assistance of taxpayer funds,
would be even more likely to be understood as a state actor. Such an RCA
would not only be providing services traditionally associated with govern-
ment, it would be providing these services with funds provided by the gov-
ernment. Under these circumstances, the RCA could be viewed as implicat-
ing the symbiotic-relationship theory as well as the public-function theory,
and held to be a state actor under the combined strength of the two theo-
ries.
313
in later cases were the state's furnishing of maintenance services to facilities leased or
owned by private actors. The state's provision of maintenance services to a private
establishment suggests a degree of entanglement between the state and a private actor
that typically would not be present in a state regulatory, licensing, or funding scheme.
Unlike state regulation, licensing, or funding, state provision of maintenance services to
a private establishment generally would entail direct involvement of public employees
in the operation of the establishment. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
310 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:67-23.5 (West 1992) (providing that an RCA that
receives municipal "reimbursements" for qualifying services provided by the RCA shall
be required to furnish to the municipality an annual accounting of its expenditure of
municipal funds).
311 See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11 (holding that state payment of more than 90% of
the medical expenses of patients in a private nursing home did not give rise to a finding
of state action in the conduct of the nursing home); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840
(holding that state payment of most of the expenses of a private school did not give rise
to a finding of state action in the conduct of the school).
312 For a discussion of public-function theory and its application to RCAs, see supra
Part II.A.2.
... For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions that found state action and placed
1998] 527
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
D. The General Governmental Powers Theory Arising from the Application
of the Constitutional Principle of One Person, One Vote to Nominally
Private Entities
When an elected policymaking body exercises general governmental
powers, the body becomes subject to the constitutional principle of one
person' one vote first recognized in Reynolds v. Sims. 14 The standard of
general governmental powers was not conceived as a theory of state action,
but rather as a means by which to apply a constitutional principle to certain
government entities and not others. 15 However, as will be argued here, the
standard of general governmental powers, when applied to a nominally pri-
vate, elected entity, takes on the formal characteristics of a state-action
test.316 For this reason, the standard of general governmental powers is
treated as a distinct theory of state action for purposes of this article.
As a theory of state action, the standard of general government powers
differs from other theories of state action in that it is expressly intended to
be applied in connection with one-and only one--constitutional right.317
The discussion that follows does not attempt to alter the focus of this theory
of state action on a single constitutional right. Because this theory of state
considerable weight on the fact that the finding was supported by multiple theories of
state action, see supra text accompanying notes 288-95.
314 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires election districts comprising a state legislature to have approximate-
ly equal populations. See id. at 565. This principle universally became known by its
shorthand description "one person, one vote." Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 362 (1981).
The principle applies to elected policy-making bodies exercising "general governmental
powers." Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968); see also Hadley v. Ju-
nior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970). For a discussion of Reynolds and its progeny,
see infra Part II.D.1.
315 See, e.g., Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that the one-
person, one-vote principle applied to a quasi-executive, quasi-legislative body with
broad authority over the City of New York); Ball, 451 U.S. at 355 (holding that the
principle does not apply to a water storage district with limited administrative authori-
ty); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
(holding that the principle did not apply to a water storage district with limited adminis-
trative authority); Hadley, 397 U.S. at 50 (holding that the principle applied to the elect-
ed board of trustees of a public educational authority); Avery, 390 U.S. at 474 (holding
that the principle applied to a governing body of a county).
316 See infra Part II.D.2.a.
By contrast, the public-function theory of state action, for example, has been em-
ployed in the service of a variety of constitutional rights, including equal protection of
the laws, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); freedom
of expression, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946); and voting rights,
see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-63 (1944).
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action is uniquely bound up with the right guaranteed by the principle of
one person, one vote, the following discussion gives considerable attention
to the right at issue31 as well as the theory of state action to which it re-
lates.
1. Overview: Reynolds v. Sims and Its Progeny
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court established the constitutional principle
of one person, one vote by holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires
election districts comprising a state legislature to have approximately equal
populations."9 The decision led to the restructuring of most of the nation's
state legislatures, which previously had been comprised of election districts
with wide variations in population.32 Reynolds has been generally regard-
ed as among the Court's most significant decisions in this century, a deci-
sion that affirmed and gave strength to "a growing awareness of political
equality as a legitimating foundation for our form of government.
321
The Court subsequently applied the principle of one person, one vote to
elected local government bodies that exercise general governmental pow-
ers.322 The Court found "little difference ... between the exercise of state
power through [state] legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in
cities, towns, and counties."3" The Court also determined that the one-
person, one-vote principle was not solely applicable to government bodies
exercising legislative, as distinct from executive or administrative, pow-
er.32 It is sufficient for a local government body to have "general respon-
sibility and power for local affairs"" without regard to whether the power
318 The attention given to the one-person, one-vote principle has the additional pur-
pose of highlighting the extent to which the typical RCA voting scheme is inconsistent
with the principle. This fact is important not only to the immediate discussion but also
to the more general concerns of this Article and to the discussion infra Part IV of pro-
posed principles governing the public/private line of demarcation in RCAs.
3' See Reynolds, 337 U.S. at 565.
32 See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 253 (1970); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 100 n.32 (2d ed. 1988).
321 TRIBE, supra note 137, at 192. Professor Tribe notes, "It is thus not surprising
that the Court has applied its most exacting equal protection scrutiny to enforce the
principle of 'one person, one vote"'; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST 117 (1980) ("[U]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial
review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential
stoppage.") Former Chief Justice Earl Warren characterized the decisions leading to the
recognition of the one-person, one-vote principle as the most important decisions made
during his tenure. See CORTNER, supra note 320, at 253.
322 See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
323 Id. at 481.
31 See id. at 482-83.
32 Id. at 483.
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is formally classified as legislative, executive, or administrative.
The application of the one-person, one-vote principle to local govern-
ment bodies, then, turns on whether the body exercises "general governmen-
tal powers. ' '31 Of course, the term "general governmental powers" is not
subject to precise definition. Instead, a court must determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether a particular local government body exercises powers that
are sufficiently important and diverse to meet this standard.327
In Avery v. Midland County,32 the Court considered whether a county
commission exercised general governmental powers. The commission, the
Court noted, established the county tax rate, issued bonds, adopted a budget,
appointed local officials, built roads, and maintained public buildings.2 In
short, the commission "[made] a large number of decisions having a broad
range of impacts on all the citizens of the county,"3" thereby coming
within the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote.331
In Hadley v. Junior College District,3 2 the Court considered whether
an elected board of trustees of a public junior college exercised general
governmental power. The trustees were authorized to "levy and collect tax-
es, issue bonds with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make con-
tracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students ... , and in general
manage the operations of the junior college. 33 3 Although the Court con-
ceded that the powers exercised by the trustees in Hadley were not as broad
as those exercised by the county commission in Avery,3" the Court never-
326 Id. at 484-85 ("We hold today only that the Constitution permits no substantial
variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local government hav-
ing general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.").
327 See supra note 315.
32 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
329 See id. at 477, 483.
330 Id. at 483.
131 See id. at 484-85.
332 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
311 Id. at 53. More recently, the Court determined that the New York City Board of
Estimate, a quasi-executive, quasi-legislative body, was subject to the one-person, one-
vote principle because the board exercised the following powers that were collectively
deemed to constitute general governmental powers: "The board manages all city proper-
ty; exercises plenary zoning authority; dispenses all franchises and leases on city prop-
erty; fixes generally the salaries of all officers and persons compensated through city
moneys; ... grants all city contracts;" "calculat[es] sewer and water rates, [and] tax
abatements;" and "approv[es] the city's capital and expense budgets." Board of Estimate
v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 695-96 (1989). The last enumerated power was shared with
the local legislative body. See id. at 696. The scope of governmental powers of the New
York City Board of Estimate appears somewhat less broad than the powers of the coun-
ty commission in Avery, although somewhat more extensive than the powers of the
education district in Hadley.
331 See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53 (citing Avery).
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theless concluded that the powers exercised by the trustees were "general
enough and have sufficient impact" '335 to give rise to the constitutional
mandate of one person, one vote.
Note the evolution of the principle of "general governmental powers"
from Avery to Hadley. In Avery, the body exercising the powers was a body
that controlled a general unit of government that provided a broad range of
services to its residents.336 In Hadley, the body exercising the powers was
a body that controlled a special unit of government that provided only one
service: education.337 In Hadley, however, the Court emphasized that edu-
cation is a "traditional" and "vital" government service.33 Hadley thus
stands for the proposition that, for an elected body to be subject to the con-
stitutional mandate of one person, one vote, the body need not be diverse in
the services that it delivers so long as it is diverse in its powers used in
connection with the delivery of its service and so long as the service itself is
sufficiently important. 39
The Court in Hadley left open the question of whether "there might be
some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so
far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately
affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with [the one-
person, one-vote principle] might not be required... ."" In Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Water Storage District, " the Court had occasion to
apply the Hadley dictum. In that decision, the Court upheld a statutory
scheme governing the election of members of an agricultural water storage
district.4 2 The statute restricted the right to vote to landowners and
weighted the votes according to the amount of land that each voter
owned.4 3 The primary purpose of the district was "to provide for the ac-
quisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming."s" The one-per-
son, one-vote principle was not implicated, the Court held, because the pur-
pose and powers of the district were so limited"S and, moreover, the
weighted voting scheme was consistent with the overall purpose of the dis-
35 Id. at 54.
336 See Avery, 390 U.S. at 483.
331 See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53-54.
338 Id. at 56.
339 Put another way, Hadley suggests that, in applying the doctrine of "general gov-
ernmental powers," the term "general" is intended as a direct modifier of "powers"
rather than of "governmental."
34. Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56.
341 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
342 See id. at 728-35.
3,3 See id. at 724-25.
344 Id. at 728.
145 See id. at 728-29.
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trict, which, the Court noted, disproportionately affected landowners.4
In Ball v. James, 3 7 the Court again considered the application of the
one-person, one-vote principle to a property-based voting scheme of a water
storage district. 4 The water district in this case, unlike the district in
Salyer Land Co., furnished electricity as well as water and supplied its ser-
vices to urban areas as well as to agricultural areas. 9 These differences,
however, did not alter the constitutional analysis or the result reached in
Salyer Land Co. The Court in Ball held that the furnishing of electricity was
only an incidental purpose of the water storage district35 and that, in any
event, the furnishing of electricity is not a "general or important governmen-
tal function." '351 As to the district's water supply function, the Court ob-
served that the district's powers in this regard were exceedingly limited,
noting that the district does "not own, sell, or buy water nor ... control the
use of any water [once] ... delivered., 352 The Court upheld the property-
based voting scheme because the functions of the district were "peculiarly
narrow"353 and because the voting scheme was consistent with the specidl
relationship of the district to one class of citizens--the landowners.3 4
It is important to note that apart from the water storage district cas-
es,355 the Supreme Court consistently has invalidated property-ownership
requirements for voting.356 For example, property-ownership requirements
were struck down in the context of school district elections, 357 referenda
on the issuance of general obligation bonds,35' and referenda on the issu-
ance of municipal utility bonds.359 In light of these decisions, there can be
little doubt that a property-ownership requirement applied to the election of
346 See id.
347 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
348 The district in Ball was termed a "water reclamation district" rather than a "water
storage district," as in Salyer Land Co. In both cases, however, the respective districts
were described as storing and distributing water for the benefit of certain landowners.
See Ball, 451 U.S. at 357, 367; Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 723. For the sake of clari-
ty, therefore, this Article refers to both districts as water storage districts.
341 See Ball, 451 U.S. at 365.
350 See id. at 368.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 367.
313 Id. at 357.
314 See id. at 370-71.
311 A third water storage district case, Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Water-
shed Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiam), decided on the same day
as Salyer Land Co., reached the same result and applied the same rationale as Salyer
Land Co. and Ball.
356 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, at 446-47 n.24.
.35 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
358 See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 214 (1970).
... See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
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an entity exercising general governmental powers would not survive consti-
tutional scrutiny.'
2. The One-Person, One-Vote Principle as Applied to RCAs
The Supreme Court has not applied the one-person, one-vote principle to
elected bodies that are denominated as private-sector entities, such as RCAs.
The principle has been applied only to elected government bodies-and,
more specifically, only to those elected government bodies exercising gener-
al governmental powers. 1 This Section nevertheless argues that the prin-
ciple of one person, one vote could be extended to RCAs, in a manner sub-
stantially consistent with established constitutional precedent, because RCAs
can be understood as exercising general governmental powers notwithstand-
ing their legal status as nominally private entities.6 2 On this view, the test
of general governmental powers is a test of function, not a test of legal sta-
tus-a view consistent with state-action theory generally.6 3 As a test of
function, the theory of general governmental powers, when applied to a
nominally private entity, takes on the formal characteristics of a state-action
test.
a. The Theory of General Governmental Powers Construed as a State-
Action Test
Although the Supreme Court has not applied the one-person, one-vote
principle to elected bodies that are denominated as private, the Court has
recognized, in a different context, that the nominal legal status of an enti-
ty-that is, whether the entity is denominated as public or private-is not
dispositive as to the reach of the one-person, one-vote principle.' Thus,
the Court, in determining that a water storage district was not subject to the
one-person, one-vote principle, noted that the "[Arizona] state legislature has
allowed water districts to become nominal public entities in order to obtain
inexpensive bond financing, [but that] the districts remain essentially busi-
3" See Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 727-28 (suggesting that an elected body's exer-
cise of general governmental powers, as in Cipriano and Phoenix, precludes an electoral
scheme that would limit the franchise to landowners of the geographic area served by
the body).
361 See supra text accompanying notes 314-39.
362 See infra Part II.D.2.b.
31 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (holding that a compa-
ny town was the functional equivalent of a municipality and, as such, was deemed to be
a state actor); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662-64 (1944) (holding that a primary
election system was a public function regardless of whether a private political party
conducted the election); see also supra notes 58, 200.
364 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981).
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ness enterprises .... Put another way, the fact that the districts were
nominally situated in the public sector was of less importance than the un-
derlying function of the districts. Conversely, it may follow from this func-
tional approach that a nominally private entity exercising general govern-
mental powers may be subject to the one-person, one-vote principle notwith-
standing its nominal legal status.'
More recently, the Court has applied an essentially functional analysis
and discounted the legal status of a nominally private entity in a different
state-action setting. In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. ,367 the
Court concluded that Amtrak was a governmental entity for constitutional
purposes notwithstanding the statute authorizing the establishment of Am-
trak, which expressly provided that Amtrak is "'not ... an agency or estab-
lishment of the United States Government.' 3 68 Lebron can be understood
as standing for the proposition that the final determination of whether an
entity is public or private for constitutional purposes is for the courts, not
for those who actually establish the entity and confer its nominal status as
public or private.3 9 In this way, Lebron reaffirms the constitutional princi-
ple recognized in Marsh v. Alabama37 and generally underlying the pub-
lic-function theory of state action.371 It is argued here that the same form
of functional analysis is implied in the test of general governmental powers
giving rise to the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote when the
test is applied to a nominally private entity.
Alternately, one can reach the same conclusion by adopting an analysis
that is less expansive and that adheres more closely to the strict confines of
the Court's constitutional precedent. The disadvantage of this analysis is that
it seems unnecessarily complex as a workable test of state action to be used
when deciding whether the one-person, one-vote principle should be applied
to elected entities that are denominated as private. Under this alternate anal-
ysis, it may be stated that the principle of one person, one vote could be
extended to certain private entities such as RCAs because (1) RCAs, al-
361 Id. (emphasis added).
366 Concededly, the converse of the proposition in Ball does not necessarily follow
from the proposition. It may be that Ball's elevation of function over nominal legal
status is limited only to nominally public, as distinct from nominally private, entities. It
is worth noting, however, that the Court in Ball need not have characterized the water
storage district as nominally public in order to support its conclusion that the district did
not exercise general governmental powers.
367 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
361 Id. at 391 (emphasis added) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) (repealed 1994)).
369 See id. at 392 ("[I]t is not for Congress to make the final determination of
Amtrak's status as a government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional
rights of citizens affected by its actions.") (emphasis added).
370 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see also supra Part II.A.1.
371 See supra note 58.
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though nominally private entities, can be understood as state actors for con-
stitutional purposes by operation of well-established theories of state action
such as the public-function theory,372 and (2) these RCAs, as a conse-
quence of their status as state actors, become subject to the principle of one
person, one vote assuming further that Hadley's test of general governmen-
tal powers373 is satisfied. But to articulate this alternate analysis is to ap-
preciate its needless complexity as a workable constitutional standard. It
would hardly seem necessary for any entity found to exercise Hadley's gen-
eral governmental powers to be also subjected to a separate test of state
action. The Hadley test, when applied to nominally private elected entities,
can be presumed to operate as a test of state action in addition to its tradi-
tional function as a test of whether the one-person, one-vote principle ap-
plies to elected governmental bodies.
b. Whether RCAs Exercise General Governmental Powers
The test of general governmental powers, as recognized in Hadley, may
be stated as whether an elected entity delivers a traditional or vital public
service3. and, in connection with the delivery of the service, whether the
powers exercised by the entity are "general enough and have sufficient im-
pact." '375 A single-purpose educational district satisfied both prongs of the
Hadley test,376 whereas a water storage district failed to satisfy either
prong of the test.3"
By this measure, RCAs would appear to exercise general governmental
powers. RCAs deliver vital and traditional public services to their members
and other residents and, in doing so, exercise broad powers.
As a "mini-government," the [residential community] associ-
ation provides to its members, in almost every case, utility
services, road maintenance, street and common area lighting,
and refuse removal. In many cases, it also provides security
services and various forms of communication within the
community. There is, moreover, a clear analogy to the mu-
nicipal police and public safety functions. All of these func-
tions are financed through assessments or taxes levied upon
31 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3.
31 See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53-56 (1970).
371 See id. at 56.
375 Id. at 54.
376 See id. at 54-57; see also supra text accompanying notes 332-39.
31 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Water-
shed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiam); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 340-54.
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the members of the community, with powers vested in the
board of directors, council of co-owners, board of managers,
or other similar body clearly analogous to the governing
body of a municipality. Terminology varies from region to
region; however, the duties and responsibilities remain the
same.
378
This concise statement of RCA power makes clear that RCAs deliver multi-
ple services, more types of services, in fact, than the educational district in
Hadley that was found to be in violation of the one-person, one-vote princi-
ple.379 So too, the power exercised by RCAs in connection with the deliv-
ery of their services is also broad, and includes, as noted in the above pas-
sage, the authority to levy mandatory assessments on residences and the
authority to impose rules that are binding on all homeowners and other
residents within the RCA subdivision.38° These are powers traditionally as-
sociated with sovereignty."
The power to levy mandatory assessments on residential real property is
a key feature of RCAs, and one that distinguishes the RCA from a mere
civic or neighborhood association .3  The RCA assessment power is, for
practical purposes, a taxing power,33 and RCA assessments are function-
ally equivalent to municipal real estate taxes. The amount of an RCA as-
sessment, like the amount of a real estate tax, typically varies in proportion
to the relative value of a residence.3" The establishment of the rate under-
lying RCA assessments and municipal real estate taxes is determined, in
each case, by a local elected body.3' The proceeds of RCA assessments,
378 Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 68, at 918 (footnote omitted).
17' The Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City-the elected body in
Hadley-was established to deliver one and only one type of service to its constituents:
higher education. See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 55-56.
" Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 68, at 918-19.
38 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978) (holding that tax collection
is a traditional function of government); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 134-35
(RCAs exhibit "'fundamental political characteristics"' in that "they exercise power over
members and even nonmembers in vital areas of concern.").
382 See Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 68, at 918.
383 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 274, at 5 (reasoning that RCA "[d]ues
and fees resemble taxes, in that payment is involuntary.").
" In condominium RCAs, assessments usually are based on the size of the unit.
Some homeowner association RCAs, however, charge equal fees regardless of the size
of the unit. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 18; see also MCQUILLIN,
THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.109.10 (3d ed. 1994) (stating that real
property valuation for assessment purposes must "have some relation to actual value").
385 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that an RCA board typically establishes
the amount of assessment); MCQUILLIN, supra note 384, § 44.96, at 392-93 (noting that
a municipal legislative body typically levies municipal taxes, including real estate tax-
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like the proceeds of real estate taxes, are commonly used to pay for local
services.86 Most importantly, a homeowner's failure to pay an RCA as-
sessment, like the failure to pay a municipal real estate tax, results in a lien
on the residence and, ultimately, may lead to the forced sale of the residence
through the enforcement of the lien.387 Once an individual chooses to pur-
chase a home in an area subject tb an RCA, the individual can no more
escape payment of an RCA assessment than he can escape payment of a
municipal real estate tax."' As the functional equivalent of the municipal
real estate tax, the RCA assessment power is a significant indicia of the
exercise of general governmental powers by an RCA.
The RCA rulemaking power also provides strong evidence that the
scope of RCA power satisfies the requirements of Hadley. RCAs "exercise
power over members and even nonmembers in vital areas of concern, in that
their decisions govern what individuals do in the privacy of their own home
and what they do with the physical structure of the house and its surround-
ings."" An RCA's rules sometimes restrict the age of those who own
homes in the RCA community,3" the number and ages of overnight visi-
tors,39" ' the color a homeowner may paint her house, 392 whether a home-
owner may build an addition to her house,393 whether a homeowner may
post signs inside or outside her home,3" and whether publications can be
sold or distributed on RCA streets. 95 An infraction of RCA rules may lead
to the imposition of a penalty against a homeowner or to the denial of the
right to use RCA common facilities backed by judicial injunction. 39 6 Thus,
a homeowner dissatisfied with an RCA rule generally has but three choices:
obey the rule, mount a drive among RCA members to change the rule
through a majority or supermajority vote, 97 or sell his residence and move
es).
386 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 23 (stating that an RCA "tax[es] its members ... to
pay for the provision of the association's amenities and services"); MCQUILLIN, supra
note 384, § 44.35, at 141-42; U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 12-13 (provid-
ing an overview of typical services provided by RCAs). Many services provided by
RCAs are traditionally provided by municipalities. See id. at 14.
387 See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 184-85, 189.
388 See id.
389 MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 135.
" See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190; MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 15.
391 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 16.
31 See DILGER, supra note 8, at 23.
31 See id. at 23-24.
31 See Diana Jean Schemo, Escape from Suburbia: Community Associations Thrive
Amid Debate on Freedom, Privacy and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at B1.
395 See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190-91; MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 15.
" See Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 68, at 919.
31 If the RCA board of directors were to promulgate the objectionable rule, then
changing the rule wouldbe a matter of lobbying the incumbent board or, if that were to
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elsewhere. Significantly, the stark choices faced by a dissatisfied RCA
homeowner mirror the choices faced by a resident of a municipality who
feels aggrieved by a municipal ordinance.39
In sum, RCAs deliver vital and traditional public services to their mem-
bers as well as to other residents within their jurisdiction. The powers exer-
cised by RCAs in connection with the delivery of their services are broad
and include the power to levy mandatory assessments on residences and the
power to impose rules of general applicability within their jurisdiction. Tak-
en together, these attributes of RCAs amount to the exercise of general
governmental powers within the meaning of Hadley.
c. The RCA Electoral System
If RCAs were deemed to exercise general governmental powers, then
they would be subject to the constitutional principle of one person, one
vote.399 This Section considers the implications of this determination by
assessing the extent to which RCA electoral systems deviate from the one-
person, one-vote principle.4"
fail, unseating the incumbent board in the annual elections, a task usually requiring a
majority of the voting members. If, however, the objectionable rule were incorporated
in the CC&Rs recorded with the deed to each RCA residence, then changing the rule
may prove considerably more difficult. A majority, supermajority, or even a unanimous
vote of the RCA members may be required. See infra notes note 399-415.
398 RCA rulemaking authority, in addition to being broad in scope and substantial in
impact, is noteworthy because of its locus: the home. Rulemaking authority affecting
the home and family life traditionally has been exercised by government, acting through
its police power. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (listing
a variety of offenses that, when committed in the home, do not escape the reach of gov-
ernment authority). Few private organizations other than RCAs "govern what individu-
als do in the privacy of their own home and what they do with the physical structure of
the house and its surroundings." MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 135.
The home and family life is an area of heightened constitutional concern, and gov-
ernment rulemaking authority in this area is limited by a number of constitutional provi-
sions. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (holding that a munici-
pal ordinance that banned the posting of signs on residential property was unconstitu-
tional in part because of the "special respect for individual liberty in the home"); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (holding that a warrantless seizure made in
the home was unconstitutional in part, because of the location of the seizure); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that a criminal conviction for the posses-
sion of obscene material was unconstitutional because the defendant possessed the mate-
rial in his home). An RCA, generally considered a private actor under current law, is
not necessarily limited in its rulemaking authority over the home to the same extent as
government is limited through constitutional restraints. See supra notes 32-37 and ac-
companying text.
... See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54-57 (1970).
"' The fact that RCAs' electoral systems deviate significantly from the one-person,
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In an RCA, everyone who purchases a home automatically becomes a
member of the association."' Thus, although the decision to buy a home
may be voluntary, membership in the association is mandatory.4"2 This fact
distinguishes RCAs from voluntary neighborhood or civic associations and
makes membership in an RCA, in some crucial respects, analogous to resi-
dency in a municipality.4 3
RCAs are governed by boards of directors, which are elected by a vote
of RCA members.' In homeowner associations, each residential unit has
one vote, regardless of the number of adults who reside in the unit. When
an individual owns more than one unit, he or she receives more than one
vote.40 5 In condominium associations, votes often are apportioned accord-
ing to the size of the individual unit, with larger units receiving greater
weight. As with homeowner associations, owners of multiple condominium
units have the right to cast multiple votes.4"
Those who live in RCAs but who are not owners generally are ineligible
to vote in RCA elections."° In many areas, the number of renters residing
in RCAs constitutes a significant percentage of the population of the RCAs.
For example, a 1987 survey of California RCAs reported that in almost
fifteen percent of the RCAs the majority of the units were occupied by
renters and that the median RCA participating in the survey had twenty
percent of its units occupied by renters.4"s RCA renters are directly -affect-
ed by RCA policies and services but, for the most part, have no voice in the
formation of these policies and the delivery of these services."
Many RCAs deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle in another
significant way. In the early years of an RCA, the RCA developer usually
dominates the board of directors. Typically, "the developer staffs all board
positions with his own employees and ... retains three votes for every
one-vote principle does not, in and of itself, amount to evidence that RCAs do not exer-
cise general governmental powers. Once an elected body is determined to exercise gen-
eral governmental powers based on a careful assessment of its functions and its authori-
ty, electoral schemes that fail to substantially conform to the one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple will be deemed unconstitutional. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,
484-85 (1968).
401 See MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 127.
402 See id.
o See DILGER, supra note 8, at 3.
4o4 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 15.
405 See id.
406 See id.
407 See id.; see also MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 128; Barton & Silverman, supra
note 269, at 35.
40 See Barton & Silverman, supra note 69, at 35. The California survey also report-
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unsold unit, so the developer is effectively in control of the association until
nearly the entire project is sold."41 The developer's power is manifested
in other ways, such as in the fact that the developer is solely responsible for
the establishment of the CC&Rs that fundamentally govern the RCA.4 '
Once adopted, the CC&Rs may be amended usually only by a supermajority
vote of all members.41
In sum, RCAs almost invariably employ a one-house, one-vote electoral
system, disenfranchise renters, and employ weighted voting in favor of the
developer. Not surprisingly, one leading commentator has characterized
RCAs as "profoundly undemocratic., 413 If the constitutional principle of
one person, one vote were to apply to RCAs, there can be little doubt that
the RCA electoral system would run afoul of the requirements of Reynolds
v. Sins4 4 and its progeny.43
E. Summary
This Article so far has attempted to show that RCAs can be understood
as state actors through a robust application of the Supreme Court's estab-
lished theories of state action. Each of these four theories, in a different
way, highlights the multiple public functions and the complex intergovern-
mental relationships that underpin the modern RCA. All of the theories,
taken together, provide a more complete understanding of the proper place
of RCAs in the constitutional scheme. Still, the theories, taken together, are
not without their conceptual limitations and practical problems in integrating
and applying state-action doctrine to RCAs. Before embarking on a discus-
sion of these limitations and problems, it is useful to briefly recapitulate
each theory and its application to RCAs.
410 MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 128 (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 127.
41 See id. Some RCAs are burdened with CC&Rs that may not be amended except
by unanimous consent of RCA members, a requirement that, as a practical matter, is
nearly impossible to achieve on most issues. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note
2, at 16. Still other RCAs are governed by CC&Rs that contain no express provisions
setting forth their amendment procedures. Under these circumstances, an RCA seeking
to amend its CC&Rs would be compelled to commence a judicial proceeding for that
purpose, a proceeding that is "difficult and expensive ... and one possibly fraught with
danger for the continued viability of the organization." Id.
413 COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 12, at xii.
414 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"" See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50.(1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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The "functional equivalent of a municipality" theory, exemplified by
Marsh v. Alabama,416 arose from the limitations on personal freedoms im-
posed by company towns. The Court in Marsh established a paradigm of a
municipality and found that a company town conformed, in essential re-
spects, to the paradigm. The municipal paradigm consisted of streets held
open for public use and an amalgam of homes, a business district, and infra-
structure.4"7 This paradigm would encompass some territ6rial RCAs that
exist today.418 The paradigm, a construct of the 1940s, may need to be up-
dated to reflect the typical contemporary suburban municipality, which often
lacks a business district. Such an updated paradigm would encompass many
more RCAs because the majority of RCAs lacks a business district.419
The underlying significance of Marsh lies not in its specific municipal
paradigm, but rather, in its recognition that company towns-the dominant
form of privatized municipal governance at the time Marsh was decid-
ed-should be made subject to constitutional restraints as a matter of funda-
mental fairness. The Court observed, "There is no more reason for denying
[the people who reside in company towns] of the liberties guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizen.""42 In the fifty years since Marsh, com-
pany towns virtually have disappeared and RCAs have grown to encompass
twelve percent of the United States population. 4 ' RCAs may be said to
occupy a similar, if not more dominant, position in the United States politi-
cal economy today as company towns occupied some fifty years ago.422
Viewed from this perspective, the Court's concern in Marsh over the major
form of privatized local government that existed at the time of its decision
would seem to apply with equal force to the major form of privatized local
government that exists today.
The judicial-enforcement theory of state action approaches the state-
action inquiry from a perspective quite different from that of Marsh. The
leading decision, Shelley v. Kraemer,423 conceivably may be read as stand-
ing for the proposition that "[w]hen judges command private persons to take
specific actions which would violate the Constitution if done by the State,
state action will be present in the resulting harm to constitutionally recog-
nized rights." ' ' This sweeping proposition has been harshly criti-
cized-quite rightly-as failing to recognize the distinction between the
416 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
417 See id. at 502-03.
418 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
420 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09.
421 See COMMUNITY Ass'NS INST., supra note 8, at 13.
"' See supra note 70.
423 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
424 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, § 16.3, at 545.
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judiciary in its capacity as a public institution and the judiciary in its capaci-
ty as an enforcer of private transactions.4' Today, Shelley has been con-
signed to a sort of jurisprudential limbo, rarely invoked as precedent, yet
recognized by many as a landmark of constitutional law notwithstanding its
conceptual flaws.4' Few would repudiate the judicial-enforcement theory
of state action as it applies to the facts of the case giving rise to Shelley.4 27
The unanswered question remains how to limit the Shelley doctrine in a
principled way. This Article has attempted to answer this question by con-
sidering four possible limiting principles and concluding that the principle
that would limit Shelley to covenants governing the use and occupation of
land would achieve a proper balance among the conflicting constitutional
issues at stake and, as well, would occupy the middle ground among the
potential limiting principles.4 s
The land-use reading of Shelley holds that Shelley is generally limited to
the enforcement of covenants that restrict the use and occupation of land in
ways that would be unconstitutional if such restrictions were the product of
a state instrumentality.429 This reading is consistent with one of the under-
lying concerns of the Court in Shelley, which, in essence, was condemning a
form of racial apartheid made possible by the wholesale and pervasive pri-
vatization of municipal land-use authority.43 The terms "wholesale" and
"pervasive" are used because racially restrictive private covenants blanketed
the country at the time of Shelley and many of these restrictive covenants
were put in place by nascent homeowner associations that were created
expressly for this purpose.431 This observation points to Shelley's concep-
tual links to RCAs today. First, the contemporary RCA regime of wholesale
land-use regulation encompasses nearly fifteen percent of the population of
the United States, and, if current estimates were to prove correct, will en-
compass thirty percent of the U.S. population early in the next century. 432
Second, just as privatized racial land-use decision making was pervasive in
the period between the two World Wars, privatized land-use decision mak-
ing that touches on many other sensitive constitutional areas is pervasive
today.433 If Shelley were to stand for something more than the ad hoc re-
pudiation of racially restrictive covenants, then it must stand for a principle
that implicates, under certain circumstances, the privatized land-use deci-
sion-making power that lies at the heart of the modern territorial RCA.
4 See Henkin, supra note 129, at 474-77.
4 See id.; see also Elkind, supra note 129, at 677-78.
427 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
41 See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
429 See supra Part II.B.2.c.
'30 See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
431 See supra text accompanying notes 197-203.
432 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
433 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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The mutual-contacts/symbiotic-relationship theory of state action offers
another perspective by which to assess RCAs and their proper position in
the constitutional scheme. Although this branch of state-action theory has
fallen out of favor among leading commentators in recent years, 434 the
doctrine has not been judicially repudiated.435 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has expressly relied on the symbiotic-relationship doctrine as recently as
1991."3 In any event, the notion of a symbiotic relationship between a
public and private entity seems peculiarly applicable to the relationship that
typically exists between a local government and an RCA that is situated
within the local government's territorial jurisdiction.437
The symbiotic-reltionship theory of state action is applicable to RCAs
in two distinct ways. First, the establishment of the RCA can be understood
as a consequence of the policy choices made by a municipality pursuant to
its land-use authority. Second, the operation of the RCA can be understood
as giving rise to a symbiotic relationship with the municipality at least under
circumstances in which the RCA and the governing municipality act as
partners in revenue collection and service delivery. As to the first applica-
tion, this Article has discussed how local government land-use policies cre-
ate substantial inducements, even de facto or de jure requirements, for de-
velopers of new residential subdivisions to establish RCAs.438 Moreover,
these municipal land-use policies often are the product of a policy choice
made by local government officials to transfer responsibility for traditional
municipal services and facilities to the private sector.439 As to the second
application of symbiotic-relationship theory, many RCAs are direct recipi-
ents of services furnished by local government even when such services are
otherwise furnished by local government only on publicly owned streets."'
When local government employees actually maintain RCA streets, including
roadway repair, streetlight maintenance, street cleaning, and snow removal,
the mutual contacts between government and the RCA are far more perva-
sive than is the case with typical government licensing or regulatory
schemes4"--of which the Supreme Court generally has held that the mutu-
al contacts contained within these schemes do not give rise to a symbiotic
relationship between public and private actors.4"2 The same may be said of
RCAs that receive municipal tax funds as "reimbursement" for the munici-
414 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 321, § 18-3, at 1701 n.13.
435 See supra text accompanying notes 246-64.
436 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991).
... See supra Part II.C.2.
43 See supra text accompanying notes 276-81.
3 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 301-06.
441 See supra text accompanying notes 307-09.
442 See supra text accompanying notes 246-50.
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pal-like services that these RCAs provide to their own residents.443 Little
wonder, then, that the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations undertook a major study of RCAs and concluded that "for the
purposes of understanding the place and role of RCAs in local governance,
as well as the costs and benefits of RCAs for both citizens and govern-
ments, an intergovernmental perspective on RCAs is more useful than a
traditional corporate or neighborhood association perspective."'
The general governmental powers theory provides yet another perspec-
tive on the proper place of RCAs in the constitutional scheme. This theory
was developed by the Supreme Court as a test of the application of the one-
person, one-vote principle to elected government bidies."5 As such, the
test was not conceived as a theory of state action. However, the standard of
general governmental powers, when applied to a nominally private elected
body, takes on the formal characteristics of a state-action test."' As a
state-action test, it bears some resemblance to Marsh's public-function test,
but differs from Marsh in crucial respects. Marsh focused on the physical
characteristics of a company town; the test of general governmental powers,
as set forth in Avery v. Midland County,"7 however, concentrated instead
on the authority of a governing body." 8 Applying the general governmen-
tal powers test to RCAs revealed that RCAs delivered a broad range of
traditional municipal services to their members as well as to other residents
within their jurisdiction."9 RCAs also have exercised the power to levy
mandatory assessments on homeowners-which are real estate taxes in all
but name"--and the power to impose rules of general applicability within
their jurisdiction.45' These attributes of RCAs collectively amount to the
exercise of general governmental powers.
Taken together, the four theories of state action discussed in this Article
establish that RCAs: (1) are, in many cases, the functional equivalent of
municipalities with respect to physical features and infrastructure, and the
natural inheritor of the historical legacy of an earlier form of privatized local
government--company towns-implicated in Marsh; (2) are the primary
legal vehicle used to establish a privatized and aggregated land-use regime,
a privatized public function implicated in Shelley; (3) often develop as the
direct consequence of policy choices made by local government officials; (4)
413 See supra text accompanying notes 310-13.
444 U.S. ADvISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 13 (emphasis added).
411 See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland Coun-
ty, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
446 See supra text accompanying notes 361-73.
.47 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
448 See supra text accompanying notes 327-40.
449 See supra Part II.D.2.b.
450 See supra text accompanying notes 382-88.
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 389-98.
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often are intertwined with local government policies, programs, services, and
taxation in their daily operations; and (5) are, in many cases, the functional
equivalent of municipalities with respect to the exercise of power and au-
thority over members and other residents within their territorial jurisdiction.
More important than the specific applicability of each theory of state action
to RCAs is the fact that RCAs are situated at the nexus of four different
theories. This observation leads to the generalized conclusion that, in light
of the traditional treatment of RCAs as private actors subject to private law,
and in light of the recent ascendancy of the RCA as a form of private-com-
munity governance that may soon encompass twenty-five percent of the
U.S. population,"' some reassessment of the RCA and its proper place in
the constitutional scheme is warranted.
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE
ESTABLISHED STATE-ACrION THEORIES AS APPLIED TO RCAs
The fact that RCAs are situated at the nexus of four different theories of
state action suggests, of course, that many RCAs could be deemed state
actors under one or another test. However, this same fact also suggests the
practical and conceptual difficulties that may arise when a court considers
the applicability to RCAs of four distinct but overlapping theories of state
action. The successive application of the four theories-as well as consider-
ation of the state-action issues implicated by each theory and by all of the
theories considered as a whole-borders on the judicially unmanageable.
Moreover, the successive application of the four established state-action
theories to a particular RCA may well lead to determinations that the RCA
is a state actor by operation of one theory but is not a state actor by opera-
tion of another theory. Although a single determination of state action is
sufficient to subject a private actor to constitutional restraints, 453 the vary-
ing thresholds of state action among the different theories would lead, as a
practical matter, to a great deal of uncertainty and confusion in the litigation
sphere as well as in the primary conduct of all those affected by RCA trans-
actions and activities. Based on these practical considerations alone, it would
seem that the multiple functions and complex legal relationships associated
with the contemporary RCA would call for a form of state-action analysis
that is less generic and more attuned to the RCA form and the legal and
political environment in which RCAs operate.
The need for a new approach to determining the proper place of RCAs
in the constitutional scheme is fueled by other concerns as well. As earlier
noted, the ascendancy of the RCA as a form of housing and community
governance and the new-found dominance of RCAs in many regional hous-
452 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
453 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, § 16.5, at 573.
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ing markets in the United States justifies careful reassessment of state-action
theory in light of these developments.454 This reassessment is warranted
not only because of RCAs' growing importance in and of themselves, but
also because of a number of subsidiary issues that have arisen as a conse-
quence of RCAs' prominence in many regional housing markets. These
issues include the question of the voluntariness of homebuyer consent to the
RCA legal regime in an RCA-dominated local housing market and the ques-
tion of whether a small territorial RCA, not otherwise the functional equiva-
lent of a municipality, may nevertheless be deemed a state actor by virtue of
RCA dominance of a particular local housing market. These considerations
are of recent origin and are unique to RCAs, meaning that they are without
precedent in the historical circumstances giving rise to the established state-
action theories.
In sum, the established state-action theories, whether considered sepa-
rately or in combination, do not provide an explicit and coherent mechanism
by which to balance the conflicting constitutional values at stake. The bal-
ancing mechanism that this Article proposes for RCAs explicitly accounts
for the special characteristics of the RCA form and the legal and political
environment in which the RCA operates. Because the ascendancy of the
RCA is an exceedingly important legal and political development that touch-
es core constitutional issues and because RCAs are, in essence, sui generis,
this Article concludes that a sui generis constitutional doctrine is necessary
to properly assess the constitutional issues at stake.
IV. A UNIFIED STATE-ACrION DOCTRINE FOR RCAs
A. The Balancing of Constitutional Values: The Expansion of
Constitutional Safeguards to "Private Government" Versus the Preservation
of Property Rights, Contract Rights, and Rights to Private Association
State-action analysis implies a balancing of constitutional values. A
private entity found to be a state actor is subject to one constitutional re-
gime, a regime that normally applies to government itself. That regime
carries with it affirmative obligations, such as the obligations to afford due
process and equal protection. Conversely, a private entity found not to be a
state actor is subjected to another constitutional regime, that is, the ordinary
constitutional protections available to any citizen. These protections include
the right to be free of government actions that excessively limit property
rights or abrogate contract rights. Therein lies the paradox of state-action
analysis: A finding of state action against a private entity often leads to the
abrogation of constitutional values that otherwise would be guaranteed to the
private entity. In a particular case, therefore, state-action analysis must ex-
454 See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
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plicitly or implicitly balance one set of constitutional values against the
other.455
In light of the above, any formulation of a state-action test that is de-
signed specifically for application to RCAs must begin with an assessment
of the conflicting constitutional values at stake. On the private side of the
constitutional ledger, we begin with the simple observation that the RCA is
a form of private property ownership. Indeed, much of the authority of the
RCA derives from the hallmark and legal embodiment of private ownership:
the deed. The CC&Rs attached to the deed impose a set of rules on those
who choose to purchase property within the RCA."6 These rules-and the
promise of their enforcement-are firmly rooted in the common law of
property and contract. It is true that the RCA form presents an unusually
complex and sophisticated application of traditional property and contract
law, in that it subjects many parcels of residential real estate to common
covenants; requires all owners of the real estate to become members of an
association; and provides the association with wide-ranging authority to
... See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (holding that, in the context of a com-
pany town, the constitutional right of free expression of both nonresidents and residents
of the town was superior to the constitutionally protected property interests of the owner
of the company town). For a more recent and a more intricate weighing of competing
constitutional values, see PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rehins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In
PruneYard, the United States Supreme Court accepted an appeal from the California
Supreme Court in which the latter court had determined that the California Constitution
protected speech and petitioning in privately owned shopping centers. In effect, the
California court had concluded that the shopping center was a state actor under the
California Constitution even though the United States Supreme Court previously had
held that privately owned shopping centers were not state actors under the Federal
Constitution. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976). The question for the
United States Supreme Court was whether the California constitutional provisions, as
interpreted by the California Supreme Court, amounted to a taking of property without
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution or amounted
to a violation of the free speech rights of the shopping center owner under the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Court decided both of these questions in
the negative. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-89. As to the Fifth Amendment, claim, the
Court concluded that the shopping center owner had "failed to demonstrate that the
right to exclude others is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that
the state-auth6rized limitation of it amounted to a taking" Id. at 84 (internal quotations
omitted). As to the First Amendment claim, the Court noted that the views expressed by
members of the public in a shopping center are not likely to be identified with those of
the shopping center owner, nor, for that matter, are the views in any way attributable to
the government. See id. at 87. PruneYard thus vividly illustrates the clash of competing
constitutional values that may arise from a state-action determination. Of course, the
competing constitutional values at stake are particular to each setting, and the alignment
of constitutional values in the RCA setting differ markedly from that of the shopping
center setting. See infra text accompanying notes 471-93.
456 See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
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maintain property held in common, to collect assessments from its members,
and to establish rules governing both commonly held and individually held
property.457 However, all of this authority derives from private, not public,
law, as those terms traditionally have been understood.45
As we have seen, much about RCAs is decidedly not private, including
the policy choices made by municipal officials that induced, even com-
pelled, real estate developers in many areas of the country to establish
RCAs as a means of securing building permits;459 the types of services,
including street maintenance and refuse collection, that an RCA typically
provides;46 the extensive land-use planning functions assumed by many
RCAs and exercised over a substantial amount of territory; 46 1 the unusually
broad rule-making authority exercised by many RCAs over the home and
family life of RCA residents; 462 and the in-kind government services and
taxpayer funds used by some RCAs to support their own operations.463 Not
all RCAs, however, manifest all of these public attributes or even some of
them.4' Any RCA state-action test therefore must make careful distinc-
tions between RCAs based on the presence or absence of these attributes.
There may be more to the "private" side of the constitutional ledger than
property rights and contract rights. An RCA may be viewed as a group of
like-minded homeowners that have come together to manage their jointly
held property, to govern themselves through an elected board of directors
and a system of rules, and generally to share their common interests and
values. As such, an RCA might appear to be the type of organization that is
entitled to a high degree of protection from government interference by
virtue of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association. If an RCA
were deemed a state actor and subjected to the constitutional restraints to
which government is subject, then its presumed associative rights undoubt-
edly would be infringed.
However, a close reading of the leading Supreme Court decisions delin-
eating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association discloses that
RCAs simply are not the type of association to which the Court has accord-
ed a high level of constitutional protection. For example, individuals claim-
ing a right of association based on personal or intimate relationships, includ-
45' See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
458 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076, 1106-07 (5th ed. 1979).
459 See supra text accompanying notes 276-83, 271.
41 See supra text accompanying note 378.
461 See supra text accompanying notes 204-10.
462 See supra text accompanying notes 389-98.
463 See supra text accompanying notes 301-10.
46 For example, nonterritorial RCAs do not typically exhibit these public attributes.
For a discussion of the attributes of nonterritorial RCAs and the distinction between
territorial and nonterritorial RCAs, see supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also
infra text accompanying notes 482-88.
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ing marriage and family relationships, are entitled to a high degree of con-
stitutional protection."' It is perhaps unnecessary to state that an RCA, al-
though an association of individuals who own homes in a geographically
proximate area, is not, in any accepted legal sense, an extended family.4 6
Also entitled to a high degree of constitutional protection are associations
that are founded primarily for the purpose of engaging in expressive or
religious activity.467 RCAs cannot fairly be said to come within this de-
4' See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984). ("The Court
has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual
liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal
relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State."); see id. at 620 ("[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the
State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regula-
tions affecting the choice of one's fellow employees.").
466 Compare Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (holding unconstitutional a housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single family because the ordinance defined "family" to
exclude some forms of traditional, but extended, families), with Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance that limited the occu-
pancy of a dwelling unit to a single family because the ordinance defined "family" in
sufficiently broad terms to pass constitutional muster). The constitutional difference
between Belle Terre and Moore is explained by Justice Powell in the latter case:
But one overriding factor sets this case [Moore] apart from Belle Terre. The
ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. It expressly allowed all who
were related by "blood, adoption, or marriage" to live together .... East Cleve-
land, in contrast, has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing
deeply into the family itself. This is no mere incidental result of the ordinance.
On its face it selects certain categories of relatives who may live together and
declares that others may not. In particular, it makes a crime of a grandmother's
choice to live with her grandson ....
431 U.S. at 498-99 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Thus the Moore ordinance was
struck down because it prohibited cohabitation among certain individuals related by
blood, marriage, or adoption. Moore made clear that individuals related by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption are entitled to special constitutional protection. Belle Terre held that
unrelated individuals are not entitled to special constitutional protection. RCAs, as an
association of unrelated individuals owning homes in a geographically proximate area,
are subject to the rule set out in Belle Terre rather than Moore.
467 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and
to petition the government for redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort
towards these ends were not also guaranteed."). The type of associations that have been
accorded a high level of constitutional protection as a consequence of their close con-
nection to expressive activity include a political party, see Democratic Party v. Wiscon-
sin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-26 (1981); a group organized to advance ballot
measures, see Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99
(1981); a law practice engaged in public interest litigation, see In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 432 (1978); and a group devoted to sponsoring and organizing an annual parade,
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scription. Like all organizations, RCAs may incidentally engage in expres-
sive activity. However, the primary purpose of RCAs is to manage physical
assets and to establish rules governing the use and occupation of real prop-
erty.4 6' As such, RCAs are entitled to no more constitutional protection in
matters of association than business organizations or labor unions, which is
to say very little.469
Strict constitutional considerations aside, what of the general public
policy claim that RCAs represent the coming together of like-minded home-
owners who share interests and values, that this phenomenon is all for the
good, and that subjecting these associations. to constitutional restraints is
unfair and unwarranted?47 The difficulty with this argument is that it fun-
damentally mischaracterizes RCAs as nothing more than the expression of
consumer choice in the housing marketplace. In fact, RCAs are "often
forced upon reluctant private developers by local governments exercising
regulatory powers."47' Once established, RCAs often operate in a manner
that is undemocratic472 and unresponsive to resident concerns.473 More-
see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2348-
51 (1995). Conversely, individuals who associate to engage in commercial activities or
to achieve economic goals are not entitled to a high level of constitutional protection.
See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945) (upholding a state law re-
stricting the membership practices of a labor union).
468 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
469 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 108, at 250 ("[T]he Court has refused to
substitute its judgment for the legislature's as to the legitimate basis for restricting [eco-
nomic associations]."). Professor Rotunda has characterized associational rights "as
proceeding on a continuum ... from the least protected form of association (for exam-
ple, the associational rights related to commercial activities) to the most protected forms
of association (for example, the associational rights related to political or religious
speech .... )". Id. at 254.
470 This perspective is presented, for example, in Mark Frazier, Seeding Grass Roots
Recovery: New Catalysts for Community Associations, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N,
supra note 2, at 63-68; Robert H. Nelson, The Privatization of Local Government:
From Zoning to RCAs, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 45-51.
4"' COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 12, at xii.
472 As previously noted, RCAs almost invariably employ a one-house, one-vote elec-
toral system (as distinct from a one-person, one-vote electoral system), disenfranchise
renters, and employ weighted voting in favor of the developer. See supra Part II.D.2.c.
Moreover, the most significant RCA rules usually are incorporated in the RCA servi-
tude regime, a regime initially established solely by the RCA developer and, once
adopted, subject to amendment only by a supermajority or even unanimous vote of all
RCA members. See supra text accompanying notes 411-12. As a practical matter,
supermajority or unanimous consent is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve on most
issues, meaning that the RCA rules established solely by the developer are highly resis-
tant to change even if a majority of RCA members were dissatisfied with these rules.
"' In this regard, it is instructive to quote at length the observation of a social scien-
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over, restrictive covenants, the primary source of RCAs' authority, can be
seen as antithetical to notions of consumer choice in several respects. By
their very nature, RCA restrictive covenants impose temporal and spatial
restraints on each RCA homeowner's property. 74 These covenants are ex-
ceedingly difficult to modify, more difficult, it has been argued, than the
most rigid local zoning ordinances.475 In the context of most RCAs, the
disjuncture between a covenant regime and consumer choice is magnified
because a detailed and comprehensive covenant regime is put in place solely
by the RCA developer at the time that the RCA is established476 and indi-
vidual homebuyer "consent" to the regime is essentially limited to the deci-
sion of whether to purchase property in the RCA.4' Even this degree of
tist who has conducted extensive empirical research of RCAs:
CIC [common interest community] residents reflect great dissatisfaction with the
community associations that govern their communities. Attendance at association
meetings is often sparse, with perhaps a majority of members actually attending
only very rarely. Conversations with member residents suggest a view of the asso-
ciation not as each resident's democratic workshop, but rather at arm's length
from the individual residents--both a vendor of community services in return for
association dues, and the strongly resented regulator of the residents' personal
activities at home. This dissatisfaction has spurred a mushrooming spate of litiga-
tion. CIC boards, composed and often managed by resident amateurs, have often
seemed inept in the crucial tasks of enforcing restrictions against neighbors while
maintaining the community association's financial strength. As the structuring of
servitude-regimes moves progressively toward vesting more discretionary power
in the governing associations, an individual resident's influence over the restric-
tions to which he is subjected is particularly shaky where the association actively
discourages member participation in association deliberations, or engages in ha-
rassment of its members. In the face of such abuses, resident autonomy becomes
illusory ....
Winokur, supra note 271, at 115-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See Lewis, supra note 129, at 1115.
4" See COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, supra note 12, at xii.
476 See MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 127.
4" Empirical research belies the theory that homebuyers provide "consent" to the
RCA servitude regime at the time buyers purchase their homes. For example, a study of
California RCA residents found a "widespread lack of understanding" on the part of
RCA homebuyers of the complex private law regime to which the homebuyers had
become subject by virtue of purchasing their homes. Barton & Silverman, supra note
28, at 137. This lack of understanding was evident even though California law requires
sellers of RCA units to provide buyers with a copy of the RCA governing documents
before the sale is closed. See id.; see also DILGER, supra note 8, at 38 ("[M]any con-
sumers are not fully aware of the RCA's powers or their own role in RCA governance
when they purchase their home. As a result, the homeowners' consent to the RCAs'
CC&Rs is often reduced to a purely theoretical premise and, unfortunately, often does
not reflect their autonomous will."). Moreover, as discussed below, notions of consent
are further vitiated by the lack of alternatives to RCAs in many regional housing mar-
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"consent," however attenuated, has become, in the past two decades, un-
available for vast numbers of homebuyers in the United States because of
the dominance of the RCA form of housing in many major regional housing
markets, the relative affordability of housing in RCAs in many communities,
and the relative uniformity of the types of restrictions and conditions im-
posed by RCA covenants. 7 As a practical matter, then, "consent" to the
RCA form of community governance, and its customary limitation of rights
that would be of a constitutional nature if such limitations were undertaken
by the state,4 79 has become largely illusory in many regional housing mar-
kets.4 "0 For this reason, the subjection of restrictive covenants of at least
some territorial RCAs to constitutional review, far from threatening indi-
vidual freedom to use and dispose of property, actually would enhance this
freedom.4"'
Although these considerations argue in favor of the application of a
public regime of constitutional values to RCAs, this Article has stressed
repeatedly that public constitutional values should not apply to all RCAs
kets.
478
CIDs [common interest developments] are often in some difficulty at the very
start, because they have owners who, if they understood the- restrictions on
homeowners' individual freedom that are inherent in a CID, did not really want to
purchase in a CID in the first place and did so only reluctantly because they could
not afford a home in an ordinary neighborhood or because few "ordinary" neigh-
borhoods existed in the area they wanted to buy in. Many other owners certainly
do not understand the nature of the CID in which they have bought. In a 12-coun-
ty survey in California of resale buyers, we found that 84 percent of those who
bought a home in a CID were not looking for a CID to buy in.
Barton & Silverman, supra note 28, at 137 (emphasis added). See also DILGER, supra
note 8, at 38 ("Although RCAs do provide more consumer options in the abstract, in
many areas of the country RCAs now dominate the local housing market and are in-
creasingly offering fairly uniform levels and types of services."); GARREAU, supra note
3, at 189 ("If you want a new home, it is increasingly difficult to get one that doesn't
come with a homeowners' association.") (quoting Douglas Kleine); McKenzie, supra
note 11.
479 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
480 See supra note 9.
481' The extent of RCA homeowner dissatisfaction with RCA rules governing the use
and occupation of the home is highlighted in the results of the California Common
Interest Development (CID) Study:
Whether because [RCA] members do not know the rules, or know them but
reject them, associations have to deal with widespread rule violations. In the Cali-
fornia.CID Study, 41 percent of associations reported major problems with rule
violations.... The most intractable problems, in which associations were often
unable to gain compliance, involved the last category, violations of architectural
controls-reflecting the depth of feeling attached to control over the home.
Barton & Silverman, supra note 28, at 137-38 (emphasis added).
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under all circumstances.8 To begin with, some RCAs never should be
subject to public constitutional values. Such a per se exclusion should apply
to nonterritorial RCAs, which have been described as urban condominiums
and housing cooperatives that are geographically limited to a single high-rise
building.4"3 The reason for this per se exclusion is rooted in Marsh:
Nonterritorial RCAs, lacking streets and substantial tracts of land, simply
cannot be analogized to an entire public municipality,4' nor do
nonterritorial RCAs provide the broad array of municipal-like services that
are typically provided by territorial RCAs.485 Moreover, nonterritorial
RCAs are concentrated in older urban areas,486 and, though they may con-
stitute an important segment of the housing market in those areas, they do
not dominate the entire local housing market,487 as many territorial RCAs
do in the newer suburban areas, particularly of the South and West. 88
482 The four established theories of state action apply "in many cases" to RCAs. See
supra text accompanying note 453.
483 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11; see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
414 Marsh's "functional equivalent of a municipality" test was construed in Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516-17 (1976), to mean that a private community could be
deemed a state actor if the community were to encompass, at a minimum, residential
buildings, streets, retail stores, and other municipal infrastructure. An alternate construc-
tion of Marsh may be found in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1978), in
which the Court opined that the state-action determination in Marsh turned on the fact
that all of the streets in the company town were owned by the company. See supra note
58. Either interpretation of Marsh obviously would preclude a finding of state action
against a nonterritorial RCA. Marsh aside, there are common sense reasons why the
interior of a building never should be deemed the functional equivalent of a municipali-
ty, even if the determination were to affect only the rights of residents of the building
and not the access rights and other possible rights of nonresidents. See infra text accom-
panying note 495.
485 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 18-20.
486 Many nonterritorial RCAs take the form of housing cooperatives. See DILGER,
supra note 8, at 16. Housing cooperatives "are typically associated with multi-family,
high-rise buildings in urban areas." Id. Of the estimated 824,000 housing units in the
United States held in the cooperative form of ownership, see COMMUNITY ASS'NS
INST., supra note 8, at 13, over one-half of these units are located in New York City.
See N.R. Kleinfeld, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has Steep Ups and Downs, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1995, at Al. All, or virtually all, of these New York City housing cooperatives
may be characterized as nonterritorial. See id.
487 New York City, for example, contains a substantial number of nonterritorial
RCAs, most of which take the form of housing cooperatives. See supra note 507. Only
15% of New York City's population, however, resides in housing cooperatives. See
Kleinfeld, supra note 486. Older urban areas in the United States generally contain a
broad variety of housing types and forms of tenure. See generally 1990 CENSUS, supra
note 70.
488 A 1990 survey by the Community Associations Institute reported that 70% of
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It is instructive to consider the specific application of constitutional
values to the other extreme of the RCA typology, i.e., large territorial
RCAs. In this setting, the application of public constitutional values is made
especially compelling by the numerous ways in which large territorial RCAs
implicate established state-action doctrine4. 9 and by the relative weakness
of countervailing constitutional considerations.49 By way of example, con-
sider this description of Sun City, an Arizona RCA of 46,000 residents:
Sun City ... is a privately owned development that has
fervently resisted incorporation into any municipality in order
to avoid a new level of taxation. But, though private, it has
taken on many trappings of a city. It runs everything from
libraries to parks to swimming pools to an art museum to a
crisis-counseling hotline to a fire department to a symphony
orchestra. The squad cars of its legally franchised, armed,
unpaid private posse routinely patrol the public streets. Its
innocuously named Recreation Association, meanwhile, has
the power to assess fees that are functionally indistinguish-
able from taxes. If a homeowner does not pay the fees, the
association has the legal right ... to slap a lien on that
person's house and sell it at auction.491
If Marsh were to mean anything fifty years after it was decided, it means
that a resident of a large territorial RCA such as Sun City deserves no less
constitutional protection than a resident of a public municipality.492 It also
means that a resident of Sun City can no more "consent" to a lesser degree
of constitutional protection by the simple act of choosing to live there than
can a resident of a public municipality exercise such consent.493
RCAs in the United States were located in the South and the West. See DILGER, supra
note 8, at 19. RCAs govern early all new residential development in California, Florida,
and Texas. See id. at 18.
489 For a discussion of the application of established state-action doctrine to RCAs,
especially large territorial RCAs, see supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3 (discussing the applica-
tion of the "functional equivalent of a municipality" or public-function theory); Part
II.B.4 (discussing the application of the judicial-enforcement theory); Part II.C.2 (dis-
cussing the application of the symbiotic-relationship theory); Part II.D.2 (discussing the
application of the general governmental powers theory).
490 See supra text accompanying notes 455-81.
491 GARREAU, supra note 3, at 184-85.
492 See supra text accompanying notes 59-70.
" For a discussion of the illusory nature of resident consent to the RCA legal re-
gime, see supra text accompanying notes 470-81. In Marsh, the Court assumed without
discussion that resident "consent" to company towns was irrelevant to a determination
that company town residents were entitled to constitutional protections. See Marsh, 326
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Having considered the application of constitutional values to
nonterritorial RCAs on the one hand, and to large territorial RCAs on the
other, what remains is the vast middle range of territorial RCAs. It is in this
setting that an explicit case-by-case balancing of constitutional values be-
comes necessary, a balancing best achieved through the application of a
comprehensive state-action test designed especially for this purpose.
B. Proposed Principles
A state-action test designed especially for application to RCAs should be
based primarily on the factors contained within the four established theories
of state action. The factors already have been discussed individually and at
some length as part of this Article's earlier analysis of the application of the
four established state-action theories to RCAs.494 These factors should be
organized into the following multi-part test of state action designed specifi-
cally for application to RCAs:
1. The nature and extent of RCA property, including the number of
housing units; housing tenure; and the ownership of streets, facili-
ties, and real estate: Does the RCA encompass a substantial tract of
land that incorporates streets and other infrastructure?495
2. The nature and extent of RCA services to RCA residents, includ-
ing street cleaning, trash collection, snow removal, street repair,
sewage treatment, park administration, and security:496 Are these
services a supplement to municipal services or a substitution for
such services?
3. The nature and extent of RCA authority over RCA residents:
Does the RCA exercise comprehensive land-use powers over a sub-
stantial number of landowners such that the land-use scheme is the
functional equivalent of municipal zoning?497 Does the RCA levy
U.S. at 508; see also supra Part II.A.3.
"' See supra Part II.
... As previously noted, nonterritorial RCAs, that is, RCAs that are geographically
limited to a single high-rise apartment building, would be subject to a per se exclusion
from this test of state action. See supra text accompanying notes 482-88.
4' A nationwide survey of RCAs conducted in 1989 by the U.S. Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations found that among the survey respondents 72%
were responsible for trash collection, 65% were responsible for water and sewer servic-
es, 65% were responsible for street repair, 58% were responsible for street lighting,
48% were responsible for snow removal, 33% were responsible for outdoor play and
recreation areas, and 31% were responsible for providing a security patrol. See U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 13. RCAs that provide many or most of these
municipal-like services to their residents would be more likely to be subject to constitu-
tional restraints.
4' This prong of the multi-part test is derived from the land-use reading of Shelley v.
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and collect mandatory assessments on real property that amount to
the functional equivalent of municipal real estate taxes?
498
4. The availability of comparable non-RCA housing in the local
housing market: Is the choice to live in an RCA truly voluntary?
49
5. The local government in-kind contributions of services to RCAs
or local government contributions of taxpayer funds in connection
with RCA services: Are the contacts between government and an
RCA so pervasive as to warrant a finding of state action even if the
RCA otherwise were deemed not to be the functional equivalent of a
municipality?5"
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as well as the application of public-function theory to the
exercise of private land-use authority, the functional equivalent of municipal zoning. See
supra Part II.B.3.
498 For a discussion of the functional equivalence of typical territorial RCA assess-
ments and municipal real estate taxes, see supra text accompanying notes 382-88.
4' This prong of the multi-part test builds on the observations of Stephen Barton and
Carol Silverman, who found in their study of the California housing market that a sub-
stantial number of RCA residents had not wished to purchase a home subject to an
RCA:
CIDs [common interest developments] are often in difficulty at the very start,
because they have owners who, if they understood the restrictions on
homeowners' individual freedoms that are inherent in a CID, did not really want
to purchase in a CID in the first place and did so only reluctantly because they
could not afford a home in an ordinary neighborhood or because few "ordinary"
neighborhoods existed in the area they wanted to buy in. Many other owners
certainly do not understand the nature of the CID in which they have bought. In a
12-county survey in California of resale buyers, we found that 84 percent of those
who bought a home in a CID were not looking for a CID to buy in.
Barton & Silverman, supra note 28, at 137 (emphasis added). These astonishing conclu-
sions are not likely to be confined to a portion of California. As previously noted,
RCAs govern 50% of all housing for sale in the 50 largest metropolitan areas of the
country and nearly all residential development in Florida, Texas, New York, and subur-
ban Washington, D.C. See DILGER, supra note 8, at 18.
00 New Jersey, for example, requires all of its municipalities to provide certain mu-
nicipal services to qualifying RCAs or, in the alternative, requires municipalities to
reimburse RCAs for the value of the services the RCAs themselves furnished. See supra
notes 301-03 and accompanying text. For other examples of symbiotic relationships that
exist between some municipalities and RCAs, see supra text accompanying notes 298-
99, 304-13.
Not included within this multi-part test is any consideration of a symbiotic relation-
ship between a municipality and an RCA arising from the role of local government in
the establishment of the RCA. Although in many cases the policies of local government
play a significant, if not primary, role in the establishment of an RCA, see supra text
accompanying notes 271-83, the factual and evidentiary issues that would be necessary
to a proper judicial determination in this matter are excessively complex. The matter is
further complicated by the fact that as an RCA ages, the role of a municipality in the
original establishment of the RCA becomes more remote in time and presumably less
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6. Nonresident access to RCA property: Does the RCA hold open
portions of its poperty, such as streets, retail establishments, or com-
mon areas, to members of the public? The question of nonresident
access to an RCA is complex. The fact that an RCA holds its streets
open to the public would be an important factor that would favor a
determination that the RCA is the functional equivalent of a munici-
pality. However, an RCA that did not hold its streets open to the
public nevertheless could be found to be the functional equivalent of
a municipality as to its own residents.5"' Also, an RCA that did not
open its streets to the public and was the beneficiary of local gov-
ernment taxpayer funds or in-kind services could be determined to
be the functional equivalent of a municipality as to its residents and
nonresidents.
A determination of state action under this multi-factor test would not
depend upon a particular RCA satisfying all of these standards or any par-
ticular standard. As with state-action analysis generally, such a determina-
tion would rest upon the totality of facts and circumstances applicable to
each case."' This multi-part test represents a modest attempt to consider
these facts and circumstances in a systematic way.
This Article has shown that many RCAs could be deemed state actors
by means of a robust application of one or more of the established state-
action theories. However, these theories, whether considered separately or in
combination, do not provide an explicit and coherent mechanism by which
to balance the conflicting constitutional values at stake." 3 The proposed
multi-part test does provide such a mechanism by expressly taking into
relevant to a determination of state action under present conditions. For these practical
reasons, consideration of this factor has been omitted from the proposed multi-part test
of state action.
501 In Marsh, the Court held that in order for a private community to be deemed the
functional equivalent of a municipality, the community's streets must be held open to
the public. This formulation should apply to cases such as Marsh when the party ag-
grieved by the private community is a nonresident of the community. As argued earlier
in this Article, however, the public access element of Marsh should not be applicable
when the party aggrieved by the private community is a resident of the community and
the community otherwise satisfies a rigorous functional equivalent of a municipality
standard. See supra Parts II.A.2.c, II.A.3.a, II.A.3.b. The proposed multi-part test essen-
tially adheres to this view, although, under the test, the determination of what amounts
to a "functional equivalent of a municipality" in a particular case is not strictly the
product of the remaining elements (other than the public access element) of the
Marsh/Hudgens standard, see supra text accompanying note 59, but, rather, is the prod-
uct of factors one through five of the multi-part test.
502 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1966) ("'Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances' can we determine whether the reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment extends to a particular case.") (citation omitted).
503 See supra text accompanying notes 453-74.
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account the special characteristics of the RCA form and the legal and polit-
ical environment in which RCAs operate.
At least two major objections to the proposed multi-part test are antici-
pated. The first objection is that the complexity of the test is not judicially
manageable.5" The second objection, related to the first, is that the objec-
tive'of the test is more properly and effectively accomplished through statu-
tory means. These objections are addressed in turn.
The multi-part test is concededly complex, but so too are the tests that
determine whether a government action affecting religion runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause; 5 whether government must pay compensation to
one whose property has suffered a loss in value as a result of a land-use or
environmental regulation;5  whether a warrantless search of an automobile
is permissible under the Fourth Amendment; whether an elected gov-
' The term "judicially manageable" is not meant to invoke the political question
doctrine, which holds that the courts may not intrude on certain manners concerning the
structure and organization of political institutions or matters concerning war or foreign
affairs in the absence of clear constitutional standards. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
209-37 (1962). Although the term "judicially manageable," also referred to as "judicial-
ly cognizable," has been used in connection with the political question doctrine, see id.
at 233, the doctrine itself, as noted above, concerns subject matter wholly different from
the subject matter of present concern. Moreover, the political question doctrine is pre-
mised in part on the recognition of insufficient judicial standards. See id. at 222-23. In
employing the term "judicially manageable" this Article intends to underscore only the
complexity of the judicial standards at issue, not their insufficiency. See infra text ac-
companying notes 502-12.
sos Under the three-part test propounded in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971), a government action affecting religion was invalid unless it (1) had a secular
purpose, (2) had the primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, and (3)
avoided causing an excessive entanglement between government and religion. But see
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (casting doubt on the continuing vitality
of the Lemon test).
' Under a two-tier analysis established by a recent line of Supreme Court cases, a
government regulation affecting real property constitutes a per se "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment if (1) the regulation authorizes the government to occupy physically
the property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982), or (2) the "regulation denies" the owner of the land "all economically beneficial
or productive uses of land," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 (1992). A government regulation that does not conform to either of these two
standards nevertheless may be deemed a "taking" when considered in light of three
factors: (1) the effect of the regulation on the claimant, (2) "the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the
character of the governmental action." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
o A warrantless search of an automobile being operated on a public highway is
permissible upon probable cause, regardless of whether the driver is subject to lawful
arrest, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
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ernment body exercises general governmental powers and, if so, whether the
electoral scheme evidences a significant deviation from the equality of popu-
lation of voting districts so as to violate the one-person, one-v6te princi-
ple;5 °8 whether a state regulation unduly burdens the right to an abor-
tion;5" whether a government action to enforce time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech in a public forum is sustainable under the First
Amendment;51 whether a school district subject to a desegregation decree
U.S. 42 (1970). The rule of automobile searches, however, does not automatically ex-
tend to a search of a person occupying an automobile. See United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581 (1948). The more lenient automobile search rule does extend to containers
found in automobiles, provided there exists probable cause to search the entire car. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Note that the automobile container rule is
an exception to the general rule governing warrantless searches of containers, which
provides that such searches must satisfy a higher standard of probable cause, that is a
search may not be undertaken absent a showing of exigent circumstances. See United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The more lenient automobile container rule
extends even to circumstances in which the police previously had removed the container
from the vehicle and the container remained in police custody. See United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
508 Under the one-person, one-vote principle first recognized in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), and further delineated in decisions such as Hadley v. Junior College
District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970), an elected governmental body is subject to the principle if
the body exercises general governmental powers, which are defined as powers exercised
in connection with the delivery of a traditional or vital public service, provided that the
powers are "general enough and have sufficient impact." Id. at 54. If the elected gov-
ernmental body were to exercise general governmental powers, then the constitutionality
of its electoral scheme would turn on the degree to which it deviates from maintaining
equal populations in its voting districts. The Court has let stand some relatively small
deviations, see Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (discussing 16.4% deviation);
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (discussing 11.9% deviation), while generally
striking down more significant deviations, see Board of Estimate v. Morris 489 U.S.
688 (1989) (discussing 78% deviation); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (discuss-
ing 19.3% deviation).
The finding of an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion
"is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus," provided however that "[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State ... may express profound respect for the life of the un-
born [may be] permitted" and "[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a woman
seeking an abortion [may be] valid." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-
78 (1992).
5"0 The validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum
turns on the application of a four-part test. The restrictions will be upheld only if they
"are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication," United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The restrictions may absolutely prohibit "a particular type of
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has made progress toward achieving unitary status;5 " and whether race-
based legislative redistricting undertaken with the intent to comply with the
Voting Rights Act amounts to unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.512 In
other words, if particular subject matter implicates a core constitutional
concern, then the complexity of the interests and issues at stake does not
preclude judicial review. 13 That the test implicates a core constitutional
concern is evidenced by the fact that it draws largely on extensive constitu-
tional doctrine established over the past fifty years.514 The test focuses this
doctrine on what amounts to a large-scale, but piecemeal and incremental,
expression" only if the prohibition is "narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling gov-
ernmental interest." Id.
"' In general, a district court supervising a school desegregation plan should look to
six factors in determining whether a unitary school system has been achieved: student
assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. See
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
512 Under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), a plaintiff
may allege a violation in the drafting of an election district "if the manipulation of
districting lines fragments politically cohesive minority voters among several districts or
packs them into one district or a small number of districts and thereby dilutes the voting
strength of members of the minority population." Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1905
(1996) (citing Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1007 (1994)). To prevail on this
claim, a plaintiff must show that "the minority group 'is sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district'; that the minor-
ity group 'is politically cohesive'; and that 'the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."' Id. (citing
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)). All of the foregoing statutory stan-
dards, however, are subordinate to the constitutional standards set out in the Court's
recent decisions in Shaw, 116 S. Ct. 1894, Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996), and
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). These decisions established that strict scrutiny
applies when race is the predominant consideration in drafting district lines such that
"the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial
considerations." Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. Under equal protection analysis, strict scrutiny
generally requires that a government action employing a race-based classification must
be supported by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to accomplish
a purpose embodied by the compelling state interest. See Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1902. The
Court in Shaw and Vera assumed that a state's claimed interest in avoiding voter dilu-
tion liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act could be a compelling state inter-
est. See Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1905; Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960. In both Shaw and Vera,
however, the Court held that the redistricting plans drawn in contemplation of section 2
liability did not survive strict scrutiny because the districts as drawn were not narrowly
tailored to effectuate section 2 objectives. See Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1904; Vera, 116 S.
Ct. at 1961-62. These recent decisions demonstrate that line-drawing--both cartographic
and jurisprudential--can be exacting indeed.
513 If anything (and as the above listing makes clear), most core constitutional con-
cerns demand a complex treatment in order to fairly balance the competing interests and
issues at stake.
514 See supra Part II.
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privatization of local government in the United States.515 The test deter-
mines whether a considerable portion of United States citizens may be enti-
tled to constitutional protections in the localities in which they live and in
connection with services traditionally thought of as governmental.
A separate but related objection to the multi-part test is that the objec-
tive sought to be achieved by the test is more properly and effectively ac-
complished through statutory means. It is no doubt true that comprehensive
statutory reform could be more effective in this area, at least in the short
run,516 but it is important to point out that this charge could be leveled in
equal measure against virtually every substantive area in which the Supreme
Court has enforced constitutional norms. A legislative remedy to de jure
school segregation in 1954 may well have been preferable to the judicial
remedy, but the legislation was not then forthcoming. In the end, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education517 became a major
precipitating factor in the eventual enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.518
V. CONCLUSION
In 1946, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether residents
of company towns were entitled to the same degree of constitutional protec-
tion as residents of public municipalities.519 The Court concluded:
Many people in the United States live in company-owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are
free citizens of their State and country .... There is no
515 See supra notes 2, 3.
516 See, e.g., Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3602
(1995) (generally prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing to house-
holds with children, and making such prohibition applicable to RCA restrictive cove-
nants); § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis
of handicap, and making such prohibition applicable to RCA restrictive covenants). At
the state level, a noteworthy enactment is Florida's 1992 statute expressly overriding
any RCA restrictive covenant that "unreasonably restrict[s] any parcel owner's right to
peaceably assemble ... in [RCA] common areas . . . ." FLA. STAT. ch. 617.304 (1993).
More recently, Congress provided the Federal Communications Commission with
express authority to pre-empt RCA restrictive covenants that ban or restrict the use of
satellite dishes by RCA homeowners. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1996).
.17 347 U.S. 583 (1954).
518 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (1995) (prohibiting racial discrimination in em-
ployment, public education, and public accommodations). For the influence of Brown
on subsequent social and political events, including the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 748-78 (1975).
519 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
1998]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guar-
anteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is
for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citi-
zen.
520
Today, many people in the United States live in RCAs, probably a far great-
er percentage of the current United States population than the percentage of
the United States population in 1946 that lived in company towns.52' The
number of Americans living in RCAs is expected to double in the next
decade, leading to predictions that twenty-five to thirty percent of Ameri-
cans will be living in RCAs by early in the next century.522 If this were
solely the product of consumer choice in the housing marketplace, then the
constitutional currents implicated by the trend would be less compelling.
The RCA phenomenon, however, is not solely or even primarily the product
of consumer choice,523 perhaps no more than the company towns of an
earlier era were the product of consumer choice. In fact, RCAs are the prod-
uct of many larger forces, including local government land-use policies"
and what the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
has termed "the most significant privatization of local government responsi-
bility in recent times.'525
Against this background, RCAs have established a complex system of
rules governing their residents, which, among other things, may restrict the
age of those who own homes in the RCA community,526 the number and
ages of overnight visitors, 527 whether a homeowner may build an addition
to her house,528 whether a homeowner may post signs inside or outside her
home,5 29 and whether publications may be sold or distributed on RCA
streets.53° In many cases, an infraction of these rules may lead to the impo-
sition of a penalty against a homeowner, the assessment of a lien against a
homeowner's residence, or the denial of the use of RCA common facilities
backed by judicial injunction. 3' Moreover, the RCA governing board,
while elected by RCA homeowners, is the product of an electoral system
520 Id. at 508.
521 See supra note 70.
522 See McKenzie, supra note 11.
" See supra text accompanying notes 470-81.
524 See supra text accompanying notes 271-83.
525 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 18.
526 See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190; MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 15.
527 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra, note 2, at 16.
52 See DILGER, supra note 16, at 23-24.
529 See Schemo, supra note 414; see also supra note 32.
531 See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 190-91; MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 15; see also
supra note 34.
... See GARREAU, supra note 3, at 184-85.
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that deviates substantially from the one-person, one-vote principle, employ-
ing instead a one-house, one-vote system, disenfranchising all renters and
frequently employing weighted voting in favor of the RCA developer.532
These circumstances call for a principled judicial response through a
reassessment and reformulation of state-action doctrine. Toward this end,
this Article has carefully assessed the four established theories of state ac-
tion, each of which offers a perspective that is directly applicable to the
present task.533 Although many RCAs could well be deemed state .actors
by operation of one or more of the established theories of state action, this
Article has argued instead for a more comprehensive and systematic ap-
proach to state action as applied to RCAs, an approach that takes account of
the special characteristics of the RCA form and the legal and political envi-
ronment in which the RCA operates. Because the ascendancy of the RCA is
an exceedingly important legal and political development that touches core
constitutional values and because RCAs are, in essence, sui generis, this
Article concludes that a sui generis constitutional doctrine is necessary to
properly assess the constitutional issues at stake."M
532 See supra Part II.D.2.c.
... See supra Part II.
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 494-501.
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